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ABSTRACT 
Thinking About the Self While Talking to Someone Else: 




Advisors: Curtis Hardin & Elizabeth Chua 
 
Although research has shown that self-focus brings attention to how one is doing relative to 
standards and changes behavior to better meet those standards (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972), this process has rarely been tested within conversations. Three experiments 
tested (1) whether state self-focus, measured by looking at oneself on-screen during online video 
chats, varied as a function of changing self-standard discrepancies (manipulated by conversation 
topics) or by traits related to self-focus (self-esteem, social anxiety, and self-consciousness) and 
(2) how state self-focus, manipulated by the presence or absence of the self on the video chat 
screen, and/or traits related to self-focus influenced conversation outcomes. Participant self-
esteem predicted increased self-focus (Exp. 1 and 2) and private and public self-consciousness 
predicted decreased self-focus (Exp. 2), regardless of conversation content. Social anxiety 
predicted decreased self-focus, particularly when sharing an embarrassing story (Exp. 1). These 
results suggest those who perceive smaller self-standard discrepancies (e.g., greater self-esteem, 
lower social anxiety and self-consciousness) increase self-focus when it is needed, whereas those 
who perceive larger discrepancies may strategically avoid it. In Exp. 3, liking of the conversation 
partner increased as public self-consciousness and social anxiety increased, and empathy ratings 
 v 
and the sum of all interpersonal ratings increased as social anxiety increased, suggesting those 
who perceive greater self-standard discrepancies had improved social outcomes. There was 
tentative evidence that seeing oneself on-screen improved one outcome: people who saw the self 
on-screen felt more similar to their conversation partner than those who did not. Overall, these 
results are consistent with an adaptive and regulatory role of self-focus, and suggest that 
personality traits play a larger role in the amount of self-focus than momentary fluctuations 
within a conversation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In day-to-day conversations, people often take turns talking about themselves and 
listening to others talk about themselves. Even while listening, one’s focus of attention can be on 
the self. What will I say next? How is this relevant to me? What kind of impression am I making? 
Does this person like me? According to objective self-awareness theory, when attention is turned 
to the self, as in the above examples, the self can be viewed as an object and will be 
automatically evaluated for how it compares with relevant standards of correctness (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). In so far as the self does not align with those standards, the perceived 
discrepancy is associated with negative affect, which is an aversive state and sets off one of two 
motivational paths: either (1) an attempt to leave the state of objective self-awareness or (2) an 
attempt to reduce the discrepancy causing the negative self-evaluation, the latter of which means 
that a person may change their behavior to better match the relevant standards of correctness 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The second path shows a clear adaptive value in self-focus and 
research has shown that individuals regulate their behavior to align with standards following 
self-focus (e.g. Silvia, 2012; Silvia & Phillips, 2013; Wicklund & Duval, 1971). If self-focus has 
a regulatory function, self-focus should fluctuate as the discrepancy between the self and 
standards changes, such as over shifts in conversations, and this should lead to positive social 
outcomes. However, very little research has investigated self-focus during conversations, which 
is the focus of this dissertation. 
 One reason that research investigating self-focus in conversations has been rare may be 
that measuring self-focus, especially within the context of an ongoing interaction, is difficult. A 
major challenge is capturing precisely when self-focus occurs. Before we can tackle that, we 
must define self-focus. Self-focused has been broadly defined as directed attention to the self, 
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self-related thoughts, or aspects of or information about the self (Carver, 1979; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). Typically, self-focus is contrasted with externally-directed focus, such as 
focusing on other people, objects, or non-self-related ideas (Ingram, 1990; Morin, 2006). When 
someone is talking, we can assess the content of their speech to determine if they are self-
focused or not. One common linguistic measure is the use of more self-focused pronouns, such 
as “I” or “me” as an indication that one is more self-focused (Brockmeyer et al., 2015; 
Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). The use of more other-focused pronouns, such as 
“you” or “they” will indicate that one is more other-focused. However, within a conversation, 
both self-focused spoken language and internal thoughts represent self-focus and self-focus can 
occur when one is either talking or listening; therefore, linguistic measures are insufficient. 
The more challenging goal is how to measure self-focus when someone is not talking and 
there are no verbal indices. To this end, for the present research, a new tool was designed to 
measure self-focus dynamically to capture the content of unspoken thoughts without interrupting 
the social interaction. In this paradigm, participants engaged in online video chats, during which 
an image of the self was presented on-screen. Participants’ eye movements were tracked during 
the conversation, and looking at the self served as an index of self-focus. With this measure, self-
focus was assessed without relying on linguistic measures. 
Another benefit to the new eye tracking measure is its temporal sensitivity. As 
conversation content and speaker change, shifts in self-focus may occur and they may occur 
quickly. Little is known about the timing of these shifts, though it has been proposed that shifts 
in objective self-awareness will occur immediately after a failure (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
However, in an ongoing interaction, it is possible that self-focus may occur within a negative 
self-evaluation, following it, or even preceding it. Because such timing is unknown, a measure of 
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self-focus that was able to capture these shifts and had adequate temporal sensitivity to capture 
fluctuations in self-focus over time was necessary. 
Although moment-to-moment, state-like fluctuations in self-focus are of great interest 
within a conversation, self-focus can also be dispositional, or trait-like, with some individuals 
having a greater tendency to direct one’s attention or thoughts to the self than others (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1985). Any understanding of the regulatory role of 
self-focus in conversation would need to account for both dispositional self-focus and moment-
to-moment fluctuations in self-focus. Understanding the interplay between these types of self-
focus could inform the timescale on which self-focus operates.  
The goal of the experiments in this dissertation was to investigate self-focus in the 
context of video conversations in order to better understand the timescale of the regulatory role 
of self-focus. The empirical questions specifically addressed were: (1) In what parts of a 
conversation—depending on content, speaker, and personality traits—does self-focus increase or 
decrease? And, (2) does increased self-focus (either state or trait) within ongoing conversation 
improve or worsen social outcomes? 
Before describing the experiments performed, backgrounds to these two empirical aims 
are provided (Chapters 2-4). Potential predictors of self-focus, including conversation factors and 
personality variables, and how they might increase or decrease self-focus measured within 
conversations are discussed in Chapter 2. Known outcomes of self-focus are reviewed in Chapter 
3 with an emphasis on outcomes that have occurred in interpersonal contexts. The current tools 
for studying self-focus are reviewed in Chapter 4, and the argument that a new instrument was 
needed to measure momentary self-focus without interfering with the natural flow of an ongoing 
interaction is made. Chapter 5 introduces the new tool that was designed to measure self-focus 
 4 
dynamically without interrupting the interaction in which it occurs (i.e., looking at the self 
onscreen during a video chat). Chapters 6-8 describe Experiments 1-3, and a general discussion 
is provided in Chapter 9. 
 
 






Chapter 2: Background on Factors Influencing Self-Focus in Conversation 
According to objective self-awareness theory, self-focus is likely to occur in almost any 
context, including conversations (e.g. Carver, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1972); however, it has 
rarely been studied in conversations. Because self-focus has been theorized to meet regulatory 
needs (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1981), and because within an ongoing interaction, regulatory 
needs are likely to shift as topics and speaker shift (Markus & Wurf, 1987), it was hypothesized 
that situational changes in the conversation (i.e. conversation content and whether one is 
speaking or listening), as well as personality traits related to self-focus (i.e., self-esteem, self-
consciousness, and social anxiety), would relate to increases or decreases in self-focus across 
conversations. 
Conversation Factors and Self-Focus 
According to objective self-awareness theory, “objective self-awareness” (i.e., self-focus) 
is activated simply by being in the presence of another and knowing the other is aware of him 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Because conversations are in the presence of another, self-focus 
should be activated throughout the conversation because the other’s awareness positions oneself 
as an “object” of attention; this is in addition to the active role of “subject” one plays in the 
conversation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; James, 1890). The conversation context also includes 
performance standards, such as sounding competent or being liked, that are relevant or salient 
according to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The amount of self-focus that 
is activated, though, is likely to vary based on the conversation content. For instance, Duval and 
Wicklund (1972) give the example that when one engages in small talk that is not self-related, 
social discomfort is likely alleviated and self-focus is reduced. On the other hand, when one 
divulges personal information, more social discomfort may be experienced, and self-focus is 
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likely increased. As illustrated by the preceding examples, conversation content can vary widely. 
In this dissertation, we focus on conversations in which people share personal information to 
capitalize on the self-focus that will inherently be involved. However, all personal information is 
not equal and sharing different kinds of information can result in different demands on self-
evaluation because of variation in discrepancies between the self and standards. For example, it 
seems reasonable that sharing negative versus positive information will result in different 
discrepancies between the self and standards. 
Indeed, some evidence suggests that negative affect is associated with increased self-
focus (for review, see Mor & Winquist, 2002). This association exists at the trait level, wherein 
depression, anxiety and chronic negative mood have been associated with increased self-focus 
(Mor & Winquist, 2002). It also exists at the state level. At the state level, it has been shown that 
the induction of negative mood leads to increased self-focus whereas positive moods do not 
(Sedikides, 1992; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990). Additional evidence from neuroimaging 
supports the link between negative affect (at both the trait and state levels) and self-focus 
(Lemogne et al., 2011). In their experiment, non-depressed participants were asked to make two 
kinds of judgments about pictures: whether they related to themselves or not and whether they 
were positive or negative (Lemogne et al., 2011). When making self-relatedness judgments, a 
person’s dispositional negative affectivity, assessed by questionnaire, correlated with greater 
activation of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), brain regions previously shown to be involved in self-referential processing (Lemogne 
et al., 2011; Northoff et al., 2006). Moreover, the correlation between trait negative affectivity 
and activation in the dorsal MPFC, which is thought to play a role in the evaluation of self and 
other stimuli, was significant for negative pictures but not positive pictures (Lemogne et al., 
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2011). Thus, when evaluating stimuli, the more one is characterized by negative affectivity, the 
more self-focused processing occurs, particularly when viewing negative images (Lemogne et 
al., 2011). This finding is broadly consistent with the idea that the self may be recruited when 
self or social needs are in need of some regulation, such as when processing negative information 
(Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1996; Muraven, 2005). Thus it can be reasoned that if a 
conversation includes material that induces negative affect, increased self-focus may occur. 
 These findings that negative affect is associated with increased self-focus are consistent 
with objective self-awareness theory, in that negative situations are indicative of the self not 
aligning with relevant standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). However, it is worth 
noting that there are other theories about when self-focus occurs, some of which make similar 
predictions and others which make different predictions. Interpersonal theory makes a similar 
prediction to objective self-awareness theory in that self-related processes are activated when the 
self is under threat. Sullivan proposed the concept of the “self-system” which functions to protect 
and defend the self against anxiety or threat with the ultimate goal of maintaining more positive 
self-regard (Sullivan, 1953). Because processes, such as dissociation or selective inattention, will 
be activated when anxiety or threat to the self is induced, according to interpersonal theory, self-
focus will increase when sharing negative aspects of the self (Sullivan, 1953). 
 The central tenets of objective self-awareness theory, supported by interpersonal theory, 
lead to the first general hypothesis to be tested in this work: Self-focus will increase in 
conversation conditions in which the self is discrepant from standards or which otherwise induce 
negative affect. Self-focus will also increase for those with chronic negative affect, including 
those with lower self-esteem or who are more socially anxious. 
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Of course, alternate theories exist and propose different motivations and functions of the 
self; from these theories, different conditions for when self-focus will be greater are 
hypothesized. For instance, theories about self-enhancement (e.g. Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
endorse a motivation to maintain positive feelings about the self. The self-enhancement 
motivation has been demonstrated by the “better-than-average-effect,” in which individuals close 
the gap between self and an ideal standard by thinking they are better than they may actually be 
(Alicke & Govorun, 2005). Based on the self-enhancement motivation, self-focus will increase 
when one’s relative position or status is enhanced, such as when sharing positive aspects of the 
self and decrease when one’s relative position or status is diminished, such as when sharing 
negative aspects of the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Despite the different formulations of the self-protection and self-enhancement 
motivations, it is likely not a question of which motivation is acting in a situation; instead, it is 
assumed that several are (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). In fact, another well-known phenomenon 
demonstrates both self-protection and self-enhancement motivations simultaneously at work; the 
“self-serving bias” involves taking credit for positive outcomes or aspects of the self and 
deflecting blame for negative outcomes or aspects of the self (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). 
Because these various motivations likely act in tandem, the goal here is not to pit these 
motivations against one another, but to consider their role in observations about self-focus in 
conversation. 
In addition to the effect of emotional valence on self-focus, different types of emotion 
may also induce more or less self-focus. According to one theory of emotion, emotions can be 
designated as “self-conscious” or “basic” (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Self-conscious emotions, 
including pride, shame, and embarrassment, are theoretically different from basic emotions 
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because self-conscious emotions require self-evaluative processes and basic emotions do not. 
This means that the experience and expression of self-conscious emotions require a mental 
comparison of how the self aligns with standards of correctness (Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
Because self-focus is theorized to occur to regulate behavior change in the face of self-evaluation 
(Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), people may self-focus more or less 
depending on the conversation content but also depending on whether or not that experience 
aligns with personal or situational standards of correctness.  
In a getting acquainted conversation, some aspects of the conversation will involve self-
conscious emotions, such as sharing achievements or faults. Because self-evaluative processes 
are necessarily involved in these parts of a conversation, they are expected to include increased 
self-focus (Tracy & Robins, 2004). On the other hand, sharing experiences that involve basic 
emotions, such as what makes one happy or sad, does not require self-evaluative processes, so 
they are expected to include comparatively less self-focus. For instance, although one can be 
happy or sad about self-related things, the object of one’s happiness or sadness need not be self-
related. Thus, these parts of the conversation will involve fewer self-evaluative processes, and so 
it is expected, less of a need for self-focus (Tracy & Robins, 2004). If the nature of self-focus is 
dynamic, then across these conversational shifts, self-focus might rise and lower with these shifts 
(Markus & Wurf, 1987). This raises a second general hypothesis: Because self-focus will be 
greater when self-evaluation is greater, self-focus will be greater for conversation content 
involving self-conscious than basic emotions. 
 Another conversation factor that should affect self-focus is who is speaking. Although 
objective self-awareness theory posited that talking would decrease self-focus, the authors use 
the example of small talk at a cocktail party, the kind meant to deflect attention at the self, rather 
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than bring it about (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). However, in a getting acquainted conversation in 
which two people share personal information, the two conditions are (1) talking about oneself 
and (2) listening to the other talking about himself. When people talk about themselves, the self 
is the object of attention. When listening to someone else talk about himself or herself, the other 
is the object of attention. In fact, in past research, self-focus has been manipulated by either 
having one give a speech or passively standing by (Woody, 1996). When one is speaking about 
oneself, self-focus is inherently activated as the content is self-relevant and the conversation role 
of speaker is self-focused (Woody, 1996). On the other hand, when passively listening, self-
focus should not be as high. It should be noted that according to Duval and Wicklund (1972) 
self-focus should not be as high when talking because the focus of attention when talking is 
external. However, if the content of one’s speech is self-focused, I argue that self-focus will be 
greater in this case. Thus, a third general hypothesis is: In a getting acquainted conversation, 
self-focus will be greater when talking about oneself than when listening to one’s conversation 
partner talk about him or herself. 
The Influence of Traits Related to Self-Focus 
In addition to fluctuations in self-focus as conversation topics vary by valence (e.g. 
positive versus negative) and type (e.g. self-conscious versus basic) via variations in 
discrepancies between the self and standards, self-focus is also expected to relate to trait factors. 
Self-esteem, social anxiety, and self-consciousness are each trait-level variables that relate to 
self-focus, in how they inform one’s typical views of the self (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & 
Larsen McClarty, 2007), their typical responses to self-focused attention (Fenigstein et al., 
1975), and their tendencies to self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Because of their relevance to 
chronic perceptions of discrepancies between the self and standards (Higgins, 1987; Schlenker & 
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Leary, 1982), these trait-level variables are expected to influence the amount of self-focus across 
conversations. 
Self-Esteem and Self-Focus. According to sociometer theory, self-esteem functions as a 
barometer of how one is doing within social contexts (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Thus, within 
a conversation context, people with greater self-esteem may expect to perform better than people 
with lower self-esteem. Because self-focus is expected to function to regulate behavior when the 
self is not meeting the standards of a situation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), those with lower self-
esteem may experience greater discrepancies between oneself and the social standards during the 
conversation, and consequently self-focus more than those with greater self-esteem. In fact, self-
esteem has been understand as a function of chronic perceptions of the discrepancies between 
self and ideal standards, with greater discrepancies between self and ideal standards accounting 
for lower self-esteem and smaller discrepancies between self and ideal standards accounting for 
greater self-esteem (Higgins, 1987). Thus, according to objective self-awareness theory, people 
with lower self-esteem may self-focus more than people with greater self-esteem, because those 
with lower self-esteem perceive chronically greater discrepancies between self and standards 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). This raises the next general hypothesis: Because people with greater 
self-esteem will experience fewer self-standard discrepancies than people with lower self-esteem, 
self-focus will decrease as self-esteem increases. 
Self-enhancement (Taylor & Brown, 1988) again offers an alternative hypothesis. 
Because people with greater self-esteem tend to focus on positive aspects of the self more than 
people with lower self-esteem (Swann et al., 2007), if self-focus increases when one’s relative 
position or status is enhanced, then self-focus may be greater across the conversation for people 
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with greater self-esteem, who hold more chronically positive views of the self and so will 
perceive smaller self-standard discrepancies than people with lower self-esteem (Higgins, 1987). 
Another theory that offers a perspective on when and how self-esteem will influence self-
focus is self-verification theory. Self-esteem has been defined as a barometer of the relative 
valence of a person’s self-views (Swann et al., 2007). That is, people with greater self-esteem 
tend to view the self more positively and people with lower self-esteem tend to view the self 
more negatively (Swann et al., 2007). In the course of a conversation, self-focus may occur not 
simply when the self is enhanced or in need of protection, but when one’s views of the self are 
consistent with the situation (Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1983; Swann & Bosson, 2010). Therefore, 
according to self-verification theory, self-focus may be greater when conversation content is 
consistent with one’s chronic self-views. For people with greater self-esteem, that will be when 
sharing stories involving positive self-conscious emotions. For people with lower self-esteem, 
that will be when sharing stories involving negative self-conscious emotions (Swann et al., 2007; 
Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
Predictions based on self-verification theory can be accounted for by how people process 
different emotional content. Depending on self-esteem, people may either internalize (take 
credit) or externalize (not assume responsibility) for success or failure (Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
For instance, whereas people with greater self-esteem identify with the feeling of pride, people 
with lower self-esteem may not take credit for it. Conversely, when sharing an embarrassing 
story, people with greater self-esteem may not identify as strongly with the feeling of 
embarrassment than people with lower self-esteem. 
 In one pilot project by this author (Pappas, Hardin, & Chua, 2013) in which self-focus 
was measured with eye tracking during video chats, participants were asked to tell and listen to 
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stories about times when they were proud and embarrassed, which are two examples of self-
conscious emotions and require a person to highlight either positive or negative aspects of the 
self (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Results showed a pattern of increased self-focus in conversational 
contexts that were consistent compared to those that were inconsistent with people’s self-esteem. 
Specifically, people with higher self-esteem looked more at the self during conversational 
conditions that bolstered the self – when asked to describe a time they were proud and when 
listening to another describe a time when they were embarrassed. Conversely, people with lower 
self-esteem looked more at the self during conversational conditions that threatened the self – 
when asked to describe a time they were embarrassed and when listening to another describe a 
time when they were proud. These preliminary results support self-verification theory (Festinger, 
1957; Swann, 1983). 
Self-Consciousness and Self-Focus. Self-focus, as it is measured across ongoing 
interactions, is likely to depend on dispositional tendencies to self-focus. The trait measure that 
has been used most extensively to indicate tendencies to self-focus comes from the Self-
Consciousness Scale, which includes three facets—private and public self-consciousness and 
social anxiety (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Both private and public self-consciousness indicate a 
tendency to engage in processes of directing attention to the self, and have been used in prior 
research to indicate the tendency to self-focus (Silvia, Jones, Kelly, & Zibaie, 2011). Whereas 
private self-consciousness corresponds to thinking about aspects of the self that are not 
observable by others (e.g. “I reflect about myself a lot”), public self-consciousness corresponds 
to thinking about aspects of the self that are observable by others (e.g. “I’m very concerned about 
the way I present myself”) (Fenigstein et al., 1975). In the course of an ongoing interaction, both 
private and public tendencies to self-focus are likely to matter. By the nature of a social 
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interaction, public self-consciousness will be activated by the real or imagined presence of 
another. Meanwhile, many of the private thoughts and scrutiny about the self that occur during a 
social interaction are aspects of private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  
Self-focus within a conversation occurs at the state-level; however, differences in self-
consciousness are likely to have implications for the level of self-focus in a conversation 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975). In fact, the authors of the self-consciousness scale proposed that the 
dispositional measure of self-consciousness is likely to have similar impacts on behaviors as 
state-level self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  However, evidence for the direct relationship 
between dispositional and state self-focus has been mixed. For example, whereas private self-
consciousness correlated with a state self-focus index, the self-focus sentence completion task, in 
one study, public self-consciousness did not (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Exner, 1973). It is an open 
question how the dispositional tendency to self-focus will relate to the measurement of state self-
focus in this work. Because a more typically self-focused person is more likely to perceive 
discrepancies between the self and standards, it is reasonable to assume that more self-conscious 
people will be more aware of discrepancies, and thus engage in more state self-focus (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein et al., 1975). 
Social Anxiety and Self-Focus. Social anxiety, as the third facet measured by Fenigstein 
et al.'s (1975) Self-Consciousness Scale, is the tendency to feel discomfort in response to self-
focused attention or to the perception that attention is being paid to the self. More so than 
individual difference measures of public and private self-consciousness, social anxiety has a 
complicated relationship with self-focus. On the one hand, social anxiety has been shown to 
involve increased self-focus (Clark, 2005). Increased self-focus for more socially anxious people 
is theorized to be due to their fears associated with the social situation and their greater self-
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presentation concerns (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). To manage these concerns in the social 
situation, socially anxious people pay more attention to the self (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
As more socially anxious people become more self-focused, they will be driven to 
compare the self to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Because socially 
anxious people doubt their ability to make a good impression, they will spend more time being 
self-focused than less socially anxious people (Spurr & Stopa, 2002). Within ongoing 
interactions, the theorized increased self-focus of more socially anxious people may be higher 
across the entire conversation, or it may vary depending on parts of the conversation. For 
instance, self-focus should be greatest when the discrepancy between the self and standards is the 
greatest, such as when sharing negative compared to positive personal information because in 
those conditions, people will most doubt their ability to make a good impression or feel they are 
not measuring up to standards of correctness. Thus, increased self-focus will be needed. 
This raises another general hypothesis: More socially anxious people will self-focus more 
across the conversation than less socially anxious people, and more so when the discrepancy 
between the self and standards is the greatest, such as when sharing information about negative 
aspects of the self. 
Alternatively, considering the option to avoid additional self-focus in order to leave the 
negative state of self-focus and its associated negative affect (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), more 
socially anxious people may self-focus less across the conversation, and specifically in the 
conditions in which the self is threatened and it would be needed the most. This alternative draws 
support from the fact that despite the theorized increase in self-focus for people with social 
anxiety, the experience of self-focus is also inherently more negative for them (Clark & Wells, 
1995). In fact, self-focus is considered such an issue for people with extreme social anxiety that 
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therapy involves instruction to direct one’s attention externally (Clark, 2005). Therefore, it is not 
clear whether more socially anxious people will demonstrate more or less self-focus, at least as it 
will explicitly be measured, within an ongoing social interaction, compared to less socially 
anxious people. Another possibility would be to find a curvilinear relationship with very low and 
very high levels of social anxiety predicting a decrease in self-focus. 
Because one feature of social anxiety is a tendency to shift one’s attention away from 
external, threatening cues (Boehme, Miltner, & Straube, 2015), in addition to predicting 
increased self-focus in more socially anxious people, we also expect to see avoidance behaviors, 
particularly avoiding attending to external cues (Clark & Wells, 1995; Morrison & Heimberg, 
2013) and engaging in safety behaviors to prevent negative evaluation (Grisham, King, Makkar, 
& Felmingham, 2015).  
Chapter Conclusions 
According to objective self-awareness theory, self-focus brings attention to how one is 
performing relative to standards of correct behavior, and a perceived discrepancy between the 
self and standards leads to regulating one’s behavior to better meet those standards (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). If this is the case, self-focus should change as the 
social context changes, such as over the course of a conversation. For instance, as conversation 
topics vary based on the size of a perceived discrepancy between the current context and 
standards, self-focus may increase during those parts of a conversation in which the self is 
perceived as most discrepant from standards, such as when sharing information about negative 
aspects of the self.  
Because trait-level factors, such as self-esteem, social anxiety, and self-consciousness, 
are also related to chronic perceptions of discrepancies between the self and standard (Higgins, 
 17 
1987; Schlenker & Leary, 1982), those who believe there are larger discrepancies between the 
self and standards (e.g., lower self-esteem, higher social anxiety and self-consciousness) may 
self-focus more, either across the conversation, or specifically when the self is perceived as most 
discrepant from standards, than those who chronically perceive there are smaller discrepancies 
between the self and standards. 
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Chapter 3: Background on Outcomes Associated with Self-Focus in Conversation 
 Based on the regulatory process defined by objective self-awareness theory (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972), self-focus should serve an adaptive function of behavioral regulation and lead 
to positive outcomes. One model for how self-focus leads to behavioral regulation is laid out in 
Carver & Scheier’s (1981) control theory, wherein self-regulation occurs as a by-product of self-
awareness via a negative feedback loop. Based on the theory, self-awareness brings about self-
evaluation, which engages an automatic discrepancy-reducing feedback loop, not necessarily to 
reduce an aversive state (unlike objective self-awareness theory), but as a natural component of 
the regulatory pathway (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Thus, increased self-focus should result in 
behavior that brings one closer to whatever standard is relevant to or salient in the present 
situation (Carver & Scheier, 1982). 
However, recall that objective self-awareness theory proposed two potential paths (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972). In so far as a discrepancy between self and standards is attended to, one will 
be motivated either to (1) attempt to leave the state of objective self-awareness or (2) reduce the 
discrepancy causing the negative self-evaluation, the latter of which means that a person may 
change their behavior to better match the relevant standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972). In the first scenario, the experience of self-focus will simply lead to an attempt to reduce 
that initial self-focus in order to reduce the negative affect associated with it, and potentially no 
other behavior change. In the second scenario, self-focus leads one to change one’s behavior to 
reduce the discrepancy between self and standards and better match those standards (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). This distinction may help explain why despite its theorized role in a regulatory 
process that should bring one closer to aligning with standards, self-focus has widely been 
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associated with negative outcomes too. This conflict with self-focus’s theorized regulatory role 
and its known negative consequences provides a puzzle for the current research to explore. 
In the years since objective self-awareness theory was originally formulated (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972), some updates have been made (Silvia & Duval, 2001). Two moderators have 
been identified for whether self-focus would lead to a regulatory change in one’s behavior or 
simply to an attempt to leave the undesirable state of self-focus (Silvia & Duval, 2001). Those 
are: (1) how likely and quickly one is to reduce the discrepancy (Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 
1979a, 1979b) and (2) one’s attribution of the cause of the discrepancy (Silvia & Duval, 2001). 
Moreover, how one responds to a self-standard discrepancy may depend on the level of one’s 
personal standards (Higgins, 1987), which might depend on individual difference factors and 
whether one is more or less inclined to reduce self-focus in response to negative self-evaluation, 
as opposed to one who uses self-focus to promote behavior change that reduces the discrepancy 
between self and standards. 
 As recent empirical evidence has shown, self-focus, particularly within interpersonal 
contexts, has been associated with poor outcomes, such as reduced attention to external 
information, reduced prosocial behavior, and reduced willingness to help (Hung & Wyer, 2014; 
Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). So the question remains 
how is self-focus operating within a regulatory process at all? These examples of negative 
outcomes do not seem consistent with an adaptive regulatory role of self-focus—at least in the 
social domain. In the context of ongoing interaction, relevant standards of correctness should 
include more socially acceptable behavior. So, if self-focus is a part of a regulatory process, then 
we would expect to see positive interpersonal outcomes from self-focus. However, it is worth 
noting that attempts vary in their effectiveness and the attempts have led to both positive (e.g. 
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Silvia, 2012; Silvia, Kelly, Zibaie, Nardello, & Moore, 2013) and negative (e.g. Fenigstein & 
Abrams, 1993; Sandelands & Stablein, 1986) outcomes. Thus, a critical motivating question for 
this research was whether or not we would see negative associations with self-focus within 
ongoing interactions, despite its role within a theoretically adaptive process. 
Effects of Self-Focus on Judgments of Self-Relatedness 
 One way self-focus has been shown to influence outcomes is by leading people to see 
external events or information as more relevant to the self thereby reducing one’s focus on 
aspects of the other (Silvia et al., 2013). One example in which self-focus was shown to increase 
the centrality of self-related information was a study that showed people higher in public self-
consciousness, a measure of trait self-focus, tended to judge their own contributions to a social 
partnership to be greater than their partner’s, compared to those lower in public self-
consciousness. Following the interaction, which was a word association task, participants were 
asked to give percentages for contributions of both self and partner (Sandelands & Stablein, 
1986). A memory test (free recall of the words produced during the association task) showed that 
the self-biased effect was not moderated by memory. Participants remembered each person’s 
contributions equally and accurately, but they subjectively judged their own contribution as 
being greater (Sandelands & Stablein, 1986). These results demonstrate that greater trait self-
focus, on one measure, correlated with an increased and biased assumptions of personal 
contribution in a social interaction dyad.  
 Self-focus also increases the degree to which one believes others will agree with his or 
her beliefs, which may suggest that self-focus functions at least in part for social regulation 
(Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). In a series of experiments, situational self-focus was induced with 
a video camera, with a mirror, and was also measured as a trait variable (Fenigstein & Abrams, 
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1993). Consistently, self-focus – whether manipulated within a situation or measured as a trait – 
was shown to increase what the authors refer to as “self-centered thinking,” defined by how 
much one thinks others will agree with one’s beliefs (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). As self-focus 
brings attention to the self and self-related thoughts are made more salient, these self-related 
thoughts are believed to be shared by others.  
There are several possible explanations for why self-focus may lead to overestimations of 
consensus—a belief that others share one’s beliefs. First, the self is inherently founded on what 
one thinks others think about them (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Festinger, 1954; Mead, 1934). According 
to self-verification theory (Swann, 1983), such overestimations of consensus might not occur for 
everybody, but only people who have positive self-views or who are socially stable, for whom 
such self-confirming beliefs would reinforce their already positive self-views (Swann & Bosson, 
2010). A second explanation is that if self-focus functions to alert one to potential social 
problems, such as discrepancies from social standards, then it might initiate motivations to 
reestablish social connections. In this case, people feel more connected to others who share their 
beliefs, which socially justifies the bias. Still another explanation is that overestimations of 
consensus may reflect motivations to share reality with others, in so far as the sense of consensus 
serves to validates one’s self and the experience (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). 
 Self-focus can also alter the reception of social feedback (Fenigstein, 1979); in one 
laboratory demonstration that used a mock interview, feedback was given to participants as 
either a favorable or unfavorable evaluation about their birth order. Positive feedback (the 
favorable evaluation) was received more positively, based on post-interview ratings, and 
negative feedback (the unfavorable evaluation) was received more negatively by people who had 
been induced to focus on the self with the presence of a mirror (Fenigstein, 1979). These results 
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are consistent with the hypothesis that self-focused people will perceive external information (in 
this case, the feedback) as being more related to the self (Silvia et al., 2013). These results are 
also consistent with the hypothesis that self-focus has a functional role in social regulation, in 
this case by “turning up the volume” of social feedback. Considering how these past findings 
would translate within ongoing conversation, we expect that a self-focused way of thinking 
would influence how other people and interactions are perceived, generally by making 
information seem more self-related than it might really be, which can impact one’s ability to 
understand and relate to others objectively (Greenwald, 1980; Silvia et al., 2013).  
Effects of Self-Focus on External Attention 
 Given limited attentional resources, increases in self-focused attention should also lead to 
decreased external attention, and evidence to this effect has been found. This reduction in 
attention or engagement with the other is likely to have effects on a conversation, in which 
attention to the other is required. For example, self-reports of a certain kind of maladaptive self-
focus, characterized by a tendency to ruminate and associated with dysphoria, correlated with a 
decreased ability to switch between two laboratory tasks, one that was self-focused and one that 
was externally-focused (Rochat, Billieux, & Van der Linden, 2012). Furthermore, people who 
had difficulty switching their attention from self-generated thoughts back to the external 
environment had depressive symptoms that were associated with maladaptive self-focus. These 
results suggest that the coupling of self-focus with negative mood, which may be induced by 
conversation context or personality differences, makes it difficult to switch attention to external 
information and can be extended to the question of how self-focus might affect ongoing 
interactions (Rochat et al., 2012). The ability to switch back and forth easily between self- and 
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other-related information, which is critical to ongoing conversation, may be inhibited among 
those with negative moods and a tendency to maladaptively self-focus. 
 Further evidence that increased self-focus may impact one’s ability to process external 
information, such as other-related information in the course of social interaction, is found in 
children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). These children exhibit heightened self-focus and 
difficulties engaging with others (Uddin et al., 2008). In a neuroimaging study, children with 
ASD and typically developing children were shown digitally morphed images of faces, which 
contained varying percentages of their own face and another gender-matched face (Uddin et al., 
2008). Participants were asked to respond if the presented face was more like their own face or 
the other’s. Typically developing children showed overlapping neural activation in right frontal 
areas when viewing images both more like the self and those more like the other, which 
represents common processing of self and other. The same activation pattern was not found in 
children with ASD. They showed consistent activation in the same region only while viewing 
images more like themselves and showed reduced activation while viewing images more like the 
other. The authors hypothesized that unlike in children with ASD, the common processing of self 
and other in typically developing children underlies their ability to mentalize, or think about 
others as being similar to the self, a key component of interest in and engagement with others. 
The authors hypothesize this difference establishes a neural basis for the clinically observed 
reduced social engagement and increased self-focused behavior of children with ASD (Uddin et 
al., 2008). Although this demonstration involves an atypical case of children with increased self-
focus, the question of whether or not moments of increased self-focus may influence anyone’s, 
or only particular individuals’, ability to engage with and understand others requires further 
investigation. 
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Similar to the coupled effect of self-focus and negative affect on attention, social anxiety 
has been shown to have an interactive effect with self-focus on attention. In one experiment 
demonstrating this effect, self-focus was manipulated by drawing attention to participants’ heart 
rates during certain trials of a mixed antisaccade task, which measures attentional control (Judah 
et al., 2013). Results differed based on trait social anxiety; self-focus was found to distract 
people high in social anxiety, but not people low in social anxiety, from focusing on their next 
response – to either saccade to or away from visual stimuli based on given cues. Those high in 
social anxiety also reported greater task interference from the self-focus inductions, compared to 
those low in social anxiety, suggesting an increased tendency to self-focus (Judah et al., 2013). If 
self-focus “reduces the availability of attentional resources for processing the environment” in 
those with high social anxiety, as Judah and colleagues (2013) suggest, then self-focused 
attention within ongoing social interactions might impair one’s ability to respond to the shifting 
relational and informational cues that are present in an interpersonal interaction.  
 The relationship between self-focus, social anxiety, and task distraction was corroborated 
in a different study that involved actual interpersonal interactions (Mellings & Alden, 2000). 
Participants engaged in an unstructured interaction with a confederate who presented certain 
pieces of scripted personal information. Following the interaction, participants completed 
measures of self-focused attention and anxiety. The following day, participants were asked to 
make judgments about and recollections of the interaction. Socially anxious people, as measured 
by the Social Avoidance and Distress scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), reported more self-focus, 
according to the Focus of Attention Questionnaire (Woody, 1996), than non-anxious participants, 
suggesting social anxiety had co-occurred with self-focus. Results showed both socially anxious 
and non-anxious participants who were more self-focused displayed larger affective biases in 
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their self-related judgments, specifically by recalling more negative self-related information, and 
recalled less information about their partner. The interpretation is that if more attention is 
focused on the self, fewer cognitive resources will be available to process information received 
from others (Mellings & Alden, 2000). As social anxiety co-occurred with self-focus, more 
socially anxious people’s judgments were more affectively biased and their recollection of 
partner-related information was even lower than non-anxious participants (Mellings & Alden, 
2000). 
Effects of Self-Focus on Prosocial Behavior 
 In addition to having cognitive effects on attention and judgments, self-focus has also 
been shown to influence relations with others—to varying effects; sometimes self-focus has 
helped prosociality, at least when self-focus was made explicit and the other was similar to the 
self (e.g. Hung & Wyer, 2014); other times, it hurt prosociality (e.g. Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 
2009). In one example of self-focus’s implications for prosocial behavior, self-focus was 
experimentally induced by asking participants to imagine themselves confronting the person 
involved in either a donation appeal or a product ad (Hung & Wyer, 2014). When people were 
more self-focused, the similarity of the other person (manipulated in ethnicity, gender, and social 
status) mattered: self-focus increased willingness to donate money or endorse a product when the 
person depicted in the message was similar to the self and decreased willingness to donate 
money or endorse a product when the other person was moderately dissimilar. This suggests that 
self-focus provokes a judgment process that involves comparing self to other (Festinger, 1954; 
Hung & Wyer, 2014), and this has downstream consequences for prosocial behavior, either 
promoting it (at least for similar others) or impeding it (at least for moderately dissimilar others). 
In a more extreme case, when the other person depicted in the ad was very dissimilar, self-focus 
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made no difference on willingness to donate money or endorse a product. In this case, the 
authors suggest comparison processes may not have been engaged because of the lack of 
similarity, so self-focus could neither help nor hurt (Hung & Wyer, 2014). 
 Not only does self-focus influence judgments of others (Hung & Wyer, 2014), but also it 
can influence others’ judgments of the self (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). In one example, 
conversational self-focus, defined as the “tendency to direct the focus of conversations to the self 
and away from others” was studied within teenaged friend pairs as it relates to perceptions of 
relationship quality and helping (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). Tenth graders engaged in 
videotaped conversations with their friends in which they were asked to discuss a problem. 
Conversational self-focus was assessed from transcripts of the conversation in three ways: with a 
global score of self-focus (i.e. how much they turned the conversation to themselves), a 
proportion of focus on one’s own problems relative to focus on other’s problems, and by coding 
the content of each person’s speech to evaluate how each responded to the other’s problems. 
Conversational self-focus was positively related to symptoms associated with depression and 
anxiety and negatively related to friends’ perception of the relationship quality, particularly with 
regards to discussion of the friends’ problem (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). This correlation 
matches prior results showing a relationship between self-focus and negative affect and anxiety, 
and it demonstrates, within the context of an actual conversation, that self-focus, or perhaps the 
depression and anxiety-related symptoms to which it is correlated, disrupts social focus on one’s 
interaction partner, analogous to other findings that show self-focus reduces attention on external 
information (Judah et al., 2013; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rochat et al., 2012). To interpret the 
correlation from the Schwartz-Mette and Rose (2009) result that shows a negative relationship 
between self-focus and prosocial behavior leaves at least three possibilities: self-focus may be a 
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cause of dysfunction, the result of dysfunction, or a part of a process of fixing dysfunction. To 
test these alternative theories, the effects of self-focus on conversational dynamics must be 
subjected to rigorous experimentation within ongoing interactions, which we begin to do in the 
present research.  
 A potentially important moderator for when self-focus might promote versus impede 
helping behavior is revealed by the findings of the two studies just discussed. That is, the 
consequences of self-focus may depend on whether the self-focus is made explicit. Although 
conversational self-focus correlated with decreased helping behaviors among teenaged friends 
when it was not made explicit (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009), in another study when self-focus 
was made explicit by asking participants to think about themselves, it made people want to help 
similar others (Hung & Wyer, 2014). Outside an actual interaction, but when provided an 
ostensible social situation, an explicit cue to self-focus may have led one to evaluate whether one 
aligned with standards of correctness, thereby promoting social comparison and encouraging 
helping behavior—at least if the other was similar to the self (Hung & Wyer, 2014). In the study 
that measured teenagers’ natural conversations, even though the conversation pairs were friends, 
self-focus during those interactions was related to decreased helping behavior. In summary, 
because self-focus uses attentional resources, without activation of additional processes, such as 
social comparison, then self-focus may relate to decreases in both attention on and prosocial 
behavior towards others. 
 Similar to situational self-focus, dispositional self-focus can also have negative 
consequences for attention directed to the other, at least in the form of perspective-taking among 
romantic partners (Gordon & Chen, 2013). The Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale, 
which measures how much one incorporates others into their sense of self (Cross, Bacon, & 
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Morris, 2000), defined people with more relational self-construal as being more dispositionally 
other-focused and people with less relational self-construal as being more dispositionally self-
focused (Gordon & Chen, 2013). Results across four studies showed that when people 
remembered times when they had power in the relationship or were induced to feel in charge 
during an ongoing conversation, they engaged in less perspective-taking if they were more 
dispositionally self-focused than other-focused, based on their relational self-construal. These 
results suggest that the combination of power and self-focus decreased attempts to understand 
one’s partner (Fiske, 1993; Gordon & Chen, 2013). Additionally, people who are more self-
focused were less “empathically accurate” when they were given power over their partner, which 
meant they were less accurate when asked to report on both their own and their partner’s 
emotional experiences during a conversation (Gordon & Chen, 2013).  
 These results demonstrate again a consequence of self-focus: making one more socially 
self-absorbed. If that self-absorbed mode could be reduced, then there may be positive relational 
outcomes, such as empathic accuracy (Gordon & Chen, 2013) and perceptions of helping 
(Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). However, when one is in a self-focused mode, there may be a 
cost; the remaining question is whether one’s attention can be reoriented to the other or not 
(Gordon & Chen, 2013; Hung & Wyer, 2014). To reconcile the negative effects of self-focus 
with a theory that posits self-focus functions ultimately to serve social needs, it is possible that 
temporary reductions in such behaviors as empathy and task-shifting are the price for searching 
for the problem to fix. It may be that relatively healthy people who regularly enjoy well-
functioning relationships use self-focus to behave more prosocially, but people who are coping 
with poorly-functioning relationships may become chronic self-focusers, with the chronic 
dysfunction that may accompany chronically high self-focus. 
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 Just as increased self-focus was associated with decreased empathic accuracy in the last 
study (Gordon & Chen, 2013), self-focus’s negative relationship with empathy was demonstrated 
in the clinical condition of depersonalization disorder, which is associated with increased self-
focus and difficulties experiencing empathy (Lawrence et al., 2007). In a laboratory task that 
required participants to report on the emotional states of pictures of others, people with 
depersonalization disorder reported less distress and displayed differential physiological 
reactions when responding to others’ emotional states compared to controls. Specifically, in 
people with depersonalization disorder, measured levels of arousal were incongruent with the 
emotional state of the other, which demonstrates a failure to be emotionally “in-tune” with the 
other (Lawrence et al., 2007). Also, while judging the emotional states of others, people with 
depersonalization disorder demonstrated increased self-focus in their judgments. Specifically, 
they used more words that they had previously used to describe themselves to describe the 
emotional states of others, particularly for negative states. These results demonstrate a potential 
relationship, at least in a clinical condition of depersonalization disorder, between increased self-
focus and reduced empathic responses to others. In fact, in clinical populations, one therapy used 
to treat people suffering from depersonalization disorder – in the same way as social anxiety – 
has been to “defocus the client from aspects of the self” (Lawrence et al., 2007). Whether or not 
self-focus in a typical population negatively impacts interpersonal outcomes is directly addressed 
in the present research. 
 In the ways just discussed, self-focus has been shown to have a largely negative effect on 
outcomes that are relevant to ongoing interactions, such as attending to the other and behaving 
prosocially, but to make predictions about the role of self-focus in ongoing interactions, one 
limitation that has emerged from a review of the known factors and consequences associated 
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with self-focus is simply that there are few experiments involving actual interactions. Most past 
research has studied self-focus outside ongoing social interaction, and because self-focus may 
function differently within conversation, it has not been clear when and why self-focus arises in 
conversation and how it impacts social relations. This hypothesized contextual difference—
between the study of self-focus inside versus outside ongoing social interaction—may reveal 
differences in the hypothesized regulatory role of self-focus for how and why attentional 
resources and social judgments might be influenced by self-focus (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
Bringing the Study of Self-Focus to the Social Interaction 
 Although the available evidence provides some insight into how self-focus might operate 
in the context of ongoing interaction, there is also the great possibility that how self-focus affects 
individuals may not be the same as how self-focus affects ongoing interactions.  
In at least one case already reviewed, the finding that self-focus was associated with 
reduced attentional resources for engaging with external information was corroborated both 
within a person (Judah et al., 2013) and within an actual interaction (Mellings & Alden, 2000). 
However, in at least one other case, another finding—that manipulated self-focus was associated 
with more prosocial behavior—was demonstrated outside an actual interaction (Hung & Wyer, 
2014), but did not match what was found within an actual interaction—wherein measured self-
focus was associated with reduced willingness to help in conversations among friends 
(Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). 
This latter point—that psychological phenomena, such as self-focus, may act differently 
inside and outside ongoing interactions—is demonstrated most clearly in the next case in which 
an effect demonstrated outside of an actual social interaction changed into a very different 
picture when studied within one (Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 2009). Outside actual social 
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interactions, participants have reported that taking the perspective of another would have 
positive effects, such as reducing stereotypes and prejudice (e.g. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; 
Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). However, in contexts involving both actual and ostensible 
social interactions, taking the perspective of another was found to also have negative effects. In a 
twisted result, people lower in prejudice were judged as behaving socially worse towards 
members of an ethnic out-group after taking the perspective of the other compared to people 
higher in prejudice (Vorauer et al., 2009). These results suggest that when faced with an 
intergroup interaction partner, whereas a prejudiced person may increase effort and change their 
behavior to align with standards of correctness (in this case, to behave unprejudiced), an 
unprejudiced person, thinking the extra effort is not necessary, may reduce effort to act better, 
and subsequently be judged as behaving socially worse (Vorauer et al., 2009). According to self-
awareness theory, self-focus makes people self-evaluate and compare the self to standards 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). When the self is not in accordance with standards, one attempts to 
rectify the discrepancy. In that case, taking the perspective of another has positive impacts. 
However, when the self is in accordance with standards, the extra efforts are not made and the 
social interaction may not be benefited (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Vorauer et al., 2009). 
Chapter Conclusions 
Based on the regulatory process defined by objective self-awareness theory (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972), self-focus should lead to positive outcomes and self-focus should serve an 
adaptive function of behavioral regulation. However, the research evidence supports associations 
between self-focus and largely negative outcomes, at least in interpersonal contexts. Because few 
empirical investigations of the regulatory processes laid out by objective self-awareness theory 
have been studied in the context of ongoing social interactions, this work needs to be done. In 
 32 
this dissertation, the regulatory role of self-focus within interpersonal contexts will be 
investigated, specifically by assessing relationships between state self-focus and traits related to 
self-focus as they relate to conversation outcomes. 
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Chapter 4: Current Tools for Studying Self-Focus in Conversation 
 The methodological challenge of capturing dynamic shifts of attention to and from the 
self may explain why, in part, self-focus in social interaction is understudied. In this section, 
current methods used to measure and manipulate self-focus are reviewed and evaluated for their 
ability to signify shifting self-focus as it occurs within ongoing interactions without disruption.  
Measuring Self-Focus Linguistically 
 One promising way to measure self-focus is to analyze linguistic content. People’s 
language can indicate such underlying psychological processes as attentional focus, such as 
whether more self-focused or other-focused, emotionality, and sociality. In the simplest way, 
whether or not one is speaking, and whether that speech is about oneself, can be an indication of 
self-focus. In fact, in past research, self-focus has been manipulated by having one give a speech, 
opposed to passively standing by (Woody, 1996). When one is speaking about oneself, self-focus 
is inherently activated as the content is self-relevant and the conversation role of speaker is self-
focused (Woody, 1996). On the other hand, when passively listening, self-focus should not be as 
high. 
 The content of one’s speech can also indicate higher versus lower self-focus. This 
linguistic approach is exemplified by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), a tool 
developed by Pennebaker and colleagues that analyzes the words people use to make inferences 
about underlying psychological characteristics (Pennebaker et al., 2003). The analysis of 
linguistic content – from both spoken and written language – has been used to assess both 
chronic (Fineberg et al., 2015) and temporary self-focus (Davis & Brock, 1975). Commonly, the 
number of first person pronouns (e.g. I, me, my) has been counted and used to indicate the 
degree to which one is self-focused in that moment (Davis & Brock, 1975) or on the trait level 
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(Fineberg et al., 2015), and can be compared to third person pronouns (e.g. they, them) to 
indicate external focus (Fineberg et al., 2015). 
 The qualitative content of language can also be analyzed to provide an index of self-
focus. Wood and colleagues (1990) asked participants to describe something that bothered them 
that day and analyzed whether the content was self-focused or external-focused and how this 
related to mood (adapted from a procedure by Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986). Self-focused 
responses involved self-evaluations, such as “came home from work and softball game very 
tired” (Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, et al., 1990). External-focused responses regarded other people, 
events, or objects, such as “My son knotted up the line on his fishing rod.” They found that 
negative affect correlated with self-focus, indicated by language used, but only between subjects. 
In other words, people who tended to have greater self-focus also tended to have more negative 
mood. These results provide evidence that there are individual differences in people’s tendency 
to self-focus and that there is a link between self-focus and affect and coping (Wood, Saltzberg, 
Neale, et al., 1990).  
 The analysis of linguistic content does have potential for use in ongoing interactions. In 
one particularly relevant study, conversation self-focus was evaluated within ongoing 
interactions by recording, transcribing, and coding conversation content for the degree to which 
verbal statements were self-focused, or having to do with the self, compared to verbal statements 
that were other-focused, or having to do with the conversation partner (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 
2009). Measured conversational self-focus correlated with reduced judgments of relationship 
quality and evidence of helping among friends (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). 
Measuring Self-Focus Implicitly 
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 Although linguistic content can indicate how self-focused one’s language is, and can be 
used to measure self-focus within ongoing social interactions, spoken or written language cannot 
reveal thoughts that are not verbalized, and self-focus can occur when nobody is verbalizing it 
(Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). For this reason, implicit measures of self-focus may be useful for 
revealing the content and direction of thoughts and attention that are not verbalized (Eichstaedt 
& Silvia, 2003). For instance, the self-focus sentence completion task has been used to implicitly 
asses self-focus in the laboratory (Exner, 1973; Salovey, 1992; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). In 
this task, participants are asked to complete given sentences that are not explicitly self-related 
with either a first-person pronoun, such as “I,” or a third-person pronoun, such as “she.” For 
example, participants may be given the sentence, “The sun went in just as ____ decided to lay 
outside.” This is an implicit measure because the sentence is not explicitly about the self or 
another, so self-focus can be measured by how much external information is made to be about 
the self (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). Accordingly, implicit self-focus is scored by counting the 
number of times the first-person pronoun was used to complete the sentences (Exner, 1973; 
Salovey, 1992; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). This measure of implicit self-focus can be used 
following other laboratory inductions to measure the degree to which one is self-focused as the 
result of some manipulation, but it may not be useful for measuring self-focus within ongoing 
social interactions. Practically speaking, this measure could not be easily inserted into an 
ongoing interaction to measure momentary self-focus without disrupting the conversation. 
Another example of implicit self-focus poses a similar challenge. Recognition latency for 
self-relevant words has also been used as an implicit measure of self-focus (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 
2003). The logic of this procedure is that self-focus makes self-relevant information more 
accessible and so participants can respond more quickly to self-relevant words when they are 
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more self-focused (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). But again, this assessment could not be inserted 
easily into an ongoing interaction to measure self-focus without disrupting the conversation, 
which may be why examples of such implicit measures of self-focus within ongoing interactions 
were not found. 
Measuring Self-Focus Explicitly 
 In some cases, explicit measures may be preferred to implicit ones, and one way to 
measure self-focus explicitly within an ongoing interaction is to ask participants to self-report 
their self-focus. To get a self-report of self-focus, we could pause the conversation, and ask 
participants if they are focused on the self, which does not seem to have been tried in the 
laboratory, perhaps because of the obvious problem: that this would disrupt the natural flow of 
the interaction. To eliminate the disruption, people could be asked retrospectively to report self-
focus following a social interaction, but there would be obvious accuracy problems (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977) and it could not reveal the potentially shifting nature of self-focus across a 
conversation. Moreover, if participants were asked to report about their focus of attention, the 
question itself requires self-focus, so it would bias the response (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003).  
 Despite these challenges in getting explicit reports of self-focus, attempts have been 
made to do so. In one study, self-focus was assessed in people’s everyday lives using digital 
check-ins (Huffziger et al., 2013). With the prompting of a digital device that participants 
carried, they were asked at various points throughout the day to rate their ruminative self-focus, 
specifically if and how much, at the moment, they were thinking about their feelings or problems 
(procedure adapted form Moberly & Watkins, 2008). The study involved three induction 
conditions: on one day, rumination was repeatedly induced with prompts such as “think about 
the way you feel inside.” On one day, mindfulness was repeatedly induced with prompts such as 
 37 
“take note of your thoughts and feelings without judging them.” And on one day, neither was 
induced. Momentary ruminative self-focus and momentary mood were taken before and after 
inductions throughout the day on each day. The key result was that the inductions to ruminate led 
to immediate increases in ruminative self-focus and decreases in mood. This experiment was 
used to show the negative effects of ruminative self-focus on mood (Huffziger et al., 2013). 
Some form of a digital check-in like this could be used during an ongoing interaction, but would 
need to be done so the natural flow of the interaction would not be unnaturally disrupted and so 
the self-focus measure would not spoil the context in which it is meant to measure. 
Measuring Self-Focus as a Trait 
 In addition to measuring self-focus as it shifts across different contexts, people also have 
dispositional differences in the degree to which they tend to be self-focused or how easily they 
become self-focused (e.g. Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1985). A popular measure of 
self-focus has been the self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). This scale and its 
revisions (Scheier & Carver, 1985) continue to be used to measure dispositional differences in 
the degree to which people tend to be self-focused. The questionnaire is divided into three sub-
measures: private self-consciousness, which corresponds to thinking about aspects of the self 
that are not observable by others, public self-consciousness, which corresponds to thinking about 
aspects of the self that are observable by others, and social anxiety, which corresponds to 
feelings of doubt or apprehensiveness in how one is observed by others (Fenigstein et al., 1975; 
Scheier & Carver, 1985). As a self-report scale, it asks people to estimate how often they self-
focus and how they respond to that self-focus, such as their level of discomfort with that self-
focus. Another scale that has been used to indicate individual differences in self-focus is the self-
reflection and insight scale (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002; Silvia et al., 2011, 2013). Items 
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on this scale are similar to the private self-consciousness scale and assess both engaging in self-
reflection, the need to self-reflect, and insight one has about the self (Grant et al., 2002). As with 
any self-report scale, caution remains that people are not good at estimating such things. Still, the 
self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) was used in the present experiments as the best 
measure of participants’ dispositional differences in self-focusing tendencies. Beyond those 
inherent differences, self-focus will still occur dynamically within ongoing interaction. Thus, 
measurements were still needed to capture the dynamic shifts within interactions, not just the 
individual differences that exist between people. 
Manipulating Self-Focus 
 Whereas measuring self-focus can illuminate the conditions in which self-focus occurs 
and for whom, manipulating self-focus and comparing outcomes can illuminate specific effects 
that self-focus has on outcomes related to mood, thoughts, behavior, and social interactions. 
 Researchers have used a variety of methods to manipulate self-focus, and many have 
distinguished two kinds of self-focus manipulations: (1) private self-focus and (2) public self-
focus, analogous to Fenigstein and colleagues’ (1975) measures of dispositional private and 
public self-consciousness. In order to manipulate private self-focus, which concerns one’s view 
of the self, attention needs to be brought to “externally unobservable events and characteristics 
such as emotions, physiological sensations, perceptions, values, goals, motives” (Morin, 2006). 
In order to manipulate public self-focus, which depends on a public audience and concerns how 
others view the self, attention needs to be brought to “visible attributes such as behavior and 
physical appearance” (Morin, 2006).  
 Researchers have induced private self-focus by placing a person alone in front of a mirror 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund & Duval, 1971), having participants look at photos of 
 39 
themselves (Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013), showing participants self-
relevant words (Ainley et al., 2013), and by giving information about one’s internal attributes, 
such as their heart rate being speeded up (Judah et al., 2013). Researchers have induced public 
self-focus with the presence of a video camera (e.g. Durlik, Cardini, & Tsakiris, 2014). The logic 
is that by activating a schema in which the person will be viewed by another, a public form of 
self-focus will be induced. In another study, public self-focus was induced by asking participants 
to speak in front of an evaluative panel while private self-focus was induced by having 
participants watch themselves speak in real-time on a television monitor, which was not recorded 
and would not be viewed by others (Denson, Creswell, & Granville-Smith, 2012). 
Chapter Conclusions 
 The ideal tool for measuring self-focus will be dynamic, not disruptive, and not limited to 
what is explicitly verbalized. A dynamic measure is critical because across a conversation, self-
focus may change with each changing topic, emotion, motivation, and speaker (Markus & Wurf, 
1987). Although the analysis of linguistic content is both non-disruptive and dynamic, it is 
limited to thoughts that are explicitly verbalized, and self-focus can occur when nobody is 
verbalizing it (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). Because there are limitations with the presently 
available tools, a new tool using eye tracking to measure looking at the self on-screen during live 
video conversations has the potential to become a useful tool to promote future research about 
the function and consequences of self-focus in ongoing interactions. 
Despite the available research on outcomes associated with self-focus and the known 
links between self-focus and emotional content and personality differences, less is known about 
the role of self-focus in ongoing interactions. Because personal outcomes may or may not occur 
in the same way as interpersonal outcomes (e.g. Vorauer et al., 2009) and because little is known 
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about the factors that contribute to shifts in self-focus within conversations, I argue for a 
broadening of the research field to include more investigations of how self-focus occurs in and 




Chapter 5: The Present Research 
In Exp. 1 and 2, the influence of conversation factors (who was speaking and emotional 
conversation content) and personality variables were evaluated for their relationship to measured 
self-focus across the conversation. In Exp. 3, self-focus was manipulated by presenting or 
removing the self on the video chat screen in order to test the effect of increased self-focus on 
conversation outcomes. The following three aims were addressed in these experiments. 
Aim 1: A New Tool for Investigating Self-Focus in Social Interactions 
The massive use of interactive social media provides a platform – the online video chat – 
for the investigation of real-time, ongoing social interaction. I developed a new tool for 
investigating self-focus in ongoing interactions using eye tracking during online video chats, 
used in Experiments 1-3. A typical video chat screen shows live video of both the self and one’s 
conversation partner, which creates a naturalistic face-to-face interaction (Licoppe & Morel, 
2012) as well as a physical representation of both the self and other on which to direct one’s 
visual attention. The amount of time spent looking at the self on the screen during online video 
conversations was measured as a moment-to-moment indicator of self-focus.  
Although using eye tracking to measure self-focus during a video chat is new, prior 
research has demonstrated that looking at the self indicates a focus of attention on the self (e.g. 
Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Past research has used looking as a measure of attention in various 
domains (e.g. Duchowski, 2003). In social interactions, gaze has been measured in live 
interactions and can indicate one’s focus; for instance, the proportion of the time spent looking at 
one’s partner can indicate how powerful that partner is perceived (Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982). 
Eye tracking, a classic tool of perception and cognitive psychology, can be used to pinpoint the 
direction of that attention with temporal and spatial accuracy. In one eye-tracking experiment, as 
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the floors in a tall building were described, participants’ eye movements traveled upwards, 
following the locations of an imagined scene (Spivey & Geng, 2001). Gaze has also been shown 
to reveal underlying thoughts or motivations. For instance, optimists gazed less at negative, 
unpleasant images than did pessimists (Isaacowitz, 2005; Luo & Isaacowitz, 2007). Together, 
these eye-tracking experiments indicate that a viewer’s gaze at various stimuli gives us some 
ability to interpret the focus of her mental activity (Isaacowitz, 2006). Because eye-tracking 
studies have used gaze information to indicate attention to and activation of mental 
representations (e.g. Spivey & Geng, 2001), it reasons this may extend to representations of the 
self. Thus, visual attention towards the physical representation of the self on the screen may 
serve as a useful index of self-focus, particularly when the method is used within ongoing 
interactions.  
Because this method is new, other indices of self-focus, specifically from the linguistic 
content of the conversation (Pennebaker et al., 2003; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) were 
measured as well. In Experiments 1-3, the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software 
was used to count the proportion of first-person singular pronouns (e.g. I, me, my) used by 
participants during the conversation to indicate their linguistic self-focus across the conversation 
(Pennebaker et al., 2003). Self-focused pronouns have been used previously to indicate self-
focus (Davis & Brock, 1975; Fineberg et al., 2015). Additionally, because our experiments use 
ongoing interactions, the time spent talking and number of words used were also measured. 
Whether or not the linguistic measures of self-focus would yield the same results as the new 
looking measure of self-focus was an exploratory aspect of these experiments.  
Aim 2: Uncovering the Factors Influencing Self-Focus 
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Conversation Factors. To understand the regulatory function of self-focus in a dynamic 
context, self-focus was measured across conversation contexts that varied by speaker and 
emotion valence and type. The general approach was to measure self-focus across conversation 
contexts that involve sharing different kinds of emotional experiences that require more or less 
self-evaluation, more or less discrepancy between the self and relevant standards, and 
consequently more or less self-focus. 
Because self-focus is theorized to bring attention to how one is performing relative to 
standards of correct behavior (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), whether or not a discrepancy between 
the self and those standards is perceived should influence the degree to which self-focus occurs. 
If this is the case, self-focus should change as the social context changes, such as over the course 
of a conversation. For instance, the particular type of emotional content being shared in a 
conversation should matter. Objective self-awareness theory predicts that self-focus will occur 
more when it is needed, when the self is not in alignment with relevant standards of correctness 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Moreover, because past research has demonstrated a link between 
negative affect and self-focus (for review, see Mor & Winquist, 2002), specifically that the 
induction of negative mood leads to increased self-focus (Sedikides, 1992; Wood, Saltzberg, & 
Goldsamt, 1990), it was expected that self-focus would increase when negative affect was 
induced by sharing experiences involving negative emotions. 
In Exp. 1, participants shared stories involving two kinds of self-conscious emotions, one 
positive (pride) and one negative (embarrassment). In Exp. 2, the question of how self-focus 
depends on emotional content was expanded to include broader categories. Participants shared 
stories involving ten different emotions categorized as either positive or negative and basic or 
self-conscious. Whereas self-conscious emotions, including pride, shame, and embarrassment, 
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require self-evaluative processes, basic emotions do not (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Thus, sharing 
experiences involving self-conscious emotions are expected to involve increased self-focus 
compared to basic emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
To study which conversation conditions (defined by who was speaking and the emotional 
content of what they were sharing) induce or reduce self-focus, the new eye-tracking measure of 
self-focus, looking at the self on-screen, was used along with additional linguistic indices of self-
focus. Whereas the new eye-tracking measure of self-focus may indicate more implicit 
regulatory processes occurring during ongoing interaction, the linguistic measure of self-focus, 
as a more explicit measure, may track more explicitly the content of the conversation. 
Personality Variables. Within certain conversations conditions or across the 
conversation in general, when and how much self-focus is called upon may depend not just on 
the conversation content, but also on the person. Self-focusing behavior was expected to depend 
on people’s natural tendencies to self-focus (measured by private and public self-consciousness), 
their response to self-focused attention (measured by social anxiety) and based on their self-
views (measured by self-esteem) (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Rosenberg, 1989; Swann et al., 2007).  
Depending on these personality factors, people may experience the entire social situation 
provided in these experiments, the overall task of sharing personal experiences with a stranger, 
differently depending on who they are, regardless of what they are talking about at what time. In 
that case, self-focus across the conversation could be overall higher or lower for different people 
depending on who they are (e.g. Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986). The experimental situation of 
sharing personal experiences is likely different for different people, and the regulatory role of 
self-focus may depend on their personal regulatory needs.  
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For instance, in a conversation context, people with greater self-esteem may expect to 
perform better than people with lower self-esteem. Because self-focus is expected to function to 
regulate behavior when the self is not meeting the standards of a situation (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972), those with lower self-esteem may experience greater discrepancies between the self and 
social standards during the conversation, and consequently self-focus more than those with 
greater self-esteem. 
Self-consciousness, as the tendency to engage in processes of directing attention to the 
self, is also likely to impact state-level self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Because a more self-
focused person is likely to perceive discrepancies between the self and standards, it is reasonable 
to assume that more self-conscious people will be more aware of discrepancies between the self 
and standards within a conversation context, and thus engage in more state self-focus across the 
conversation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein et al., 1975). 
Finally, social anxiety has been associated with increased self-focus (Clark, 2005), and 
because socially anxious people doubt their ability to make a good impression in a social 
situation (Spurr & Stopa, 2002), thus perceiving greater discrepancies between the self and 
standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) in that conversation context, it is 
hypothesized that more socially anxious people will self-focus more across the conversation than 
less socially anxious people. 
The influence of personality variables on self-focus may also be moderated by emotional 
conversational content. Those who chronically perceive discrepancies between the self and 
standards (e.g. those who are more socially anxious, self-conscious, and have lower self-esteem) 
(Higgins, 1987; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) may self-focus more especially during parts of a 
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conversation in which the self is perceived as most discrepant from standards of correctness, 
such as when sharing negative compared to positive information about the self. 
Aim 3: Investigating Outcomes of Self-Focus 
 In addition to investigating when self-focus occurs within conversations depending on 
variations in speaker, emotion type and valence and personality factors, another goal of this 
research was to identify direct consequences of self-focus within conversations, specifically on 
interpersonal outcomes measured during and after the conversations. This goal was addressed in 
Exp. 3, in which self-focus was manipulated by presenting or removing the self on the video chat 
screen in order to test the effect of increased self-focus on three conversation outcomes. 
Following the conversation, participants gave self-reports of how interested they were in the 
conversation and how much they liked, how similar they felt, and how empathic they felt 
towards their conversation partner. These questions were used to gauge the interpersonal 
connection that was formed between two strangers. Second, engagement with the other was 
measured as time spent looking at the other on-screen during the conversation. Third, the self-
focus of people’s language was measured—how many self-focused pronouns participants used 
and the length of the stories they shared.  
 Despite the theorized regulatory role of self-focus that leads one to change their behavior 
to better meet personal or social standards, (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), 
such theorized attempts have been shown to have both positive and negative outcomes. For 
instance, when primed to self-focus and to do their best, participants put more effort into a task 
(e.g. Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2013). But self-focus has also been shown to induce self-centered 
thinking (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993), has been implicated in difficulties engaging with others 
(Uddin et al., 2008) and difficulties experiencing empathy, (Lawrence et al., 2007), and has been 
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shown to impede prosocial behavior when it was measured as it naturally occurred in 
conversations (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). Because the majority of past research supports 
predictions for more negative interpersonal outcomes, increased self-focus was expected to result 
in reduced engagement with the other, measured as more negative interpersonal ratings about the 
conversation and conversation partner, less looking at the other during the conversation, and 
corroborated by increased self-focus indicated by linguistic cues. 
Exp. 3 directly addressed Aim 3 using an experimental manipulation of self-focus. Before 
that, correlations between measures of self-focus and a self-report of interpersonal connection, 
“Inclusion of Other in the Self” (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) were assessed in Exp. 2. 
Because self-focus has been theorized to reduce one’s focus on aspects of the other (Greenwald, 
1980; Silvia et al., 2013), increased self-focus was predicted to correspond with reduced 
engagement with the other and reduced interpersonal closeness. However, the alternative 
possibility has some support; for instance, self-focus has been shown to promote prosocial 
behavior, at least when the other was similar to the self, and when self-focus was made 
explicit—though the social situation in that experiment was ostensible rather than actual (e.g. 
Hung & Wyer, 2014). 
Although much of the previous research on self-focus has revealed negative outcomes, 
such outcomes may or may not translate directly onto social interactions (Vorauer et al., 2009). 
Hence, the novelty of this research is in identifying the nature of self-focus and its impact on 
ongoing interactions. 
Chapter Conclusions 
After reviewing the various outcomes associated with self-focus, the known factors 
influencing self-focus, and the current tools for measuring and manipulating self-focus, it stands 
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that too little is known about when, why, and for whom self-focus occurs in ongoing interactions, 
in which attention, motivation, and emotion may fluctuate with each passing moment. And what 
effect does self-focus have on conversation outcomes, such as the connection between 
conversation partners? In this dissertation, these questions are addressed to uncover the function 
and effects of self-focus in conversational contexts that are a vital part of everyday experience. 
  
 49 
Chapter 6: Experiment 1 
Self-focus was measured as it spontaneously occurred across video conversations and 
was indicated (1) with eye tracking as the time spent looking at the self on the screen and (2) 
based on linguistic indices, specifically, pronoun use and story length. Self-focus was assessed as 
a function of when participants mutually shared personal experiences involving a time when they 
felt proud and a time when they felt embarrassed. To explore the possibility that temporary 
manipulations of self-standard discrepancies might interact with chronic perceptions of the self, 
participant self-esteem, self-consciousness, and social anxiety were also assessed. Exp. 1 used a 
speaker x story x personality variable mixed factorial design, which included two factors 
representing the within-subject manipulations of 1) speaking versus listening and 2) telling a 
proud versus embarrassed story, and individual difference measures of self-esteem, self-
consciousness, or social anxiety. 
Different theories about the function of the self make different predictions about 
conditions in which self-focus will occur. According to objective self-awareness theory (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972), self-focus serves a regulatory function by engaging one in evaluation 
processes that compare oneself to standards of correctness. Based on this theory, self-focus is 
likely to occur more when it is needed: when the self is not in alignment with such standards 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Interpersonal theory predicts a similar result, that based on the 
function of the self to protect and defend against anxiety or threat, self-focus will occur more 
when the self is threatened (Sullivan, 1953), such as when sharing negative aspects of the self. 
Alternatively, self-enhancement theory predicts that based on the motivation to maintain positive 
views of the self, self-focus will increase when one’s relative position or status is enhanced, such 
as when sharing positive aspects of the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Expanding on these 
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theories is self-verification theory, which predicts that regulatory needs may vary not only by 
situational content but also by how that content aligns with one’s extant views of the self 
(Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1983; Swann & Bosson, 2010), which can be indicated by self-esteem 
(Swann et al., 2007). Positive self-conscious emotions, such as pride, will confirm the self-views 
of a person with greater self-esteem, who tends to view the self more positively. On the other 
hand, negative self-conscious emotions, such as embarrassment, will confirm the self-views of a 
person with lower self-esteem, who tends to view the self more negatively (Swann et al., 2007; 
Tracy & Robins, 2004). Based on the motivation to confirm one’s self-views, greater self-focus 
would occur for people when their extant views of the self are confirmed (Festinger, 1957; 
Swann, 1983; Swann & Bosson, 2010). However, these theories have not been adequately tested 
during ongoing social interactions, during which standards, threats to the self, and self-
enhancements may vary.  
In this experiment, participants shared stories that were designed to either (a) present 
positive aspects of the self that are aligned with social standards (e.g. telling a proud story) or (b) 
present negative aspects of the self that are not aligned with social standards (e.g. telling an 
embarrassing story) (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). If self-focus increases when the self is 
threatened or not aligned with social standards (main effect for story type), then objective self-
awareness or interpersonal theory will be supported. If self-focus increases when the self is 
enhanced, then self-enhancement theory will be supported. If self-focus increases depending on 
story content in interaction with one’s stable self-views indicated by self-esteem, then self-
verification theory will be supported. Participants’ global self-esteem as well as dispositional 
tendencies to self-focus and their typical response to self-focus (assessed by the self-
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consciousness scale) will be assessed for how they interact with conversation conditions in the 
increase or decrease of self-focus. 
 In addition to self-esteem which is a barometer of how worthwhile one views the self 
(Swann et al., 2007), social anxiety involves chronic perceptions of the self that is likely to 
interact with manipulations of discrepancies between the self and social standards. Social anxiety 
is the tendency to feel discomfort in response to self-focused attention or to the perception that 
attention is being paid to the self (Fenigstein et al., 1975), and this tendency translates in clinical 
conditions to social phobia, which is defined by fears associated with the social situation (Clark 
& Wells, 1995). Despite the tendency to feel discomfort in response to self-focus, paradoxically, 
social anxiety has also been shown to involve increased self-focus (Clark, 2005), which is 
theorized to be involved in managing self-presentation in social situations, something that 
socially anxious people are worried about (Clark & Wells, 1995).  
Because socially anxious people doubt their ability to make a good impression (Spurr & 
Stopa, 2002), they will feel they are not measuring up to social standards more than less socially 
anxious people, especially when sharing information that is discrepant with social standards 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Thus, as social anxiety increases, self-focus may be greater across 
the conversation, and more so when sharing negative (e.g. embarrassing) personal information 
compared to positive (e.g. proud) information. 
 Finally, self-focus as it is measured across ongoing interactions should depend on 
dispositional tendencies to self-focus. The best available measure of dispositional self-focus is 
the self-consciousness scale, which includes three facets—private and public self-consciousness 
and social anxiety (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Both private and public self-consciousness indicate a 
tendency to engage in processes of directing attention to the self, and have been used in prior 
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research to indicate the tendency to self-focus (Silvia et al., 2011). Because both indicate a 
tendency to self-focus, more privately and publicly self-conscious people are expected to 
demonstrated greater self-focus. 
In addition to measuring looking at the self across video chats, looking at the other was 
also measured. In a dyadic interaction, focus may shift between self and other. Accordingly, in 
both theory and prior research, self-focus is often contrasted with externally-directed focus, such 
as focusing on other people (Ingram, 1990; Morin, 2006); therefore, the measure of looking at 
the other was included as a theoretically opposite target of attention that could provide 
complementary information to the new looking measure of self-focus. When video-chatting, 
because there is the option to look at the self, other, or neither, these measures will not be 
inherently reciprocal. Still, when and for whom self-focus is reduced, other-focus may be 
increased, and vice versa. For instance, for more socially anxious people, who are expected to 
increase self-focus to manage presentation, they may avoid attending to external, threatening 
cues, and look less at the other (Clark & Wells, 1995; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013).  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 (main effect of speaker): In an interpersonal context of sharing 
personal information, self-focus will be greater when talking about oneself than when 
listening to another talk about oneself. Because self-focus is theorized to function in part for 
self-regulation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1983), when sharing personal 
information, self-regulatory goals will be activated. Therefore, self-focus will be greater when 
sharing personal information than when listening to one’s conversation partner share personal 
information. 
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Hypothesis 2 (speaker x story type interaction): Demonstrating support for self-
focus’s regulatory role, self-focus will increase when the self is threatened or does not align 
with standards. Because self-focus will be more likely to occur when the self is perceived to be 
discrepant from social standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), self-focus will be greater when 
sharing embarrassed stories compared to proud ones. There will be no difference in self-focus 
while listening to the other’s embarrassed versus proud stories. 
Hypothesis 3 (main effects of personality variables): In a conversation context, self-
focus will be greater for those who more chronically perceive discrepancies between the self 
and social standards, including those with lower self-esteem and those who are more 
socially anxious and self-conscious. 
a. People with lower self-esteem, who focus more on negative aspects of the self 
than people with greater self-esteem (Swann et al., 2007), will experience or 
attend to self-standard discrepancies more than people with greater self-esteem 
(Higgins, 1987), so self-focus will be greater as self-esteem decreases (main 
effect of self-esteem). 
b. Because more socially anxious people are less comfortable in social situations and 
worry more about how they are presenting in a social situation than less socially 
anxious people (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Spurr & Stopa, 2002), more socially 
anxious people will focus more on discrepancies between the self and social 
standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) than less socially anxious people, so self-
focus will increase as social anxiety increases (main effect of social anxiety). 
c. Because self-consciousness indicates a tendency to self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 
1975), more privately and publicly self-conscious people are expected to 
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demonstrate greater self-focus (main effects of public and private self-
consciousness). 
Hypothesis 4 (speaker x story type x personality interactions): Self-focus will be 
greater for those who more chronically perceive discrepancies between the self and 
standards especially in parts of the conversation in which the self can be perceived as most 
discrepant from standards. 
a. People with lower self-esteem will self-focus more especially when the most 
negative aspects of the self are shared and when the self can be perceived as most 
discrepant from social standards—when sharing an embarrassing story (self-
esteem x speaker x story type interaction). 
b. More socially anxious people will self-focus more especially when they most 
doubt their ability to make a good impression (Spurr & Stopa, 2002) and feel they 
are not measuring up to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972)—
when sharing an embarrassing story (Clark, 2005; Fenigstein et al., 1975) (social 
anxiety x speaker x story type interaction). 
c. More self-conscious people will be more aware of discrepancies between the self 
and standards within a conversation context, and thus self-focus more in parts of a 
conversation in which the self is more discrepant from standards—when sharing 
an embarrassing story (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein et al., 1975). 
Hypothesis 5 (effects of social anxiety on looking at the other): More socially anxious 
people will look less at the other, especially when feeling the most threatened. Because more 
socially anxious people will decrease external attention on a threatening cue (Clark, 2005; 
Fenigstein et al., 1975), looking at the other will decrease as social anxiety increases (main effect 
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of social anxiety) (Boehme et al., 2015) and to a greater degree while sharing embarrassing 




 136 Brooklyn College undergraduate students (33 males; 103 females; M = 21.70, SEM 
= .49 years) participated in the experiment. Participants arrived in 68 pairs based on the 
appointment time they had signed up for. One participant was designated to include eye tracking, 
based on the slot they had signed up for (16 males; 52 females; M = 21.96, SEM = .77 years). 
The second participant was designated to be the conversation partner but did not include eye 
tracking, based on the slot they had signed up for (17 males; 51 females; 21.44, SEM = .62 
years). All participants were recruited for a study about natural conversation in which they 
expected to talk about assigned topics in an online video chat with a fellow student and then 
answer questions about themselves and the conversation. Participants having their eye 
movements tracked reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and did not wear hard contact 
lenses that interfere with eye tracking. Informed consent was obtained in a manner approved by 
the Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) of the City University of New York. Of those 
68 pairs, data from a total of nine conversation pairs were incomplete (there was technical failure 
in data collection for 7 pairs; 1 pair did not complete study protocol; 1 pair was outside age 
exclusion criterion). Hence, the final sample included 59 conversation pairs. 
Procedure and Materials 
 Both conversation partners were naïve study participants, and a conversation pair was 
designated based on who signed up for the study on the same date and time. Participants sat in 
 56 
separate rooms of the lab without interacting before meeting online. Both were informed they 
would video-chat with a fellow student and that the video chat would be recorded on the screen 
during the conversation. The video chat screen was recorded with Debut Video Capture Software 
(NCH Software, Greenwood Village, CO). Because the researchers had just one eye-tracking 
device, one participant had his or her eye movements tracked. Which participant had his or her 
eye movements tracked was based on the study description for which they signed up. One person 
within each pair was told that their eye movements would be recorded on the screen during the 
conversation.  
Participants having their eye movements tracked sat in front of a 22-inch computer 
monitor, onto which an SMI RED eye-tracking camera (SMI, Boston, MA) was mounted on the 
bottom and a Logitech HD Webcam C310 was mounted on the top. Eye-tracking data were 
acquired using SMI iView, run on a laptop connected to the secondary participants’ monitor, at 
60 Hz. Prior to the start of the video chat, participants’ eye movements were calibrated. The 
calibration procedure required they look at five points on the screen, and was repeated until a 
valid calibration was obtained (maximum deviation of 0.6 degrees on both the x- and y-axes). 
Two online video chat accounts created with Skype™ software were used to connect 
conversation partners. As is typical in video chats, all participants saw their conversation partner 
large and in the center of the screen and their self in the upper left corner of the screen, as shown 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Video chat screen configuration. Video of one’s self appeared in the upper left corner 
of the screen (boxed in yellow), and the conversation partner appeared in the center of the screen. 
  
 Prior to the start of the video chat, both participants were handed a slip of paper 
containing the four story prompts. The prompts were: 
1. Tell them about a time when you felt embarrassed. 
2. Tell them about a time when you felt proud. 
3. Listen to them tell about a time when they felt embarrassed. 
4. Listen to them tell about a time when they felt proud. 
The prompts were given to participants in 8 counterbalanced orders, assigned by cycling through 
the different story orders as participants participated. These four conversation conditions used a 2 
x 2 within-subjects design (Table 1). Conversation prompts were manipulated to involve a 
negative self-conscious emotion (i.e., embarrassment) or a positive self-conscious emotion (i.e., 
pride). 
Table 1 
Exp. 1 Conversation Design  
 Story Type  
Speaker Proud Embarrassed 
Telling Telling own proud story Telling own embarrassed story 
Listening Listening to other’s proud story Listening to other’s embarrassed story 
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 Participants had about one minute to think about the prompts and their responses before 
the video chat began. Participants met on the video chat, briefly shared introductions, and were 
instructed to begin sharing their responses to the four prompts (two for each participant). A video 
recording of the conversation was made by recording the computer screen of the participant who 
had their eye movements tracked. On-screen recording began at the start of the video chat. This 
video recording was used for a record of the conversation. 
 After the four stories were shared, the video chat was ended, and the video recording was 
stopped. Following the video chat, participants responded to questionnaires administered through 
SMI Experiment Center on the same computer screen, including the 10-question Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989) and the 23-question Self-Consciousness Scale, which included 
three sub-scales to assess private and public self-consciousness and social anxiety (Fenigstein et 
al., 1975). Upon completion of the questionnaires, participants were fully debriefed. All 
procedures were completed in less than one hour. 
Data Analysis 
 Measuring Self-Focus 
 (1) Looking at the self. The percentage of time spent looking at the self was calculated as 
the duration of eye fixations made to the area of interest on the screen, a rectangular box drawn 
around the self, divided by the total story length, as recorded by the computer. Eye-tracking data 
were analyzed using SMI’s BeGaze software (SensoMotoric Instruments, Boston, MA). Eye 
fixations were calculated offline using a dispersion threshold of 100 pixels and a duration 
threshold of 80 milliseconds.  
 (2) Linguistic indices of self-focus. The verbal responses to the conversation prompts of 
those participants who had their eye movements tracked were manually transcribed from the 
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recorded videos of the conversations and double-checked for accuracy by members of the 
research team (by listening to the audio recording and reading and editing the transcripts). The 
text of the transcripts was entered into the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program 
(LIWC2007; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007; Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & 
Booth, 2007). The program outputs percentages of words in a variety of categories, and two of 
those categories from LIWC were used: first person singular pronouns (targets included: I, Id, 
I'd, I'll, Im, I'm, Ive, I've, me, mine, my, myself) and total word count. Self-focused pronouns 
have been used previously to indicate self-focus (Davis & Brock, 1975; Fineberg et al., 2015), 
and two proportions were calculated based on the number used: self-focused pronouns used per 
minute and self-focused pronouns out of total words. Self-focused pronouns out of total words is 
the unit typically used by Pennebaker and colleagues in linguistic analyses of written text (e.g. 
Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). However, because spoken conversation includes a 
temporal component (i.e. taking turns in conversation may be more practically measured with 
time) and to parallel the looking measure of self-focus that uses a proportion over time, the 
number of self-focused pronouns per minute was also measured. In addition to measuring self-
focused pronoun use specifically, gross measures including the time people spent talking and the 
total number of words used in response to the story prompts were also measured. Although these 
measures have not been used previously to indicate self-focus, it stands to reason that the time 
one spends talking about oneself in a conversation may reasonably indicate their self-focus and 
may serve as a potential new way of indicating self-focus in conversation contexts.  
 Measuring Looking at the Other 
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Eye tracking was also used to assess the percentage of time spent looking at the 
conversation partner, calculated as the duration of eye fixations within a rectangular area of 
interest around the conversation partner’s face and torso divided by the total story length. 
 Multilevel Modeling 
A multilevel modeling approach was used to analyze the influence of conversation 
content and personality differences on (1) looking at the self and (2) linguistic indices of self-
focus. Because within-subject conversation factors were included, as well as between-subject 
continuous personality variables, a nested structure was used. That is, the individual story 
conditions (indicated by speaker and story) were nested with individuals. Subjects were treated 
as a random effect with a varying intercept. All other effects were fixed effects.  
Personality measures for social anxiety, private self-consciousness, public self-
consciousness, and self-esteem were obtained from participants’ self-report responses to the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989) and the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et 
al., 1975), which were assessed following the conversation. To test if the personality variable 
data met the assumption of collinearity, both tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
were assessed. Moreover, to avoid the issue of collinearity, a separate multilevel model was run 
using each of the continuous personality variables. Personality scores were centered and included 
both for their main effects and their interactions with the binary conversation factors. 
(1) On looking at the self. Both within-subject conversation conditions were dummy 
coded; for speaker (whether telling or listening to stories), “self” was coded “1” and other was 
coded “0;” for story (embarrassed or proud), “embarrassed” was coded “1” and proud was coded 
“0.” These binary factors were included for their main effects as well as all two-way and three-
way interactions with each continuous personality variable (social anxiety, private self-
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consciousness, public self-consciousness, and self-esteem) on the dependent variable, the percent 
time looking at the self.  
(2) On linguistic indices of self-focus. Multilevel models were also run on the following 
four outcomes: (1) self-focused pronoun use per minute, (2) self-focused pronouns out of total 
words, (3), story length, measured in time, and (4) word count. The binary factor story was 
dummy coded (“embarrassed” was coded “1” and proud was coded “0”) and included for its 
main effect and interaction with each continuous personality variable. 
  In all multilevel model analyses, significant two-way interactions were followed up with 
simple slopes tests (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Dawson, 2013) to determine if each slope, 
tested at one standard deviation above and below the mean, was significantly different from zero. 
A significant two-way interaction would reveal that the two simple slopes were significantly 
different from one another. Significant three-way interactions were followed up with slope 
difference tests. 
(3) On looking at the other. The same modeling approach for looking at the self was 
used for looking at the other. 
Results 
Personality Variables 
Prior to including the personality variables in subsequent analyses, their correlations were 
assessed and are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 






Self-Esteem 0.102 -0.2 -0.252^ 
Private Self-Consciousness  .388** 0.208 
Public Self-Consciousness   0.237^ 
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Note. All correlations include 59 participants with df = 58; **p < .010; ^p < .100 
 
Tests to see if the personality variable data met the assumption of collinearity, using an 
upper threshold for VIF values of 2.5, indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern (Self-
Esteem, Tolerance = .865, VIF = 1.156; Private Self-Consciousness, Tolerance = .789, VIF = 
1.267; Public Self-Consciousness, Tolerance = .782, VIF = 1.278; Social Anxiety, Tolerance = 
.871, VIF = 1.148). Still, because there was some correlation between the personality variables, a 
separate multilevel model was run using each of the continuous personality variables—social 
anxiety, private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and self-esteem—on looking at 
the self, linguistic indices of self-focus, and looking at the other. 
Looking at the Self 
To test the effect of story, speaker, and their interaction with personality variables on 
looking at the self, multilevel models were tested including each of the personality variables in a 
separate model. No main effects of speaker or story on looking at the self were found, providing 
no support that measured self-focus was greater when speaking versus listening (Hypothesis 1), 
nor during embarrassed versus proud stories (Hypothesis 2), but interactions with personality 
variables were found (Tables 3-4; Appendix B Tables 33-34). 
Self-esteem model on looking at the self. In contrast to the prediction that self-focus 
would be greater for those who chronically perceive discrepancies between the self and social 
standards, including those with lower self-esteem (Hypothesis 3a), in fact self-esteem 
significantly predicted looking at the self, such that the higher people’s self-esteem, the more 
they looked at the self during the video chat, B = .469, t(173) = 3.014, p = .003. Self-esteem also 
interacted with speaker, such that as self-esteem increased, people self-focused more during their 
 63 
own stories compared to the other’s stories, as indicated by a two-way interaction, B = -.534, 
t(171) = 2.947, p = .004. The two-way interaction indicates the two slopes are significantly 
different from one another, though each simple slope is not significantly different from zero. As 
shown in Figure 2, self-esteem predicted a positive trend of looking at the self (as indicated by a 
positive, though not different from zero, slope: gradient = .469, t(232) = 1.189, p = .235) and a 
negative trend of looking at the self during the other’s stories (as indicated by a negative, though 
not different from zero, slope: gradient = -.065, t(232) = .117, p = .907). Model results are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Figure 2. Speaker x Self-esteem interaction on looking at self. Endpoints for self-esteem (on 
continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines represent two levels of the speaker 
variable: whether listening to or telling stories. 
Table 3 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story (Proud v. Embarrassed), and 
Self-Esteem on Looking at the Self 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95%  CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 2.437 0.825 174 2.956 0.004 0.810 4.065 
Speaker -1.324 0.960 171 -1.379 0.170 -3.218 0.571 
Story -0.710 0.960 171 -0.740 0.460 -2.604 1.184 
Self-Esteem 0.469 0.156 174 3.014 0.003 0.162 0.777 
Speaker x Story 0.576 1.357 171 0.425 0.672 -2.103 3.255 
Speaker x Self-Esteem -0.534 0.181 171 -2.947 0.004 -0.892 -0.176 
Story x Self-Esteem -0.267 0.181 171 -1.475 0.142 -0.625 0.090 




























Low Self-Esteem              High Self-Esteem 
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For speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; for story variable: 1 = embarrassed, 0 = proud 
 
Social anxiety model on looking at the self. Contrary to the prediction (Hypothesis 3b) 
that more socially anxious people would pay more attention to the self in order to manage self-
presentation concerns than less socially anxious people (Clark & Wells, 1995), social anxiety 
actually predicted an overall decrease in looking at the self, as indicated by a significant main 
effect of social anxiety on looking at the self, B = -.597, t(173) = 4.009, p < .001. Social anxiety 
also interacted with speaker, such that it predicted a sharper decrease in looking at the self during 
one’s own stories than while listening to others, B = .506, t(171) = 2.924, p = .004. Social 
anxiety interacted with story as well, such that it predicted a sharper decrease in looking at the 
self during embarrassed than proud stories, B = .574, t(171) = 3.312, p = .001. 
 A three-way interaction between social anxiety, speaker, and story (B = -.622, t(171) = 
2.541, p = .012; Table 4) revealed a pattern in the opposite direction of what was predicted 
(Hypothesis 4), that self-focus would increase during the conversation condition that makes 
socially anxious people most doubt their ability to make a good impression (Spurr & Stopa, 
2002) and feel they are not measuring up to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
Instead, social anxiety predicted the sharpest decrease in looking at the self during their own 
embarrassed story out of the four story conditions (slope gradient = -.597, simple slope test: 
t(228) = 1.547, p = .123), especially when compared to the slope for their own proud story (slope 
gradient = -.024, simple slope test: t(228) = .044, p = .965). As shown in Figure 3, while 
listening to the other, social anxiety predicted only a subtle decrease in looking at the self in both 
the other’s proud (slope gradient = -.140, simple slope test: t(228) = .177, p = .859) and 
embarrassed stories (slope gradient = -.091, simple slope test: t(228) = .168, p = .867). However, 
when telling one’s own stories, there is a sharp contrast between story types. During one’s own 
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proud story, social anxiety did not predict a change in looking at the self, but during one’s own 
embarrassed story, social anxiety predicted a strong decrease in the looking at the self. Results of 
slope difference tests indicate the difference in looking at the self during one’s own embarrassed 
story compared to one’s own proud story, though not significant (slope difference test: t(234) = 
1.380, p = .169), is greater than the difference in looking at the self between the other’s proud 
and embarrassed stories (slope difference test: t(234) = .083, p = .934).  
Considering those graphed at one standard deviation below the mean for social anxiety, 
as shown in Figure 3, self-focus is the greatest during the sharing of one’s own embarrassed 
story, standing apart from the other three story conditions. This is in contrast to those graphed at 
one standard deviation above the mean for social anxiety, who look less (and more similarly) at 
the self in all story conditions. Thus, the prediction (Hypothesis 2) based on objective self-
awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) that self-focus would be the greatest when the self 
is most discrepant with social standards, when telling an embarrassing story, is supported, at 
least for less socially anxious people, rather than more socially anxious people as predicted 
(Hypothesis 4). 
 
Figure 3. Three-way interaction of social anxiety, speaker, and story on looking at the self. 




























Low Social Anxiety      High Social Anxiety 
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lines represent each of the four conversation conditions: both one’s own and the other’s proud 
and embarrassed stories. 
 
Table 4 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story (Proud v. Embarrassed), and 
Social Anxiety on Looking at the Self 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 2.437 0.815 173 2.991 0.003 0.829 4.046 
Speaker -1.324 0.947 171 -1.397 0.164 -3.194 0.546 
Story -0.710 0.947 171 -0.750 0.455 -2.580 1.160 
Social Anxiety -0.597 0.149 173 -4.009 <0.001 -0.891 -0.303 
Speaker x Story 0.576 1.340 171 0.430 0.668 -2.068 3.221 
Speaker x Social Anxiety 0.506 0.173 171 2.924 0.004 0.165 0.848 
Story x Social Anxiety 0.574 0.173 171 3.312 0.001 0.232 0.916 
Speaker x Story x Social Anxiety -0.622 0.245 171 -2.541 0.012 -1.106 -0.139 
Speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; Story variable: 1 = embarrassed, 0 = proud 
 Public and private self-consciousness models on looking at the self. Multilevel models 
including private and public self-consciousness, which are dispositional tendencies to self-focus 
and so were expected to relate to the state measure of self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975), did not 
produce any significant main effects or interactions with the conversation factors on looking at 
the self (Hypotheses 3c and 4c). Those model results are presented in Appendix B (Tables 33-
34). 
Correlations among Dependent Variables 
 Before showing if and how linguistic indices of self-focus were influenced by personality 
variables and conversation factors in the same way as the looking measure of self-focus, 
correlations reflecting the relationships among the dependent variables were assessed. Overall 
time spent looking at the self while speaking did not correlate with overall story length and 
overall self-pronoun use during those same periods of speaking (Tables 5-6). While these 
relationships could speak directly to the validity of the self-focus measures and provide some 
insight as to how each might be functioning, they appear to indicate different constructs. 
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Table 5 
Correlations between Dependent Variables in Exp. 1 





















% Time Looking at Self 0.163 -0.116 -0.071 -0.068 0.118 
% Time Looking at Other   -0.135 -.298* -0.053 0.093 
Word Count     .324* .756*** -0.148 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total 
Words 
      .300* -0.147 
Story Time Length         -.387** 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute           





Correlations between Dependent Variables in Exp. 1, Continued 











% Time Looking at Self 0.254 0.089 0.012 -0.243 
% Time Looking at Other 0.174 0.251 0.185 -0.029 
Word Count -0.005 -0.159 0.112 -.362** 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of 
Total Words 
-0.193 -.294* 0.017 -0.07 
Story Time Length -0.058 -0.066 0.186 -0.192 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute -0.055 -0.152 -0.098 -0.142 
All correlations include 59 participants with df = 58; ***p < .001; **p<.01; *p < .050 
 
Linguistic Indices of Self-Focus 
 In an analysis procedure analogous to that of looking at the self, linguistic indices of self-
focus (self-focused pronoun use and story length) were also considered. These measures of self-
focus were predicted to be influenced by personality variables and conversation factors in the 
same way as the looking measure of self-focus.  
Word Count  
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Social anxiety model on word count. More words were used when people shared 
embarrassed (M = 166.559, SEM = 16.179 words) than proud stories (M = 136.153, SEM = 
16.179 words), B=-30.407, t(57) = 2.119, p = 0.039, a result that supports the prediction 
(Hypothesis 2) that increased self-focus would occur when the self was more discrepant from 
social standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972).  
There was also a main effect of social anxiety, such that as social anxiety increased, 
stories contained fewer words, B = -10.814, t(83) = 3.657, p < .001; Table 7. This finding is in 
contrast to the prediction (Hypothesis 3b) that social anxiety would be associated with increased 
self-focus, but it corroborates the finding in this experiment that social anxiety predicted reduced 
looking at the self. Figure 4 illustrates a two-way interaction: as social anxiety increased, the 
difference between the number of words in stories was more similar (and overall lower) whether 
telling an embarrassed or proud story; conversely, as social anxiety decreased, people were more 
self-focused during their embarrassed compared to proud stories, B = 6.103, t(57) = 2.326, p = 
0.024. According to simple slopes tests, social anxiety predicted a greater decline in word count 
for embarrassed stories (as indicated by a negative slope significantly differently than zero: -
10.814, t(114) = 6.288, p = <.001) compared to proud stories (as indicated by a negative slope 
not significantly differently than zero: gradient = -4.711, t(114) = 1.334, p = .185). This result 
corroborates results from the analysis of looking at the self that showed decreased self-focus, 
especially during one’s own embarrassed stories, for more socially anxious people. It contrasts 
the prediction (Hypothesis 4) that self-focus would increase as social anxiety increased 




Figure 4. Story x Social Anxiety interaction on story word count. Endpoints for social anxiety 
(on continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines represent two levels of the story 
variable: embarrassed versus proud stories. 
 
Table 7 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social Anxiety on Word Count 
Parameter	 Estimate	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	 95% CI	
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 166.559 16.179 83 10.295 <.001 134.383 198.736 
Story -30.407 14.353 57 -2.119 0.039 -59.148 -1.666 
Social Anxiety -10.814 2.957 83 -3.657 <0.001 -16.696 -4.932 
Story x Social Anxiety 6.103 2.624 57 2.326 0.024 0.850 11.357 
For story variable: 1 = embarrassed, 0 = proud 
  
Self-esteem, public and private self-consciousness models on word count. Neither 
self-esteem, private, nor public self-consciousness were involved in any additional significant 
effects on word count; those model results are presented in Appendix B (Tables 35-37). 
Additional linguistic indices of self-focus. Multilevel models were run on the three 
other linguistic indices of self-focus: self-focused pronouns out of total words (Appendix B; 
Tables 38-41), self-focused pronouns per minute (Appendix B; Tables 42-45), and story time 
length (Appendix B; Tables 46-49), but the models found no significant predictors. 























 The same modeling approach that was used to assess how the within-subject conversation 
conditions of speaker and story and the continuous personality variables influenced looking at 
the self was also used on looking at the other. As self-focus is often considered in contrast to 
other-focus, this analysis provides a more complete picture of the focus of people’s attention 
across the conversation. And, because participants have the option to look at the self, other, or 
neither, these measures are not inherently reciprocal. 
Social anxiety model on looking at the other. Providing methodological support for the 
capability of the eye-tracking measure to track visual attention based on conversation factors, 
participants looked more at the other when listening to the other’s stories (M = 54.708, SEM = 
2.630%) than when telling their own stories (M = 25.736, SEM = 2.630%), as indicated by a 
significant main effect of speaker, B = 27.603, t(171) = 11.825, p < .001). 
 Whereas social anxiety predicted reduced looking at the self in this experiment, 
especially during one’s own embarrassed stories, the more socially anxious people were, the 
more they looked at the other during embarrassed stories and less during proud stories, indicated 
by a significant Story x Social Anxiety interaction, B = -.983, t(171) = 2.304, p = .022, Figure 5. 
Though the two-way interaction indicates the slopes are different, neither is significantly 
differing from zero, embarrassed stories: gradient = .413, t(232) = .570, p = .570; proud stories: -
.570, t(232) = -.649, p = .517. As with the pattern for looking at the self, the pattern for looking 
at the other differed from what was predicted. Rather than more socially anxious people looking 
less at the other during negative emotion conditions (Hypothesis 5), the reverse pattern occurred. 
Model results are presented in Table 8. 
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Figure 5. Story x Social Anxiety interaction on looking at the other. Endpoints for social anxiety 
(on continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines represent two levels of the story 
variable: embarrassed versus proud stories. 
 
Table 8 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story (Proud v. Embarrassed), and 
Social Anxiety on Percent Time Looking at Other 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 23.883 2.877 97 8.301 <.001 18.173 29.593 
Speaker 27.603 2.334 171 11.825 <.001 22.996 32.211 
Story 3.705 2.334 171 1.587 0.114 -0.903 8.313 
Social Anxiety 0.413 0.526 97 0.785 0.434 -0.631 1.457 
Speaker x Story 2.737 3.301 171 0.829 0.408 -3.779 9.253 
Speaker x Social Anxiety -0.084 0.427 171 -0.196 0.845 -0.926 0.758 
Story x Social Anxiety -0.983 0.427 171 -2.304 0.022 -1.825 -0.141 
Speaker x Story x Social Anxiety 0.373 0.603 171 0.618 0.538 -0.818 1.564 
For speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; for story variable: 1 = embarrassed, 0 = proud 
 
Self-esteem, public and private self-consciousness models on looking at the other. 
Neither self-esteem, private, nor public self-consciousness were involved in any additional 


































The question pursued in this experiment was how self-focus would fluctuate based on 
conversation conditions, specifically when talking versus listening and during proud versus 
embarrassed stories. Based on the evidence, these manipulated conversation conditions 
interacted with self-esteem and social anxiety to influence self-focus, but in opposite directions 
than was predicted by objective self-awareness theory (and in contrast to Hypotheses 3 and 4) 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). In fact, increases in self-esteem predicted an increase in looking at 
the self, while talking but not listening, regardless of self-discrepant versus self-consistent 
emotional content, which is more consistent with a self-enhancement motivation (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). Increases in social anxiety, which have been associated with increases in self-
focus (Clark, 2005), in fact predicted a decrease in looking at the self specifically during one’s 
own embarrassing story, when the self should have been perceived to be the most discrepant 
from social standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Thus, more socially anxious people’s pattern 
of self-focus seems more consistent with the option to avoid self-focus rather than use it to 
regulate one’s behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). However, for less 
socially anxious people, increased self-focus was found during the conversation condition in 
which the self is perceived to be the most discrepant from social standards, a result which 
partially supports Hypothesis 2 as well as a regulatory role for self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 
1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Taking these results together, we see mixed support for both 
the enhancing and regulatory aspects of self-focus, depending on one’s chronic perceptions of 
the self and expectations of the social situation.  
Self-Esteem and Looking at the Self 
The prediction (Hypothesis 3a) that self-focus would increase for those who chronically 
perceive discrepancies between the self and social standards, including those with lower self-
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esteem (Higgins, 1987), especially when the self was not aligned with social standards 
(Hypothesis 4a) (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), was not supported. Instead, self-focus increased as 
self-esteem increased, specifically while people shared their own stories. Moreover, the 
relationship between self-esteem and looking at the self did not depend on the emotional content 
of the story shared, whether a proud or embarrassed story. 
These results suggest that for people with greater self-esteem, self-focus may be more 
desirable than for those with lower self-esteem. In this experiment, the experience of sharing 
personal information may have been overall more positive for those people who tend to focus on 
more positive aspects of the self (Swann et al., 2007) and who perceive the self as less discrepant 
from social standards (Higgins, 1987). This evidence of greater self-focus while sharing personal 
experiences may indicate the motivation to confirm or enhance the already positive self-views 
that people with higher self-esteem hold (Swann et al., 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988).   
On the other hand, for those with lower self-esteem, self-focus may have been something 
to be avoided. Similar to what is known about more socially anxious people’s avoidance of 
threat, past research has shown that people with low self-esteem, who tend to take social threat 
worse than people with high self-esteem, can buffer the threat by directing attention away from 
threatening stimuli (Gyurak et al., 2012). In this experiment, people with lower self-esteem 
avoided looking at the self while sharing personal information, which may indicate that the self 
on the screen was considered threatening.  
Social Anxiety and Looking at the Self 
Predictions based on objective self-awareness theory (Hypothesis 2) (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972) were supported, but only for less socially anxious people. As social anxiety decreased, 
self-focus was the greatest when the self was most discrepant with social standards, when 
 74 
sharing an embarrassed story compared to a proud story or while listening to the other’s stories. 
More socially anxious people, on the other hand, who were expected to pay more attention to the 
self to manage self-presentation in social situations than less socially anxious people (Clark & 
Wells, 1995), actually looked less at the self than less socially anxious people (in contrast to 
Hypothesis 3b).  
There are several possible reasons looking at the self did not increase as social anxiety 
increased. One possible reason is that given the natural tendency to self-focus of more socially 
anxious participants (Clark, 2005), a limit may exist at which point additional external 
expressions of self-focus are expressly avoided. For instance, as social anxiety increases, 
additional self-focusing behaviors may level out or even decrease, resulting in a non-linear 
relationship. Therefore, rather than hypothesizing increased looking at the self in a video 
conversation for more socially anxious people, we could have hypothesized decreased looking at 
the self, due to their already increased state of self-focus. Having greater self-focus may 
paradoxically result in decreased rather than increased explicit self-focusing behavior, such as 
that we tried to capture (i.e. looking at the self, self-focused pronoun use, and story length). A 
ceiling effect for these measures of self-focus may occur in a context in which socially anxious 
people are uncomfortable—a social interaction. And, it may occur especially during the most 
uncomfortable aspects of a conversation, when, for instance, sharing an embarrassing story. This 
may, in fact, be the time when the option to avoid self-focus rather than use it to regulate 
behavior occurs (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), at least for people made most uncomfortable by 
self-focused attention, such as those who are most socially anxious (Fenigstein et al., 1975). For 
those who do not face the same discomfort in response to self-focus, such as less socially 
anxious people, self-focus was, in fact, used in a way that was expected. For them, self-focus 
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was greatest when it was most needed, when the self was most discrepant with social standards 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). This occurred when sharing their own embarrassed compared to 
proud story or compared to listening to the other’s stories. 
It may also be that for those with greater social anxiety, too much self-focus is 
counterproductive. Recalling that more socially anxious people doubt their ability to make a 
good impression (Spurr & Stopa, 2002) and feel they are not measuring up to standards of 
correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), for them, additional self-focus while sharing an 
embarrassing story, may not reduce this sort of negative experience or thinking. Thus, more 
socially anxious people may avoid self-focus during these parts of a conversation (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). This avoidance of self-focus by more socially 
anxious people (in contrast to Hypothesis 3b and 4b), perhaps to prevent negative evaluation 
(Grisham et al., 2015), was supported by a linguistic index of self-focus as well. As social 
anxiety increased, participants also told shorter stories, particularly during embarrassing stories. 
Less socially anxious people, on the other hand, used more words in their embarrassing stories 
than proud, again supporting the theory (and in partial support of Hypothesis 2) that self-focus 
would increase when people, at least less socially anxious people, feel they are not measuring up 
to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
Looking at the Other 
 Beyond measuring the influence of conversation content on looking at the self, looking at 
the other was considered to explore the broader issue of social attention. Accordingly, in both 
theory and prior research, self-focus is often contrasted with externally-directed focus, such as 
focusing on other people, objects, or non-self-related ideas (Ingram, 1990; Morin, 2006). 
Therefore, information about when and how much people look at the other may complement 
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information about looking at the self because at least in dyadic interactions, one’s self and their 
conversation partner serve as two key targets of attention. In the present study, participants 
looked more at the other when listening to them tell stories than when telling their own stories. 
This result provides some additional credibility to the new eye-tracking measure, and it 
demonstrates how both self-focus and other-focus do track with relevant conversation factors. 
When sharing personal experiences involving self-conscious emotions which, by definition, 
require self-evaluative processes (Tracy & Robins, 2004), focus on the other is understandably 
less; on the other hand, while listening to the other share their own experiences, the self was less 
at stake, and people were free to focus more on the other. Additionally, socially speaking, while 
listening, it is considered customary to pay closer attention to the other. Results from the eye-
tracking measure confirmed that people paid that attention when it was expected. 
Social anxiety also factored in to participants’ attention to the other. As social anxiety 
decreased, participants looked more at the other during either their own or the other’s proud story 
compared to the embarrassed stories. Perhaps less socially anxious people look for evidence (by 
looking at the other) that they are viewed positively during their positive stories and avoid 
negative reactions to their negative stories by focusing on the self. These results may also reveal 
something about whether the self or other, within a social interaction, is considered more 
threatening.  
Because more socially anxious people have been shown to avoid threatening stimuli 
(Boehme et al., 2015; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013), one could surmise that by avoiding looking 
at the self, and looking more at the other, during more threatening parts of a conversation, 
attention to the self was considered more threatening by more socially anxious people than 
looking at the other. In the present experiment, participants were provided two specific targets 
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for their attention; they could focus more or less on the live video of the self and more or less on 
the live video of their conversation partner. Rather than providing evidence for the theorized 
increase in internal self-focus of more socially anxious participants (Clark, 2005), the results 
suggest that attention to the externally-presented self was something to be avoided. 
Study Limitations and Next Steps 
 Exp. 1, as the first investigation into the regulatory role of self-focus in conversation, has 
its limitations. Only two emotion conditions were used and not many differences were found 
between those two conditions. One reason these differences were not found may have been the 
time scale of the conversations in Exp. 1 was too short to capture fluctuations in self-focus. In 
order to further investigate if and how emotion condition influences self-focus, self-focus needs 
to be measured across longer conversations including a greater variety of emotional conditions, 
which will be done in Exp. 2.  
 A challenge of this research in general is its use of a new measure, looking at the self, as 
an index of self-focus. So, a concern is the validity of that measure, specifically if looking at the 
self indicates thinking about the self. To this end, the fact that the new looking measure of self-
focus produced the same result as a verbal index of self-focus in one case provides some support 
for its validity. However, the looking index of self-focus did not correlate with any of the verbal 
measures of self-focus; this may indicate that they measure different things. Notably, self-
focused pronoun use, which has been used to indicate self-focus in past research (e.g. 
Brockmeyer et al., 2015; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), was not significantly predicted by the 
variables tested in Exp. 1. It may be that the looking measure of self-focus is better able to track 
differences in self-focus, depending at least on the conversation factors and personality variables 
that have been considered as predictors.  
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Chapter Conclusions 
Because Exp. 1 tells us that the looking measure of self-focus is a promising way to 
capture differences in self-focus depending on the manipulated conversation conditions and 
personality variables, the measure was used again in Exp. 2. In Exp. 2, more emotional 
conditions were include to further evaluate how increased or decreased self-focus may occur 
depending on differences in the need for self-evaluation and in the likelihood of self-standard 
discrepancies (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Because Exp. 1 had low levels of looking at the self, 
Exp. 2 uses a larger image of the self on the screen. By making it easier for participants to look at 
the self on the screen, is likely to increase rates of looking at the self and improve our ability to 




Chapter 7: Experiment 2 
The goals of Exp. 2 were to provide a conceptual replication and extension and to 
improve on methodological limitations of Exp. 1. Exp. 2 continues to explore the question of 
when and for whom self-focus occurs within ongoing interactions. Conversation factors, 
including who was speaking and whether stories were likely to involve more versus less 
discrepancies between the self and social standards, were retained and extended. Because there 
was mixed support for greater self-focus for less socially anxious people when the self was not in 
alignment with social standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and for people with greater self-
esteem when the self was verified or enhanced (Swann, 1983; Taylor & Brown, 1988), this 
experiment seeks to find replication or clarify the nature of the relationships. 
Despite original predictions that informed the conversation design of Exp. 1, not much 
difference in self-focus between the two emotion conditions—sharing proud versus embarrassed 
stories—was found. This may be because these individual conversation segments were brief and 
the conversations in which they were contained were also brief, so there may have not been 
enough time to see the fluctuations in self-focus across them. To remedy this, Exp. 2 uses longer 
conversations that contain a greater variety of emotional sharing conditions than Exp. 1. By 
measuring self-focus across more conditions in Exp. 2, these expected fluctuations may emerge. 
 In Exp. 1, only one positive emotion, pride, and one negative emotion, embarrassment, 
were considered. Sharing a proud story was expected to be self-consistent and sharing an 
embarrassed story was expected to be self-discrepant, at least for those with more positive views 
of the self (Swann et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004). However, one reason there might not 
have been consistent changes in self-focus between these conditions is that they each involved 
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the same type of emotion, self-conscious emotions. Therefore, in Exp. 2, a comparison to a 
different type of emotion, basic emotions, was included (Tracy & Robins, 2004).  
According to one theory, emotions can be designated as self-conscious or basic (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004). Self-conscious emotions, including pride, shame, and embarrassment, are 
theoretically different from basic emotions because self-conscious emotions require self-
evaluative processes and basic emotions do not. Because self-evaluative processes are 
necessarily involved in the parts of a conversation that involve self-conscious emotions (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004) and because self-focus is theorized to occur to regulate behavior change in the 
face of self-evaluation (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), sharing experiences 
that involve self-conscious emotions should increase self-focus. On the other hand, sharing 
experiences that involve basic emotions, such as what makes one happy or sad, will involve 
fewer self-evaluative processes, and so it is expected, less of a need for self-focus (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004).  
In Exp. 2, more emotional conditions were include to evaluate how increased or 
decreased self-focus occurs depending on differences in the need for self-evaluation and in the 
likelihood of self-standard discrepancies (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Exp. 1 had low levels of 
looking at the self, so in Exp. 2, participants saw a larger image of the self on the screen. Rather 
than being in just one small corner of the screen, participants saw a split-screen configuration, 
with the video of self and other appearing of equal size on the screen. Modified in response to 
concerns about the low rate of looking at the self in Exp. 1, this change in procedure, by making 
it easier for participants to look at the self on the screen, is likely to increase rates of looking at 
the self and improve our ability to capture variation in looking at the self across the conversation. 
Finally, although the looking index of self-focus did not correlate with any of the verbal 
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measures of self-focus in Exp. 1 and they are likely to indicate self-focus differently, the same 
linguistic indices of self-focus (i.e. self-focused pronoun use and story length) were included for 
additional exploration. 
As in Exp. 1, conversation factors were expected to interact with trait-level perceptions of 
the self, so participant self-esteem, self-consciousness, and social anxiety were also assessed. In 
Exp. 1, self-focus was greater for people with higher than lower self-esteem while sharing 
personal information in general, perhaps as a way of confirming their overall more positive 
views of the self (Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1983; Swann & Bosson, 2010). In Exp. 1, self-focus’s 
relationship to self-esteem did not depend on the content of what was being shared, whether it 
was discrepant or consistent with self-views (Swann et al., 2007) or relevant social standards 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). In Exp. 2, this may occur as predicted given the wider range of 
emotions tested across a longer conversation. 
Replication of the relationship between social anxiety and self-focus found in Exp. 1 is 
also predicted for Exp. 2. More socially anxious people are predicted to reduce self-focus when 
they most doubt their ability to make a good impression (Spurr & Stopa, 2002) and feel they are 
not measuring up to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). On the other hand, less 
socially anxious people are expected to increase self-focus when the self is more discrepant with 
social standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), when sharing negative self-conscious emotions, 
compared to positive or basic emotions. 
To begin investigating the downstream consequences of self-focus within ongoing 
interactions, a final feature of Exp. 2 is the addition of a self-reported measure of interpersonal 
connection, “Inclusion of Other in the Self” (IOS), that will be tested for its correlation with the 
various indices of self-focus (Aron et al., 1992). Because self-focus has been theorized to reduce 
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one’s focus on aspects of the other (Greenwald, 1980; Silvia et al., 2013), increased self-focus 
was predicted to correspond to reduced interpersonal closeness. However, the alternative 
possibility has some support; for instance, self-focus has been shown to promote prosocial 
behavior, at least when the other was similar to one’s self, and when self-focus was made explicit 
(e.g. Hung & Wyer, 2014). To test an exploratory hypothesis that self-focus during particular 
parts of a conversation is more conducive to interpersonal connection than others, the 
relationship between self-focus during individual conversation conditions and IOS will be 
considered.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 6 (speaker x self-esteem interaction): Self-focus will increase when the 
self is enhanced. Replicating Exp. 1, and providing support for self-enhancement theory, as self-
esteem increases, self-focus will increase, especially while sharing one’s own experiences, 
which is an overall more self-enhancing experience (Taylor & Brown, 1988), regardless of 
whether or not they are sharing personal information that is self-confirming (e.g. positive self-
conscious emotions) or self-discrepant (e.g. negative self-conscious emotions). This is because 
sharing personal experiences is a more positive experience for people with greater self-esteem 
(Swann et al., 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and because people with greater self-esteem tend to 
focus on positive aspects of the self more than people with lower self-esteem (Swann et al., 
2007).  
Hypothesis 7 (speaker x emotion type x social anxiety interaction): Self-focus will 
increase when the self is most threatened for less socially anxious people and decrease when 
the self is most threatened for more socially anxious people. Replicating Exp. 1, and in 
support of objective self-awareness theory which predicts that self-focus will be greatest when it 
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is needed, when the self is most discrepant with social standards, (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), 
self-focus will be greatest, at least for less socially anxious people when they feel they are not 
measuring up to standards of correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972)—while sharing stories 
involving negative self-conscious emotions. 
Hypothesis 8 (main effect of emotion type): Self-focus will be greater while sharing 
personal information involving self-conscious than basic emotions. Because self-focus is 
generally theorized to be a part of self-regulation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Festinger, 1957; 
Swann, 1983) and because the sharing of personal information involving self-conscious emotions 
requires self-evaluation processes to be activated (Tracy & Robins, 2004), the need for self-
regulation, and thus self-focus, will be greater while sharing stories involving self-conscious 
emotions compared to basic ones. 
 Hypothesis 9 (correlation hypotheses): Increased self-focus will be associated with 
reduced interpersonal closeness. If self-focus is associated with reduced focus on aspects of the 
other (Greenwald, 1980; Silvia et al., 2013), then self-focus (measured in three ways, as looking 
at the self, linguistic indices of self-focus, and dispositional indices of self-focus) will negatively 




 144 Brooklyn College undergraduate students (47 males; 97 females; M = 20.811, SEM 
= .347 years) were recruited and participated in exchange for course credit. 72 participants were 
assigned to have their eye movements tracked (20 males; 52 females; M = 20.361, SEM = .392 
years) and 72 were assigned to be the conversation partner but not have their eye movements 
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tracked (27 males; 45 females; M = 21.268, SEM = .572 years). Recruitment, screening, and 
informed consent procedures were the same as Exp. 1. Of the 72 participants assigned to have 
their eye movements tracked, 69 of them (19 males; 50 females; M = 20.362, SEM = .398 years) 
had complete conversation and eye tracking data. Two participants excluded from analyses did 
not follow the conversation prompts, and due to a technical error, eye-tracking data were not 
collected for one participant. 
Procedure and Materials 
 Two online video chat accounts created with ooVoo software were used to connect 
participant conversation partners. With the ooVoo software, participants saw equal-sized boxes 
containing video of the self and their conversation partner on the screen, as shown in Figure 6. 
The video chat screen of the participant having her eye movements tracked was recorded using 
the ooVoo software. The participants’ computer monitor and eye-tracking devices were the same 
as in Exp. 1.  
 
Figure 6. Video chat screen showing equally sized images of conversation partners. 
 
 Study procedures mirrored those of Exp. 1, except that the booklet of conversation 
prompts, adapted from the Fast Friends Paradigm (Aron et al. 1997), were given to the 
participants not having their eye movements tracked prior to the conversation. The prompts were 
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designed around the key manipulation of emotional conversation content in a 2 (positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (basic vs. self-conscious) within-subjects design (Table 9).  
Table 9 
Conversation Categories 
 Emotion Type  












Each conversation partner responded to each conversation prompt. The participant with 
the book of prompts was instructed to read aloud each prompt and indicate who was to respond 
first. The order and who was asked to respond first to each prompt alternated across participants. 
The 12 specific conversation prompts (10 of which pertained to the key emotion conditions 
depicted in Table 9) are shown in Table 10. Two prompts did not fit into the emotion categories; 
the first prompt was always to “give a one-minute version of your life story,” and was intended 
as an introduction. The seventh prompt was always to “name something you and your partner 
appear to have in common,” and was intended to build community between the two.  
Table 10 
Twelve Conversation Prompts 
Category Conversation Prompt 
Community-building Give your partner a one-minute version of your life story. 
Surprise What is the most surprising thing that anyone has ever done for you? 
Embarrassment 
 
Share with your partner an embarrassing moment in your life. 
Achievement-Oriented 
Pride 
What achievement are you most proud of? 
Sadness When did you last cry in front of another person or by yourself? 
Envy Have you ever disliked someone for being luckier or more successful 
than you?  
Community-building Name something you and your partner appear to have in common. 
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Happiness What is your happiest memory? 
Shame Is there anything about yourself that you feel ashamed of? 
Hubristic Pride Tell your partner something you really like about yourself. 
Fear What is your scariest memory? 
Guilt If you could take one thing back, something you feel guilty about 
doing, what would it be? 
 
 As in Exp. 1, participants who had their eye movements tracked responded to the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989) and the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et 
al., 1975) following the conversation. In a procedure not used in Exp. 1, the interpersonal 
connection formed during the conversation was assessed following the conversation, using the 
“Inclusion of Other in the Self” scale (Aron et al., 1992). Both participants were given the scale, 
as depicted in Figure 7, which is scored based on the image a participant selects from least 
(indicated by the first image with two non-overlapping circles) to most connected (indicated by 
the last image with two mostly overlapping circles). 
 
Figure 7. Inclusion of other in the self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The instructions 
were adapted for the present experiment. 
 
 Participants were debriefed, and all procedures were completed in less than one hour. 
Data Analysis 
 Factors influencing self-focus. Multilevel models were used to analyze the influence of 
conversation content and personality differences on (1) looking at the self and (2) linguistic 
indices of self-focus throughout the conversation. 
Instructions: Please circle the picture that best describes 
your current relationship with your conversation partner. 
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(1) On looking at the self. Looking at the self was measured in the same way as Exp. 1. 
Multilevel models included the within-subject variables of speaker (telling v. listening to stories), 
emotion type (basic v. self-conscious), and valence (positive v. negative) as binary factors and 
personality variables as continuous covariates. To test if the personality variable data met the 
assumption of collinearity, both tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) were assessed. 
Moreover, to avoid the issue, a separate multilevel model was run using each of the continuous 
personality variables—social anxiety, private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and 
self-esteem—on the dependent variable, the percent time looking at the self. Each of the 
continuous personality variables was centered and included both for its main effects and 
interactions with the binary factors of speaker, emotion type, and valence. 
The three binary factors: speaker, emotion type, and valence were dummy coded. For 
speaker, “self” was coded “1” and other was coded “0.” For emotion type, “self-conscious” was 
coded “1” and “basic” was coded “0.” For valence, “negative” was coded “1” and “positive” was 
coded “0.”  
(2) Linguistic indices of self-focus. Linguistic indices of self-focus were measured in the 
same way as Exp. 1. Multilevel models were run on each of the four measures of verbal self-
focus: self-focused pronouns per minute, self-focused pronouns out of total words, story time 
length, and word count. The models included the two binary factors: emotion type and valence, 
which were dummy coded in the same way as looking at the self. Each of the continuous 
personality variables was centered and included both for its main effects and two-way and three-
way interactions with the binary factors of emotion type and valence. 
Self-focus and inclusion of other in the self. An interpersonal outcome measure, 
“Inclusion of Other in the Self” (IOS, Aron et al., 1992) was included to assess how measured 
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self-focus relates to a social outcome, feeling connected to one’s conversation partner (Aron et 
al., 1992). Although self-focus has been associated with reduced engagement with the other and 
negative interpersonal outcomes (e.g. Hung & Wyer, 2014; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 
2013; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009), it is also theorized to be involved in a self-evaluative 
process that may lead one to behave more in line with relevant standards (Carver & Scheier, 
1982, 1981). Feeling connected to one’s conversation partner is a relevant standard on which an 
interaction’s success can be judged; therefore, whether self-focus is associated with more or less 
feelings of connection provides a test of these competing theories. IOS was analyzed in four 
ways: 1) one participant’s IOS responses, which were coded on a 7-point scale, representing 
feeling least to most connected, 2) her conversation partner’s IOS responses, 3) the difference 
between the participant and her partner’s score, which indicates the degree to which one 
participant felt more connected to the other than they did (a more positive value would mean that 
the participant felt more connected to the partner than they did), and 4) the absolute value of the 
difference between one participant’s score and her partner’s score, which indicates how different 
the two conversation partners’ scores were with a higher value indicating a less shared view, and 
a lower value indicating a more shared view. Looking at the self, linguistic indices of self-focus, 
and dispositional tendencies to self-focus, indicated by the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein 
et al., 1975), were all tested for their correlations to IOS. 
Results 
Personality Variables 
Prior to including the personality variables in subsequent analyses, their correlations were 
assessed and are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 







Self-Esteem -0.043 -0.286* -0.203^ 
Private Self-Consciousness  .489*** -0.010 
Public Self-Consciousness   0.125 
 
All correlations include 69 participants with df = 68; ***p < .001; *p < .050; ^p < .100 
 
Tests to see if the personality variable data met the assumption of collinearity indicated 
that multicollinearity was not a concern (Self-Esteem, Tolerance = .865, VIF = 1.156; Private 
Self-Consciousness, Tolerance = .789, VIF = 1.267; Public Self-Consciousness, Tolerance = 
.782, VIF = 1.278; Social Anxiety, Tolerance = .871, VIF = 1.148). Still, because there was some 
correlation between the personality variables, a separate multilevel model was run using each of 
the continuous personality variables—social anxiety, private self-consciousness, public self-
consciousness, and self-esteem—on looking at the self and linguistic indices of self-focus. 
Looking at the Self 
To test the effect of speaker, valence, emotion type, and their interaction with personality 
variables on looking at the self, multilevel models were performed including each of the 
personality variables in a separate model. In none of the models did speaker, valence, or emotion 
type have a main effect on looking at the self (see Tables 10-12). However, as in Exp. 1, main 
effects and interactions involving personality variables were found. 
Self-esteem model on looking at the self. Supporting the replication hypothesis that as 
self-esteem increases, self-focus would increase (Hypothesis 6), in Exp. 2, as in Exp. 1, self-
esteem predicted an increase in looking at the self, as indicated by a significant main effect, B = 
.004, t(140) = 2.443, p = .016. Also replicating Exp. 1, the increase in looking at the self as self-
esteem increased was greater while participants told their own stories than while listening to 
others’ stories, as indicated by a significant Self-esteem x Speaker interaction, B = -0.003, t(468) 
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= 2.192, p = .029). This replicated result implies that the general situation of sharing personal 
information may be a more self-enhancing experience for people with greater self-esteem 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988), regardless of whether they are sharing personal information that is self-
confirming or self-discrepant. As depicted in Figure 8, self-esteem predicts a positive trend of 
looking at the self while telling one’s own stories, represented by a positive simple slope: 
gradient = .429, t(548) = .434, p = .664). Although that simple slope is not significantly different 
from zero, the two-way interaction indicates the increase when telling one’s own stories is 
significantly greater than the increase when listening to the other’s stories (simple slope: gradient 
= .102, t(548) = .097, p = .923). Model results are presented in Table 12. 
 
Figure 8. Speaker x Self-esteem interaction on looking at the self. Endpoints for self-esteem (on 
continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines represent two levels of the speaker 
variable: telling versus listening to stories. 
 
Table 12 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-
Conscious), Valence (Positive v. Negative) and Self-Esteem on Looking at Self 
  95% CI 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.059 0.010 141 6.001 <.001 0.039 0.078 
Speaker -0.015 0.008 468 -1.794 0.074 -0.031 0.001 
Emotion Type -0.002 0.008 468 -0.226 0.821 -0.018 0.014 






























Self-Esteem 0.004 0.002 140 2.443 0.016 0.001 0.008 
Speaker x Emotion Type 0.003 0.012 468 0.248 0.804 -0.020 0.026 
Speaker x Valence -0.007 0.012 468 -0.574 0.566 -0.030 0.016 
Speaker x Self-Esteem -0.003 0.001 468 -2.192 0.029 -0.006 0.000 
Emotion Type x Valence -0.002 0.012 468 -0.195 0.845 -0.025 0.021 
Emotion Type x Self-
Esteem 
-0.001 0.001 468 -0.337 0.736 -0.003 0.002 
Valence x Self-Esteem 0.002 0.001 468 1.335 0.182 -0.001 0.005 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Valence 
-0.008 0.017 468 -0.462 0.645 -0.040 0.025 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Self-Esteem 
0.000 0.002 468 0.029 0.977 -0.004 0.004 
Speaker x Valence x Self-
Esteem 
-0.001 0.002 468 -0.709 0.479 -0.006 0.003 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Self-Esteem 
-0.001 0.002 468 -0.642 0.521 -0.006 0.003 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Valence x Self-Esteem 
0.001 0.003 468 0.273 0.785 -0.005 0.007 
For speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; for emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; 
for valence: 1 = negative, positive = 0 
 
Social anxiety model on looking at the self. Model results for social anxiety, in which 
there were no significant predictors, are presented in Appendix C (Table 53). 
 Private and public self-consciousness models on looking at the self. Similar to the 
finding in Exp. 1, in which social anxiety predicted decreased looking at the self, (predicted in 
Exp. 2, Hypothesis 7), this time instead, private and public self-consciousness predicted 
decreased looking at the self, as indicated by significant main effects (Private: B = -.005, t(144) = 
2.783, p = .006; Public: B = -.006, t(140) = 2.664, p = .009) (Tables 13-14).  
Both private and public self-consciousness also interacted with speaker, such that as 
private and public self-consciousness increased, there was a sharper decrease in looking at the 
self during one’s own stories compared to the other’s stories, Private x Speaker interaction: B = 
0.003, t(468) = 1.968, p = .050; Public x Speaker interaction: B = 0.004, t(468) = 2.300, p = .022. 
As shown in Figure 9, both private and public self-consciousness predicted negative trends of 
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looking at the self while telling their own stories, represented by a negative simple slope (for 
Private: gradient = -.510, t(548) = 1.191, p = .234; for Public: gradient = -.558, t(548) = 1.220, p 
= .223). Although that simple slope is not significantly different from zero, the two-way 
interaction indicates the decrease when telling one’s own stories is significantly greater than the 
decrease when listening to the other’s stories (simple slope for Private: gradient = -.201, t(548) = 
.359, p = .720; for Public: gradient = -.150, t(548) = .253, p = .801). Model results are presented 
in Tables 13-14. 
 
Figure 9. Interactions between speaker and private self-consciousness (left panel) and public 
self-consciousness (right panel) on looking at the self. Endpoints for private and public self-
consciousness (on continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines represent two 
levels of the speaker variable: telling versus listening to stories. 
Table 13 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-
Conscious), Valence (Positive v. Negative) and Private Self-Consciousness on Looking at Self 
  95% CI 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.058 0.01 141 5.894 <.001 0.039 0.078 
Speaker -0.014 0.008 468 -1.712 0.088 -0.031 0.002 
Emotion Type -0.001 0.008 468 -0.164 0.87 -0.018 0.015 





















































-0.005 0.002 144 -2.783 0.006 -0.009 -0.001 
Speaker x Emotion Type 0.002 0.012 468 0.202 0.84 -0.021 0.026 
Speaker x Valence -0.007 0.012 468 -0.609 0.543 -0.031 0.016 
Speaker x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.003 0.002 468 1.968 0.05 0 0.006 
Emotion Type x Valence -0.003 0.012 468 -0.235 0.814 -0.026 0.021 
Emotion Type x Private 
Self-Consciousness 
0.001 0.002 468 0.814 0.416 -0.002 0.004 
Valence x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.001 0.002 468 0.773 0.44 -0.002 0.004 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Valence 
-0.007 0.017 468 -0.426 0.67 -0.04 0.026 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.001 0.002 468 -0.282 0.778 -0.005 0.004 
Speaker x Valence x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
0 0.002 468 0.187 0.852 -0.004 0.005 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
0 0.002 468 -0.119 0.905 -0.005 0.004 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Valence x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0 0.003 468 -0.09 0.928 -0.006 0.006 
For speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; for emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; 




Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-
Conscious), Valence (Positive v. Negative) and Public Self-Consciousness on Looking at Self 
 95% CI 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.059 0.01 139 5.984 <.001 0.039 0.078 
Speaker -0.015 0.008 468 -1.818 0.07 -0.032 0.001 
Emotion Type -0.002 0.008 468 -0.25 0.803 -0.018 0.014 
Valence 0.009 0.008 468 1.033 0.302 -0.008 0.025 
Public Self-Consciousness -0.006 0.002 140 -2.664 0.009 -0.01 -0.001 
Speaker x Emotion Type 0.003 0.012 468 0.265 0.791 -0.02 0.026 
Speaker x Valence -0.007 0.012 468 -0.558 0.577 -0.03 0.017 
Speaker x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.004 0.002 468 2.3 0.022 0.001 0.008 
Emotion Type x Valence -0.002 0.012 468 -0.179 0.858 -0.025 0.021 
Emotion Type x Public 
Self-Consciousness 
0.002 0.002 468 1.17 0.242 -0.001 0.006 
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Valence x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.001 0.002 468 -0.423 0.673 -0.004 0.003 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Valence 
-0.008 0.017 468 -0.474 0.636 -0.041 0.025 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
0 0.003 468 -0.029 0.977 -0.005 0.005 
Speaker x Valence x Public 
Self-Consciousness 
0.001 0.003 468 0.548 0.584 -0.004 0.006 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
0 0.003 468 0.036 0.971 -0.005 0.005 
Speaker x Emotion Type x 
Valence x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.001 0.004 468 -0.302 0.763 -0.008 0.006 
For speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; for emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; 
for valence: 1 = negative, positive = 0 
 
Correlations among Dependent Variables 
 As in Exp. 1, in addition to the looking measure of self-focus, linguistic indices of self-
focus were also considered for how they were influenced by personality variables and 
conversation factors. Correlations reflecting the relationships among these looking and linguistic 
indices of self-focus were assessed. As in Exp. 1, overall time spent looking at the self while 
speaking did not correlate with overall story length and overall self-pronoun use during those 
same periods of speaking (Tables 15-16). 
Table 15 
Correlations between Dependent Variables in Exp. 2 












% Time Looking at Self 0.076 -0.085 0.031 -0.074 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute  -0.207 .558*** -0.029 
Story Time Length   -.398** .954** 
Self-Focused Pronouns / Total Words    -0.416*** 
Word Count     





Correlations between Dependent Variables in Exp. 2, Continued 









% Time Looking at Self .267* -0.228 -0.236 -0.021 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute 0.149 0.193 0.065 -0.147 
Story Time Length -0.069 0.192 -0.035 -0.182 
Self-Focused Pronouns / Total Words 0.134 -0.062 0.035 0.152 
Word Count -0.080 .259* 0.032 -.238* 
All correlations include 69 participants with df = 68; ***p < .001; **p<.01; *p < .050 
 
Linguistic Indices of Self-Focus 
As in Exp. 1, linguistic indicators of self-focus were investigated for how they change 
depending on different emotional conversation content and individual differences and whether or 
not they do so in the same way as looking at the self-focus. To test the effect of valence and 
emotion type and their interaction with personality variables on each of the four linguistic 
indices, multilevel models were performed including each of the personality variables in a 
separate model. 
Self-focused pronouns out of total words 
 Main effects of emotion type and valence on self-focused pronouns out of total words. 
Main effects of emotion type and valence occurred in each of the four models including self-
esteem, public and private self-consciousness, and social anxiety on self-focused pronouns out of 
total words. One representative model is shown below (Table 17) and the other three models are 
included in Appendix C (Tables 54-56). In each model, support for the prediction that stories 
involving self-conscious emotions would include greater self-focus than those involving basic 
emotions (Hypothesis 8) was supported. Specifically, a greater percent of self-focused pronouns 
were used out of total words during stories involving self-conscious (M = 13.407, SEM = .297%) 
compared to basic emotions (M = 11.640, SEM = .333%), B = -1.210, t(597) = 2.264, p = .024.  
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The prediction from Exp. 1 (Hypothesis 2) that self-focus would be greater during stories 
involving negative emotions was not supported by self-focused pronoun usage. In fact, a smaller 
percent of self-focused pronouns out of total words were used during negative (M = 11.726, 
SEM = .297%) than positive stories (M = 13.321, SEM = .333%), B = 2.147, t(597) = 4.015, p < 
.001. Overall, when people shared negative personal experiences, they decreased self-focus by 
using fewer self-focused pronouns.  
Table 17 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Social Anxiety on Self-Focused Pronouns Out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 12.338 0.336 251 36.690 <.001 11.676 13.000 
Emotion Type -1.210 0.535 597 -2.264 0.024 -2.260 -0.160 
Valence 2.147 0.535 597 4.015 <.001 1.097 3.197 
Self-Esteem 0.098 0.060 246 1.640 0.102 -0.020 0.217 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.115 0.814 598 -1.369 0.172 -2.714 0.485 
Emotion Type x Self-Esteem -0.032 0.096 597 -0.336 0.737 -0.220 0.156 
Valence x Self-Esteem -0.096 0.096 597 -1.007 0.315 -0.284 0.092 
Emotion Type x Valence x Self-
Esteem 
0.054 0.146 597 0.372 0.710 -0.232 0.341 
For emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; for valence: 1 = negative, positive = 0 
 
Word count 
Emotion type and valence on word count. A main effect of emotion type and interaction 
between emotion type and valence occurred in each of the four models including self-esteem, 
public and private self-consciousness, and social anxiety on word count. One representative 
model is shown below (Table 18), and the other three models are included in Appendix C 
(Tables 57-59). Contradicting the finding in this experiment that self-focused pronoun use, 
hypothesized to indicate increased self-focus, was greater during stories involving self-conscious 
emotions, and contrary to the prediction (Hypothesis 8) that stories involving self-conscious 
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emotions would involve more self-focus than those involving basic emotions, in fact, stories 
involving self-conscious emotions contained fewer words (M = 84.677, SEM = 7.974) than those 
involving basic emotions (M = 94.927, SEM = 8.155 seconds), B = 19.371, t(593) = 3.175, p = 
.002. As shown in Figure 10, that reduction in word count among stories involving self-
conscious emotions occurred specifically for negative, not positive, stories. It is when telling 
negative emotional stories that those involving basic emotions contain more words than those 
involving self-conscious emotions. This is indicated by an Emotion Type x Valence interaction, 
B = -18.229, t(593) = 1.961, p = .050 
 
Figure 10. 2-way interaction of emotion type (basic v. self-conscious) and valence (positive v. 
negative) on predicted word count. Error bars are SEM. 
 
Table 18 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Self-Esteem on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df T Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 90.175 8.176 81 11.029 <.001 73.906 106.444 
Emotion Type 19.371 6.101 593 3.175 0.002 7.389 31.352 
Valence -11.132 6.101 593 -1.825 0.069 -23.113 0.849 
Self-Esteem -1.241 1.468 80 -0.845 0.401 -4.162 1.681 
Emotion Type x Valence -18.229 9.294 593 -1.961 0.050 -36.483 0.025 
Emotion Type x Self-Esteem -1.152 1.092 593 -1.055 0.292 -3.296 0.993 
Valence x Self-Esteem 0.890 1.092 593 0.815 0.415 -1.255 3.034 
Emotion Type x Valence x Self-
Esteem 

























For emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; for valence: 1 = negative, positive = 0 
 
Self-focused pronouns per minute 
A main effect of valence occurred in each of the four models including self-esteem, 
public and private self-consciousness, and social anxiety on self-focused pronouns per minute. 
Contrary to the prediction from Exp. 1 that self-focus would be greater when sharing negative 
compared to positive emotions (Hypothesis 2), in fact, people used fewer self-focused pronouns 
per minute during negative (M = 17.417, SEM = .575) than positive stories (M = 18.888, SEM = 
.268), B = 2.282, t(597) = 2.538, p = .011 (Table 19). Models including self-esteem and private 
and public self-consciousness contained no additional effects on the outcome self-focused 
pronouns per minute and are included in Appendix C (Tables 60-62). 
 Social anxiety model on self-focused pronouns per minute. A two-way interaction 
between valence and social anxiety revealed that as social anxiety decreased, people used more 
self-focused pronouns per minute during positive than negative stories, but as social anxiety 
increased, there was less of a difference between positive and negative stories, B = -.487, t(598) 
= 2.765, p = .006. Although no pairwise comparisons of simple slopes were significant, the 
three-way interaction between emotion type, valence, and social anxiety (B = .650, t(598) = 
2.427, p = .016; Table 19) appears to be driven by the condition involving positive self-
conscious emotions specifically, not positive emotions in general. As shown in Figure 11, as 
social anxiety decreases, people use more self-focused pronouns per minute specifically in 
stories involving positive self-conscious emotions. This finding does not support Hypothesis 7, 
and it runs contrary to what was found in Exp. 1, in which looking at the self increased as social 
anxiety decreased when sharing a story involving a negative self-conscious emotion. 
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Figure 11. 3-way interaction of valence, emotion type, and social anxiety on self-focused 
pronoun use. Endpoints for social anxiety (on continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the 
mean. Lines represent the four emotion conditions, which include the two levels of valence: 
positive and negative and the two levels of emotion type: basic and self-conscious emotions. 
Table 19 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Social Anxiety on Self-Focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df T Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 18.227 0.633 183 28.774 <.001 16.977 19.476 
Emotion Type -1.606 0.899 597 -1.786 0.075 -3.372 0.160 
Valence 2.282 0.899 597 2.538 0.011 0.516 4.047 
Social Anxiety -0.032 0.124 190 -0.260 0.795 -0.277 0.213 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.597 1.370 597 -1.166 0.244 -4.287 1.093 
Emotion Type x Social Anxiety -0.113 0.176 598 -0.641 0.521 -0.459 0.233 
Valence x Social Anxiety -0.487 0.176 598 -2.765 0.006 -0.834 -0.141 
Emotion Type x Valence x Social 
Anxiety 
0.650 0.268 598 2.427 0.016 0.124 1.175 
For emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; for valence: 1 = negative, positive = 
 Story time length 
A main effect of emotion type occurred in each of the four models including self-esteem, 
public and private self-consciousness, and social anxiety on the time length of stories. The 
prediction (Hypothesis 8) that there would be greater self-focus, indicated by longer stories, 
during stories involving self-conscious compared to basic emotions was not supported. In fact, 


































those involving basic emotions (M = 37.956, SEM = 3.065 seconds), B = 7.042, t(590) = 2.915, 
p = .004; Table 20. Models including private and public self-consciousness and social anxiety 
contained no additional effects on story time and are included in Appendix C (Tables 63-65). 
Self-esteem model on story time length. An additional three-way interaction between 
valence, emotion type, and self-esteem was discovered on the time people spent telling different 
emotional stories, B = 1.465, t(590) = 2.222, p = .027; Table 20. Self-esteem predicted shorter 
stories in all but one of the emotion conditions. Only when telling stories involving positive basic 
emotions (e.g. happiness and surprise) did self-esteem predict longer stories. As shown in Figure 
12, comparing first between positive and negative basic emotions, greater self-esteem predicted 
longer stories involving positive basic emotions and shorter stories involving negative basic 
emotions (slope difference test: t(663) = 1.911, p = .056). These results provide some evidence 
of a match between one’s self-views and when they self-focus more or less, indicated by the time 
they spend talking about a given subject. This is especially evident as self-esteem decreased: 
people spent more time sharing personal experiences involving negative basic emotions and less 
time sharing personal experiences involving positive basic emotions. The simple slopes for both 
positive and negative self-conscious emotions, on the other hand, are both negative and not 
significantly different (slope difference test: t(663) = .444, p = .657).  
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Figure 12. 3-way interaction of valence, emotion type, and self-esteem on story time length. 
Endpoints for self-esteem (on continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines 
represent the four emotion conditions, which include the two levels of valence: positive and 
negative and the two levels of emotion type: basic and self-conscious emotions. 
Table 20 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Self-Esteem on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df T Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 36.529 3.074 81 11.882 <.001 30.412 42.646 
Emotion Type 7.042 2.416 590 2.915 0.004 2.297 11.787 
Valence -4.563 2.416 590 -1.889 0.059 -9.308 0.182 
Self-Esteem -0.344 0.552 80 -0.624 0.534 -1.442 0.754 
Emotion Type x Valence -6.716 3.681 590 -1.825 0.069 -13.945 0.513 
Emotion Type x Self-Esteem -0.748 0.432 590 -1.730 0.084 -1.597 0.101 
Valence x Self-Esteem 0.121 0.432 590 0.280 0.780 -0.728 0.970 
Emotion Type x Valence x Self-
Esteem 
1.465 0.659 590 2.222 0.027 0.170 2.760 
For emotion type variable: 1 = self-conscious, basic = 0; for valence: 1 = negative, positive = 0 
 
Inclusion of Other in the Self 
Correlations between self-focus and inclusion of other in the self. To consider how an 
interpersonal outcome, “Inclusion of Other in the Self” (IOS; Aron et al., 1992), relates to 
various measures of self-focus, correlations between three indices of self-focus (looking at the 
self, linguistic indices of self-focus, and dispositional indices of self-focus) and IOS scores 

































between the two, and the absolute value of that difference) were tested. Although self-focus has 
been associated with reduced engagement with the other and negative interpersonal outcomes 
(e.g. Hung & Wyer, 2014; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 
2009), it is also theorized to lead one to behave more in line with relevant standards (Carver & 
Scheier, 1982, 1981). In a social situation, a relevant standard is establishing connection with 
one’s conversation partner. To test if spontaneous self-focus (looking at the self and linguistic 
indices of self-focus) during particular parts of a conversation is more conducive to interpersonal 
connection than other parts of a conversation, self-focus during individual conversation 
conditions was considered. 
Own IOS score. The number of self-focused pronouns used per minute during one’s own 
stories involving negative self-conscious emotions positively correlated with one’s own IOS 
score, r(68) = .274, p = .023. That is, the more self-focused people were during their own 
negative self-presentations, the more they reported including the other in the self, indicating a 
sense of greater interpersonal connection. This finding is in contrast to the prediction 
(Hypothesis 9) that increased self-focus would correlate with decreased IOS. 
Other’s IOS score. On the other hand, the number of self-focused pronouns out of total 
words used during one’s own stories involving positive self-conscious emotions negatively 
correlated with the partner’s IOS score, r(68) = -.299, p = .013. That is, the more self-focused 
people were during their own positive self-presentations, the less their partner reported including 
them in their self, indicating a reduced sense of interpersonal connection from one’s conversation 
partner. This finding partially supports the prediction (Hypothesis 9) that increased self-focus 
would correlate with decreased IOS. 
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However, the number of words used during one’s own stories involving positive self-
conscious emotions positively correlated with the partner’s IOS score, r(68) = .237, p = .049. So, 
using more words, but fewer self-focused pronouns, during one’s own positive self-presentations 
helps one’s conversation partner feel more connected. 
One dispositional index of self-focus, social anxiety, correlated with the partner’s rating 
of connection. The more socially anxious a participant was, the lower their conversation partner 
rated including the other in the self, r(68) = -.256, p = .034. Complete correlation results are 
presented in Appendix C (Tables 66-68). 
Discussion 
 Replicating results from Exp. 1, self-esteem predicted an increase in looking at the self, 
especially while sharing one’s own stories, supporting Hypothesis 6. Conversely, both private 
and public self-consciousness predicted a decrease in looking at the self, again especially while 
telling one’s own stories. In Exp. 1, social anxiety, a third component of the self-consciousness 
scale, predicted the decrease in looking at the self, and this was the basis for Hypothesis 7. In 
Exp. 2, it was public and private self-consciousness, the other two sub-scales of the self-
consciousness scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) that predicted the decrease in looking at the self. In 
sum, whereas self-esteem predicted increased looking at the self while sharing personal 
information in conversations across two experiments, self-consciousness (as indicated by its 
three facets: public and private self-consciousness and social anxiety) predicted decreased 
looking at the self while sharing personal information in conversations across two experiments. 
 In both of these key findings from Exp. 2, looking at the self did not depend on the 
conversation content, which is inconsistent with objective self-awareness theory (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). Instead, the effects of both self-esteem and self-consciousness occurred 
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regardless of emotional content, suggesting that self-focus across the experience of sharing 
personal information depends on trait-level indictors of one’s self-views (Swann et al., 2007) and 
one’s tendency to engage in self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975), and not depending on variations 
in the type and valence of emotional information that is shared that is either consistent or 
discrepant to social standards. 
Self-Esteem and Looking at the Self 
 The fact that people with greater self-esteem tended to self-focus more during aspects of 
the conversation that are personally relevant—when sharing stories about themselves—
demonstrates the motivation to confirm or enhance the already positive self-views that are 
characteristic of people with higher self-esteem (Swann et al., 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988).   
Self-Consciousness and Looking at the Self 
 More self-conscious people, on the other hand, self-focused less during those aspects of 
the conversation that are personally relevant. The social context provided in the experiment—
sharing personal experiences with a stranger—was met with a reduction in further explicit self-
focusing behaviors for more dispositionally self-conscious people. This fact demonstrates one of 
the options presented in objective self-awareness theory: that increased self-focus may result in 
an attempt to leave the state of self-focus (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Because more privately 
and publicly self-conscious people, by their definition, tend to self-focus more (Fenigstein et al., 
1975), for them, as for more socially anxious people in Exp. 1, additional self-focus may be more 
likely to be avoided, or simply unnecessary, for more naturally self-focused people.  
Social Anxiety and Self-Focus 
 The role of social anxiety on self-focus differed between Exp. 1 and 2. In Exp. 1, as 
social anxiety increased, self-focus, indicated by looking and number of words used, decreased 
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during parts of the conversation in which the self was most discrepant from social standards—
specifically when sharing embarrassed stories. In Exp. 2, as social anxiety increased, self-focus, 
based on self-focused pronoun use, decreased during parts of the conversation in which the self 
was least discrepant from social standards—specifically when sharing stories involving positive 
self-conscious emotions. This finding in Exp. 2 contradicts Hypothesis 7. So, although more 
socially anxious people looked less at the self and told shorter stories when the self was 
discrepant from social standards, they used fewer self-focused pronouns when there was the least 
discrepancy. Together these results provide evidence that the role of social anxiety in behavior 
regulation may spread across the conversation—influencing both sharing that would be 
considered discrepant with social standards and that which is not. These results also speak to the 
difference between the various measures; for instance, explicit verbal indices of self-focus, such 
as pronoun use, may indicate differences in communication rather than one’s self-focus, whereas 
how much one looks at the self and how much one speaks may more implicitly denote one’s self-
focus. 
Linguistic Indices of Self-Focus 
 The linguistic indices of self-focus, more so than the looking measure of self-focus, were 
more directly affected by the manipulated conversation conditions, but no convergence was 
found between the results involving linguistic indices across Exp. 1 and 2. Also, as in Exp. 1, 
time spent looking at the self was not correlated with self-focused pronouns use or story length. 
Generally, looking at the self was more affected by personality differences, especially during the 
parts of the conversation when one was talking about oneself. On the other hand, increases or 
decreases in linguistic indices of self-focus, especially in Exp. 2, depended more on the type of 
emotional sharing. Moreover, though some convergence was found between Exp. 1 and 2 in the 
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new looking measure of self-focus, none was found for the linguistic measures. For instance, 
although stories involving negative self-conscious emotions contained fewer words, self-focused 
pronoun use was greater during stories involving self-conscious emotions, and overall fewer 
self-focused pronouns were used during negative stories. These incongruous findings suggest 
that overall word count and self-focused pronouns are likely not tapping the same construct. 
Measured Self-Focus and Interpersonal Connection 
 In the first attempt to assess the relationship between self-focus and interpersonal 
outcomes, correlations between self-focus and Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) (Aron et al., 
1992) were tested, but only sparse evidence for a relationship was found. However, because the 
correlations were broken down by condition, the Type 1 error rate is inflated, so results should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 Some hints at a coherent relationship emerged, especially between IOS and linguistic 
indicators of self-focus, which are perhaps more apparent to conversation partners than looking. 
In general, using more words, but fewer self-focused pronouns, during one’s positive self-
presentations helps one’s conversation partner feel more connected. And using more self-focused 
pronouns during one’s negative self-presentations helps one feel more connected to their partner. 
Together, these results indicate something about the shared regulatory experience between 
conversation partners (Hardin & Conley, 2001); specifically, acknowledging one’s self during 
negative sharing helped interpersonal connection by the one doing the acknowledging, and 
acknowledging one’s self during positive sharing hurt interpersonal connection from one’s 
partner. So, rather than self-focus always being a harm to interpersonal connection, as posited in 
Hypothesis 9, in some instances, it seems to improve it.  
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In addition to the relationship between linguistic indices of self-focus and interpersonal 
connection, one correlation was found with social anxiety. Conversation partners reported 
including more socially anxious participants less in their self than they did for less socially 
anxious participants, suggesting an interpersonal disadvantage for more socially anxious 
participants. This result is supported by past research that has shown that as socially anxious 
people tend to self-focus and engage in safety behaviors (Grisham et al., 2015), they can be less 
appealing to and liked by others (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Clark, 2005). 
Methodological Contributions 
 Of methodological significance for the new looking measure at the self, the different 
screen configuration used in Exp. 2 resulted in increased time spent looking at the self on-screen 
compared to Exp. 1. In Exp. 1, participants looked at the self only 1.604 ± .583% of the time. In 
Exp. 2, the time spent looking at the self was about five times that, allowing for more variance in 
the data given a larger self to look at. Compared to Exp. 1, participants in Exp. 2 also engaged in 
longer sharing sessions with their conversation partner. This time was likely more conducive to 
richer, more personal conversations. These differences should be considered for future studies. 
Study Limitations and Next Steps 
Because clear and coherent evidence of the relationship between self-focus and 
interpersonal outcomes is lacking based on its minimal exploration in Exp. 2, this relationship 
will be more rigorously examined in Exp. 3. In Exp. 3, self-focus is manipulated within the 
conversation, and more specific questions are given to participants following the conversation 
about their feelings toward their conversation partner. Hence, while the primary goal in 
Experiments 1 and 2 was to uncover the predictors that influence self-focus across a 
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conversation, the primary goal switches in Exp. 3 to uncovering the outcomes that are associated 
with increased self-focus within a conversation.  
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Chapter 8: Experiment 3 
 Moving beyond the questions of when and for whom self-focus occurs during ongoing 
interactions which were investigated in Exp. 1 and 2, Exp. 3 asks what outcomes are associated 
with manipulated self-focus within these interactions. Although self-focus has been theorized to 
involve attempts to regulate behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), these 
attempts have been shown to have mostly negative interpersonal outcomes (Fenigstein & 
Abrams, 1993; Lawrence et al., 2007; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009; Uddin et al., 2008). Yet, 
based on both objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and control theory (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981), increased self-focus should result in behavior that brings one closer to whatever 
standard is relevant to or salient in the present situation (Carver & Scheier, 1982). In the context 
of ongoing interactions, relevant standards of correctness should include more socially 
acceptable behavior. So, if self-focus is a part of a regulatory process, then more positive 
interpersonal outcomes should emerge from increased self-focus. This logic presents a conflict 
between the theorized adaptiveness of self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 1982) and past research that 
shows a link between self-focus and negative interpersonal outcomes (e.g. Mellings & Alden, 
2000). It remains that self-focus has not been tested enough within ongoing interactions to yield 
a coherent answer to the question of if and how self-focus serves a regulatory role within 
ongoing interactions.  
Whereas Exp. 1 and 2 investigated correlational relationships involving measured self-
focus, Exp. 3 directly manipulated self-focus to test its effects on interpersonal outcomes. Self-
focus was manipulated by controlling the presence or absence of the self on the screen during 
online video chats. That is, participants either saw or did not see the self on the screen during the 
conversation. This manipulation occurred in a way that is natural to the ongoing interaction and 
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was inspired by past research in which self-images were used to induce self-focus, most 
famously by placing research participants in front of a mirror (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; 
Wicklund & Duval, 1971). As the only experiment presented in this dissertation to manipulate 
self-focus, it is uniquely poised to demonstrate how increased self-focus affects conversation 
outcomes.  
Based on prior research, self-focus has been shown to reduce attention on external 
information, and in the context of an interaction, disrupt focus on one’s interaction partner 
(Judah et al., 2013; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rochat et al., 2012). The basis for this disruption is 
that as more attention is focused on the self, fewer cognitive resources are available to process 
information received from others (Mellings & Alden, 2000), and this disruption may be stronger 
in more socially anxious people (Mellings & Alden, 2000). Conversational self-focus has also 
been associated with reduced prosociality, such as willingness to help (Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 
2009). 
To assess prosocial, attentional, and conversation outcomes as a function of manipulated 
self-focus, (1) participants’ ratings of the conversation and partner: how interested they were and 
how similar to, empathic, and how much they liked their conversation partner, (2) their visual 
engagement with the other, measured as looking at the other, and (3) the self-focus of their 
conversational input, measured as self-focused pronoun use and story length, were compared 
between participants who saw the self on-screen and those who did not. 
 As in Exp. 1 and 2, the influence of conversation factors (speaker and story type) and 
individual differences (self-esteem, private and public self-consciousness and social anxiety) 
were hypothesized to affect how self-focus influences these outcomes. Results from Exp. 1 and 2 
provide evidence that self-focus is naturally sought or avoided by some more than others. For 
 111 
instance, self-focus increased as self-esteem increased (i.e. as the tendency to view the self more 
positively increased) (Swann & Bosson, 2010) and was avoided when experienced in excess by 
those with greater private and public self-consciousness (i.e. those who have already high 
tendencies to self-focus) and those with greater social anxiety (i.e. those that experience 
discomfort in the face of self-focus) (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Therefore, in Exp. 3, the 
manipulated increase in self-focus is likely to influence interpersonal outcomes depending on 
these personality differences. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 10 (main effect of seeing oneself on-screen): Increased self-focus will lead 
to more negative interpersonal outcomes. People who see the self on screen, because self-
focus will be increased, will engage less with their conversation partner (Judah et al., 2013; 
Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rochat et al., 2012); they will rate the conversation and their 
conversation partner more negatively, use more self-focused pronouns and tell longer stories, and 
they will look less at the other. 
Hypothesis 11 (seeing oneself on-screen x personality interactions): Increased self-
focus will improve interpersonal outcomes for those for whom self-focus is positive or 
embraced, and it will negatively impact interpersonal social outcomes for those for whom 
self-focus is threatening or avoided. 
a. Because self-focus is more positive for people with more positive self-views 
(Swann et al., 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988), as self-esteem increases, 
interpersonal outcomes will be improved for those who see the self on screen. 
They will rate the conversation and their conversation partner more positively.  
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b. Because self-focus is avoided by those for whom it is a more negative experience, 
or for whom self-focus already tends to be high, such as more socially anxious 
and self-conscious people (Clark & Wells, 1995; Fenigstein et al., 1975), as social 
anxiety and self-consciousness increase, interpersonal outcomes will be 
negatively impacted for those who see the self on screen. They will rate the 
conversation and their conversation partner more negatively.  
Hypothesis 12 (seeing oneself on-screen x story type x personality interactions): Self-
focus will increase for those for whom self-focus is positive or embraced in parts of the 
conversation when their self-views are enhanced, and it will decrease for those for whom 
self-focus is threatening or avoided in parts of the conversation when their self-views are 
threatened. 
a. Because self-focus is enhancing (Taylor & Brown, 1988) or confirming 
(Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1983; Swann & Bosson, 2010) for people with greater 
self-esteem, they will demonstrate increased self-focus by using more self-
focused pronouns and telling longer, especially proud, stories. 
b. Because self-focus is more threatening for more socially anxious and self-
conscious people, they will demonstrate decreased self-focus by using fewer self-
focused pronouns and telling shorter, especially guilty, stories, when they are 
feeling most threatened (Boehme et al., 2015).  
Methods 
Participants 
85 Brooklyn College undergraduate students participated for course credit. Of those, three 
participants were excluded due to missing data (due to technical failure in data collection). 
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Hence, the final sample included 82 participants (31 males; 51 females; M = 22.06, SEM = .62 
years). Of those, half the participants (n = 41) saw the self on-screen (15 males; 26 females; M = 
21.66, SEM = .79 years), and half the participants (n = 41) did not see the self on-screen (16 
males; 25 females; M = 22.35, SEM = .96 years). Recruitment, screening, and informed consent 
procedures were the same as Exp. 1. 
Procedure and Materials 
 Unlike in Exp. 1 and 2 in which conversation pairs consisted of two naïve participants, in 
Exp. 3, during each study session, one naïve participant engaged in conversation with a member 
of the study team. Participants were informed they would video-chat with a fellow student and 
member of the study team, that the video chat would be recorded, and that they would have their 
eye movements tracked. Eye-tracking materials were the same as in Exp. 1 and 2, and calibration 
was performed in the same manner as Exp. 1 and 2. Participants and their conversation partners 
were stationed in separate rooms of the lab without interacting before meeting online. Seven 
Brooklyn College undergraduate research assistants (5 female, 2 male) served as conversation 
partners.  
 Prior to beginning the video chat, participants were given a “Brainstorm Sheet” that 
included the following two conversation prompts: 
First story prompt: 
For your first story, please talk about a time when… 
You were ashamed because someone (close to you) was disappointed in you or a time 
when you got into trouble or were guilty of something. You should talk about what 
happened and why it was a big deal or why they were disappointed in you. 
Second story prompt:  
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For your second story, please talk about a time when… 
Someone (close to you) was proud of you or you got recognition for something. You 
should talk about what you did, why it was a big deal, and why the person was proud or 
why you got recognition. 
Participants were given time to think about, and write down if they wished, what they would talk 
about in response to the two prompts. Participants informed the researcher when they had 
enough time to think about the stories they would tell. The prompts were given in alternating 
order to participants, instructing them to tell their guilty or proud story first or second (stratified 
to keep orders counterbalanced across the conversation partner and participant gender). 
Participants were instructed not to look down at the brainstorm sheet once the video chat began.  
 Two online video chat accounts created with Skype™ software were used to connect 
participants with their conversation partner. Skype is more commonly used than ooVoo, which 
was used in Exp. 2 to better assess looking at the self, and this common usage means it is likely 
to be more natural for participants. Skype also provides a way to easily present or remove video 
of the self on the screen, as shown in Figure 13. A between-subjects manipulation of self-focus 
was used involving the configuration of the video chat screen. Participants either: (1) saw a live 
video of the self on the screen, or (2) did not see a video of the self on the screen. Half the 
research participants saw their reflected self as video in the upper left corner of the video chat 
screen (as in Figure 13a). For the rest of participants, the video was minimized so it was not seen 
(as in Figure 13b). Assignment to condition was made in the following manner: a number of 
participants were administered the first condition and then a number of participants were 
administered the second condition, and so on until a balance was reached. Groups were equal in 
terms of their gender make-up and age. 
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Seeing Oneself On-Screen   Not Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
    
Figure 13. Video chat screen manipulation for Exp. 3. One group of participants saw their own 
reflected moving image in the corner of the video chat screen (Figure 13a). For a second group 
of participants, the self was removed from the screen (Figure 13b). 
 
At the start of the video chat, a video capture of the participants’ screen was initiated, 
recording both picture and audio, which would be used for transcribing conversation content. 
The research assistant conversation partner began the conversation by explaining to the 
participant what was going to happen. RAs followed the same “introduction” script (see 
Appendix A), the purpose of which was to make the conversation partner appear friendly and 
natural in order to make the participant feel comfortable. This segment was intended to acclimate 
participants to the video chat and was not included in the analysis. It also allowed the participant 
to see and confirm that their conversation partner was a real person that was really listening to 
them and that they appeared friendly and nonjudgmental prior to being asked to divulge their 
personal experiences.  
Then, participants shared their two prepared stories (in alternating order) and 
subsequently listened to their conversation partner share their two stories (in the same order as 
the participant). Conversation partners, who were members of the study team, each prepared and 
memorized their own responses to the conversation prompts that they told every time from 
memory. Conversation partners always told their stories after the participants had already told 
theirs so they would not influence the participants’ stories. RAs were also instructed to look at 
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the webcam while telling their stories and listening to the participant’s stories, so the participant 
would feel that their conversation partner was looking at and engaged with them. This is 
important because if the conversation partner were to look at the participant’s eyes on the screen, 
rather than at the camera, it would appear that they were looking down. 
 After the four stories were told, conversation partners said goodbye, the video chat was 
ended, and the video recording was stopped. Following the conversations, participants responded 
to questionnaires on the same computer screen and administered through SMI Experiment 
Center. In addition to the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989) and the Self-
Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) used in both Exp. 1 and 2, in Exp. 3, four 
additional questions were used to assess participants’ judgments of the conversation and their 
partner: 
1) How likeable did you find the other person with whom you were video chatting? 
2) How interested were you in the video conversation you were having? 
3) How empathetic did you feel towards your conversation partner? (Did you identify with 
or vicariously experience their feelings?) 
4) How similar do you think the conversation partner is to yourself? 
Responses to these questions were used as dependent variables gauging interpersonal relations 
formed during the conversation. Participants’ responses to each question were self-reported by 
clicking on the computer screen on a 4-point scale: 3 = a lot, 2 = somewhat, 1 = a little, 0 = not at 
all. Upon completion of the questionnaires, participants were fully debriefed. All procedures 
were completed in less than one hour. 
Data Analysis 
 117 
 Manipulation check: Looking at the self on-screen. To check whether the 
manipulation of seeing oneself on-screen worked, eye tracking was used to measure the 
percentage of time spent looking at the self on-screen when it was presented. Eye-tracking data 
were analyzed using an area of interest (AOI) approach. For subjects who saw themselves, the 
AOI was a rectangular box drawn around the self. For subjects who did not see themselves, an 
analogous AOI was drawn in the upper left corner of the screen. If people looked to that corner 
more when the self was present, then that looking could be attributed to attention paid to the self. 
A mixed ANOVA was used for analysis, and it included the between-subjects manipulation of 
seeing oneself on screen and within-subject conversation factors of who was speaking and which 
story (proud or guilty) was being told.  
Consequences of increased self-focus on conversation outcomes. To analyze the 
influence of seeing oneself on-screen and personality variables on three conversation outcomes, 
moderated multiple regressions were used to analyze the effect of personality and self-focus on 
participants’ ratings of the conversation and partner. Multilevel models were used to analyze the 
effect of self-focus and personality variables on looking at the other and linguistic outcomes. 
Each of the models included the between-subjects variable of seeing oneself on-screen versus not 
and one of the four continuous personality variables—self-esteem, private and public self-
consciousness, or social anxiety (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Rosenberg, 1989). To test if the 
personality variable data met the assumption of collinearity, both tolerance and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) were assessed. Moreover, to avoid the issue of collinearity, a separate 
multilevel model was run with each of the continuous personality variables. 
The between-subjects variable of seeing oneself on-screen versus not was dummy-coded; 
the target group was those who saw the self on the screen, and they were coded “1,” and those 
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who did not see the self on the screen were coded “0” as the comparison group. Each of the 
personality variables were scored from participants’ self-report responses, mean centered, and 
included both for their main effects and their interactions with the condition of seeing oneself on-
screen or not.  
(1) On participants’ ratings of the conversation and partner. To evaluate whether self-
focus is part of an adaptive process that leads to improved social outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 
1982) or more evidence that self-focus is linked to negative interpersonal outcomes (e.g. 
Mellings & Alden, 2000), moderated multiple regressions were run on participants’ ratings of the 
conversation and partner depending on the self-focus manipulation and individual personality 
variables. Participants gave ratings on a 4-point scale for how much they liked, how similar they 
felt, and how empathic and interested they were in their conversation partner. These ratings were 
also combined into a sum score. For each regression, main effects were tested in Step 1, and 
interactions were tested in Step 2. 
(2) On looking at the other. To evaluate whether self-focus reduced engagement with the 
other (Judah et al., 2013; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rochat et al., 2012), multilevel models were 
run on the percent time looking at the other. Because participants could look at the other 
throughout the conversation, both within-subject conversation factors, speaker (whether telling 
or listening to stories) and story (guilty or proud), were dummy coded, and included in the 
model. For speaker, “self” was coded “1” and other was coded “0.” For story, “guilty” was coded 
“1” and proud was coded “0.” Personality variables were also included for their main effects and 
interactions with other variables. 
(3) On linguistic indices of self-focus. To evaluate how seeing oneself on-screen 
corresponds with increased self-focus indicated by linguistic content across the two conversation 
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conditions, multilevel models were run on each of four measures of verbal self-focus, which 
were collected and calculated in the same way as Exp. 1 and 2. Only the linguistic content of 
participants’ own stories was analyzed, so the within-subject conversation factor of speaker was 
not included, but the story condition was included in the model, and guilty was coded “1” and 
proud was coded “0.” 
Reliability and factor structure of social outcome measures. An evaluation of the 
reliability and factor structure of the social outcome measures used was also performed, and 
complete results and explanation are provided in Appendix D (Figure 16; Tables 69-70). In brief, 
Cronbach's alpha was found to be α = .723. For the exploratory factor analysis, principal axis 
factors analysis was used (Costello & Osborne, 2005) and because the individual items were 
significantly correlated with one another (Appendix D, Table 69), an oblique rotation (direct 
oblimin) was used. Based on the results of the exploratory factor analysis, in addition to each 
being considered separately, the four self-report items were also considered as a single factor—




Prior to including the personality variables in the subsequent analyses, their correlations 
were assessed and are presented in Table 21. 
Table 21 






Self-Esteem -0.233* -0.385*** -0.423*** 
Private Self-Consciousness  .425*** 0.159 
Public Self-Consciousness   0.441*** 
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All correlations include 82 participants with df = 81; ***p < .001; *p < .050 
Tests to see if the personality variable data met the assumption of collinearity indicated 
that multicollinearity was not a concern (Self-Esteem, Tolerance = .744, VIF = 1.344; Private 
Self-Consciousness, Tolerance = .804, VIF = 1.244; Public Self-Consciousness, Tolerance = 
.652, VIF = 1.534; Social Anxiety, Tolerance = .725, VIF = 1.380). Still, because there were 
correlations between the personality variables, a separate multilevel model was run using each of 
the continuous personality variables. Additionally, independent samples t-tests were performed 
on each of the personality variables to test if these measures were affected by the self-focus 
manipulation. None were, all p > .100. 
Looking at the Self: Manipulation Check 
 Before evaluating how seeing oneself on-screen influenced conversation outcomes, it is 
important to verify that the presence of the self on-screen was capable of increasing self-focus. 
One way to assess if the presence of the self on-screen was salient enough to increase self-focus 
is to assess whether or not participants looked more to the area of interest on the screen when the 
self was present compared to when it was absent. A 2 (between: seeing oneself on-screen vs. not) 
x 2 (within: self vs. other speaking) x 2 (within: proud vs. guilty story) mixed ANOVA showed 
that participants who saw the self on-screen spent a greater proportion of time looking at the 
corner of the screen where the self was present (M = 1.048, SEM = .233% of the time) compared 
to those for whom the self was not present (M = 0.201, SEM =.233% of the time; F(1, 80) = 
6.618, p = .012, d = 0.147), indicating that people did look at the self when it was present on the 
present screen more so than random looking at the screen. There were no main effects of who 
was speaking or story type, and there were no significant interactions, all p > .100. 
Interpersonal Outcomes 
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Sum of Interpersonal Outcomes. Because the four self-report items (likeability, 
interest, empathy, and perceived similarity) loaded onto a single factor based on exploratory 
factor analysis, this sum value was examined for how it was influenced by seeing oneself on-
screen and/or personality variables. No significant predictors of the sum of the four outcomes 
emerged in the models including self-esteem and private or public self-consciousness; those are 
presented in Appendix D (Tables 71-73). 
Social anxiety model on the sum of interpersonal outcome. On the sum of the 
interpersonal outcomes, a main effect of social anxiety emerged, such that the degree to which 
people were socially anxious predicted an overall increase in the sum of their interpersonal 
ratings of their conversation partner, B = .120, t(79) = 2.493, p = .015; Table 22.  
Table 22 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Social Anxiety on Sum of Interpersonal 
Outcomes 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 9.234 0.302  30.615 <.001 8.633 9.834 
 Social Anxiety 0.120 0.048 0.269 2.493 0.015 0.024 0.215 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.313 0.427 0.079 0.734 0.465 -0.536 1.162 
2 (Constant) 9.230 0.302  30.516 <.001 8.628 9.832 
 Social Anxiety 0.167 0.078 0.375 2.134 0.036 0.011 0.323 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.315 0.428 0.080 0.736 0.464 -0.537 1.166 
 Social Anxiety x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
-0.076 0.099 -0.134 -0.764 0.447 -0.274 0.122 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.078 3.343 2 79 0.040   
2  0.007 0.584 1 78 0.447   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Liking. Although the four separate self-report items (likeability, interest, empathy, and 
perceived similarity) loaded onto a single factor based on exploratory factor analysis, the 
separate dimensions were analyzed for exploratory purposes. First examined was if reported 
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liking of one’s conversation partner was influenced by seeing oneself on-screen and whether that 
relationship was moderated by personality differences. Each personality variable (self-esteem, 
private and public self-consciousness, and social anxiety) was considered in a separate model. 
No significant predictors of liking emerged in the model including self-esteem; it is presented in 
Appendix D (Table 74). 
Private self-consciousness model on reported liking of conversation partner. Private 
self-consciousness, which has been used as a dispositional measure of self-focus (Silvia et al., 
2011, 2013), interacted with seeing oneself on-screen, though in contrast to the prediction 
(Hypothesis 11) that more self-conscious people would have worse social outcomes when the 
self was on-screen, B = .072, t(1, 78) = 2.251, p = .027; Table 23. In fact, when participants saw 
the self on-screen, the more privately self-conscious they were, the more they reported liking 
their conversation partner (represented by a positive, though not different from zero, simple 
slope: gradient = .023, t(78) = .098, p = .922. However, when participants did not see the self on-
screen, the more privately self-conscious they were, the less they reported liking their 
conversation partner (represented by a negative, though not different from zero, simple slope: 
gradient = -.049, t(78) = .310, p = .757). Although neither slope (Figure 14) was significantly 
different than zero, the significant interaction indicates the slopes are different from one another.  
 123 
  
Figure 14. Interaction of private self-consciousness and seeing oneself on-screen on predicted 
liking of one’s conversation partner. Endpoints for private self-consciousness (on continuous 
scale) are 1 SD above and below the mean. Lines represent the two levels of the manipulated 
variable: whether participants saw (or did not see) oneself on-screen 
Table 23 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Private Self-Consciousness on Liking of 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.759 0.080  34.635 <.001 2.600 2.917 
 
Private Self-Consciousness -0.006 0.016 -0.044 -0.391 0.697 -0.038 0.026 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.079 0.113 -0.078 -0.694 0.489 -0.304 0.147 
2 (Constant) 2.777 0.078  35.556 <.001 2.622 2.933 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.049 0.025 -0.349 -2.000 0.049 -0.099 0.000 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.085 0.110 -0.085 -0.769 0.444 -0.304 0.135 
 Private Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.072 0.032 0.391 2.251 0.027 0.008 0.135 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.007 0.289 2 79 0.750   
2  0.061 5.069 1 78 0.027   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Public self-consciousness and social anxiety models on reported liking of conversation 


































conversation partner (public self-consciousness: B = .034, t(2, 79) = 2.141, p = .035; Table 24; 
social anxiety: B = .026, t(2, 79) = 2.084, p = .040; Table 25). 
 
Table 24 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Public Self-Consciousness on Liking of 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.748 0.077  35.546 <.001 2.594 2.902 
 Public Self-Consciousness 0.034 0.016 0.234 2.141 0.035 0.002 0.066 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.057 0.109 -0.057 -0.525 0.601 -0.275 0.160 
2 (Constant) 2.754 0.077  35.776 <.001 2.601 2.908 
 Public Self-Consciousness 0.008 0.024 0.055 0.324 0.747 -0.041 0.057 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.059 0.109 -0.059 -0.544 0.588 -0.276 0.157 
 Public Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.044 0.032 0.234 1.389 0.169 -0.019 0.108 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.060 2.517 2 79 0.087   
2  0.023 1.929 1 78 0.169   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 25 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Social Anxiety on Liking of Conversation 
Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.754 0.077  35.604 <.001 2.600 2.908 
 Social Anxiety 0.026 0.012 0.228 2.084 0.040 0.001 0.050 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.069 0.109 -0.069 -0.629 0.531 -0.287 0.149 
2 (Constant) 2.754 0.078  35.373 <.001 2.599 2.909 
 Social Anxiety 0.026 0.020 0.228 1.275 0.206 -0.014 0.066 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.069 0.110 -0.069 -0.625 0.534 -0.288 0.150 
 Social Anxiety x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
0.000 0.026 0.000 0.001 0.999 -0.051 0.051 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.057 2.395 2 79 0.098   
2  0.000 0.000 1 78 0.999   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
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Interest. No significant predictors of interest were found; those model results are 
presented in Appendix D (Tables 75-78). 
 Empathy. Next examined was how empathy with one’s conversation partner was 
influenced by seeing oneself on-screen and/or personality variables. A main effect of social 
anxiety emerged, but no significant predictors were found in the models including self-esteem, 
private and public self-consciousness; those are presented in Appendix D (Tables 79-81).  
Social anxiety model on reported empathy with conversation partner. The degree to 
which people were socially anxious predicted an overall increase in reported empathy with the 
conversation partner, B = .060, t(79) = 3.321, p = .001; Table 26.  
Table 26 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Social Anxiety on Reported Empathy with 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.336 0.113  20.612 <.001 2.111 2.562 
 Social Anxiety 0.060 0.018 0.349 3.321 0.001 0.024 0.096 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.132 0.160 0.087 0.825 0.412 -0.187 0.451 
2 (Constant) 2.335 0.114  20.522 <.001 2.109 2.562 
 Social Anxiety 0.075 0.029 0.436 2.550 0.013 0.016 0.134 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.133 0.161 0.087 0.825 0.412 -0.188 0.453 
 Social Anxiety x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
-0.024 0.037 -0.111 -0.649 0.518 -0.099 0.050 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.128 5.803 2 79 0.004   
2  0.005 0.422 1 78 0.518   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 Similarity. Next examined was if perceived similarity to one’s conversation partner was 
influenced by seeing oneself on-screen and/or personality variables. A main effect of seeing 
oneself on-screen was found in the model including public self-consciousness, but no significant 
predictors were found in the models including self-esteem, private self-consciousness, and social 
anxiety; those are presented in Appendix D (Tables 82-84). 
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Public self-consciousness model on perceived similarity to conversation partner. A 
main effect of seeing oneself on-screen was found such that people who saw the self on-screen 
felt more similar (M = 1.902, SEM = .098) to their conversation partner than did those who did 
not see the self on-screen (M = 1.585, SEM = .135), B = .331, t(79) = 1.986, p = .050; Table 27.  
Table 27 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Public Self-Consciousness on Perceived 
Similarity to Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 1.579 0.118  13.420 <.001 1.344 1.813 
 Public Self-Consciousness 0.030 0.024 0.134 1.226 0.224 -0.018 0.078 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.331 0.167 0.217 1.986 0.050 -0.001 0.662 
2 (Constant) 1.586 0.118  13.468 <.001 1.351 1.820 
 Public Self-Consciousness -0.001 0.037 -0.003 -0.018 0.986 -0.075 0.074 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.329 0.166 0.216 1.975 0.052 -0.003 0.660 
 Public Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.052 0.049 0.179 1.055 0.295 -0.046 0.149 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.061 2.572 2 79 0.083   
2  0.013 1.113 1 78 0.295   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
 Looking at the Other 
 Influence of speaker on looking at the other. A second way to determine how seeing 
oneself on-screen influenced conversation outcomes is to measure engagement with the other, as 
indicated by looking at the other on the video chat screen. Despite predictions (Hypothesis 10) 
that increased self-focus would reduce focus on the other, seeing oneself on-screen did not 
reduce the time spent looking at the other during the conversation, B = -.015, t(178) = .324, p = 
.746. In fact, the only factor that significantly predicted looking at the other was who was 
speaking, B = .357, t(234) = 11.072, p < .001, with more time spent looking at the other when 
listening to stories (M = 64.409, SEM = 1.972%) than when telling stories (M = 29.572, SEM = 
1.972%), replicating a result from Exp. 1. Thus, seeing oneself on-screen did not interfere with 
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visual engagement with the other. The speaker effect emerged in each of the models including 
the four personality variables. One model including self-esteem is included below (Table 28). 
The rest of the model results are presented in Appendix D (Tables 85-87). 
Table 28 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story 
(Proud v. Guilty) and Self-Esteem on Percent Time Looking at the Other On-Screen 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.289 0.032 178 8.970 <.001 0.226 0.353 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.015 0.046 178 -0.324 0.746 -0.105 0.075 
Speaker 0.357 0.032 234 11.072 <.001 0.294 0.421 
Story 0.025 0.032 234 0.764 0.446 -0.039 0.088 
Self-Esteem -0.010 0.006 178 -1.641 0.102 -0.022 0.002 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Speaker 
0.018 0.046 234 0.390 0.697 -0.072 0.108 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 0.006 0.046 234 0.127 0.899 -0.084 0.096 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Self-
Esteem 
0.016 0.008 178 1.922 0.056 0.000 0.032 
Speaker x Story -0.036 0.046 234 -0.783 0.435 -0.126 0.054 
Speaker x Self-Esteem -0.004 0.006 234 -0.575 0.566 -0.016 0.009 
Story x Self-Esteem 0.005 0.006 234 0.889 0.375 -0.007 0.018 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Speaker x Story 
0.000 0.064 234 0.007 0.994 -0.126 0.127 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Speaker x Self-Esteem 
0.002 0.008 234 0.272 0.786 -0.014 0.019 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story x 
Self-Esteem 
0.002 0.008 234 0.198 0.843 -0.015 0.018 
Speaker x Story x Self-Esteem 0.003 0.009 234 0.401 0.688 -0.014 0.021 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Speaker x Story x Self-Esteem 
-0.015 0.012 234 -1.295 0.197 -0.038 0.008 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
speaker variable: self = 1, other = 0; for story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Linguistic Indices of Self-Focus  
 A third way to determine how seeing oneself on-screen influenced conversation 
outcomes is to analyze the self-focus of people’s language (indicated by self-focused pronoun 
use and story length) as a function of the on-screen manipulation of seeing oneself. 
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 Influence of seeing oneself on-screen, story condition, and self-esteem on word 
count. Of the four linguistic indices of self-focus, word count was the only outcome to be 
significantly predicted by seeing oneself on-screen and a personality variable, self-esteem; Table 
29. The other models without significant predictors are displayed in Appendix D (Tables 88-
102). First, there was a main effect of seeing oneself on-screen, such that those who saw the self 
on-screen told stories with fewer words (M = 204.126, SEM = 27.538 words) than did those who 
did not see the self on-screen (M = 271.218, SEM = 27.453 words), B = 87.272, t(93) = 2.144, p 
= .035. This was contrary to the prediction (Hypothesis 10) that seeing oneself would increase 
self-focus; instead it reduced it. 
 There was also a significant three-way interaction between seeing oneself on-screen, 
story type, and self-esteem, B = -9.282, t(78) = 2.122, p = .037; Table 29. As shown in Figure 15, 
telling shorter stories when seeing oneself on-screen occurred more for people with lower self-
esteem than those with greater self-esteem. For people with greater self-esteem, not seeing 
oneself on-screen actually predicted shorter stories, particularly for proud stories, which 
reinforce positive self-views. In fact, as self-esteem increased, when participants did not see the 
self on-screen, they told shorter stories, and that slope was significantly different than for proud 
stories of those who saw the self on-screen, slope difference test: t(156) = 2.275, p = .024. Guilty 
stories, on the other hand, which undermine positive self-views, were shorter as self-esteem 
increased, regardless of seeing oneself on-screen or not, slope difference test: t(156) = 1.231, p = 
.220. These results only partially support the prediction (Hypothesis 12) that seeing oneself and 
greater self-esteem would induce longer proud stories. When one did not see oneself on-screen, 
as self-esteem increased, proud stories were shorter; when one saw oneself on-screen, as self-
esteem increased, proud stories were numerically, but not significantly, longer. 
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Figure 15. Three-way interaction between seeing oneself on screen, the story, and self-esteem on 
predicted word count. Endpoints for self-esteem (on continuous scale) are 1 SD above and below 
the mean. Lines represent the two levels of the manipulated variable: whether participants saw 
(or did not see) oneself on-screen and the two levels of story type: proud versus guilty. 
 
Table 29 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-
Esteem on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df T Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 213.589 28.831 93 7.408 <.001 156.336 270.842 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 87.272 40.710 93 2.144 0.035 6.428 168.115 
Story -18.926 17.071 78 -1.109 0.271 -52.911 15.059 
Self-Esteem -2.080 5.481 93 -0.379 0.705 -12.965 8.805 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-40.359 24.104 78 -1.674 0.098 -88.347 7.629 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Self-Esteem 
-3.356 7.389 93 -0.454 0.651 -18.029 11.317 
Story x Self-Esteem 3.391 3.246 78 1.045 0.299 -3.070 9.853 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Self-Esteem 
-9.282 4.375 78 -2.122 0.037 -17.992 -0.572 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
speaker variable: self = 1, other = 0; for story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Correlations among Dependent Variables 
 As in Exp. 1 and 2, correlations reflecting the relationships among the various dependent 
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spent looking at the self, for those participants who did see the self on the screen, while speaking 
did not correlate with overall story length and overall self-pronoun use during those same periods 
of speaking (Tables 30-32). 
Table 30 














% Time Looking at Self -0.211 -0.114 0.012 -0.182 0.05 
% Time Looking at Other  0.259 -0.068 .346* -0.133 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute   -0.237 .700*** -0.102 
Story Time Length    -0.216 .945*** 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of 
Total Words 
    -0.287 













% Time Looking at Self -0.23 0.197 -0.079 0.035 
% Time Looking at Other -0.247 0.052 0.179 0.166 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute 0.166 -0.048 -0.038 0.079 
Story Time Length -0.152 0.141 0.220 0.002 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words -0.144 -0.055 0.141 0.221 
Word Count -0.017 0.16 0.15 -0.030 
All correlations include 41 participants with df = 40; ***p < .001; **p<.01; *p < .050 
 
Table 32 
Correlations between Dependent Variables in Exp. 3, Continued 
 Liking Interest Empathy Similarity Sum 
% Time Looking at Self -0.152 -0.008 0.039 0.013 -0.033 
% Time Looking at Other -0.061 -.341* 0.143 -0.045 -0.104 
Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute 0.045 0.089 0.096 -0.058 0.064 
Story Time Length 0.018 -0.021 -0.036 -0.059 -0.041 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words 0.077 -0.097 0.089 -0.255 -0.077 
Word Count -0.004 0.060 0.004 0.013 0.027 
Self-Esteem -0.101 0.279 -0.107 0.108 0.067 
Private Self-Consciousness 0.167 0.067 -0.086 0.017 0.053 
 131 
Public Self-Consciousness .379* 0.058 0.236 0.308 .377* 
Social Anxiety 0.247 0.054 .399** 0.069 0.300 
All correlations include 41 participants with df = 40; ***p < .001; **p<.01; *p < .050 
 
Discussion 
 In Exp. 3, the effect of increased self-focus on interpersonal outcomes was directly 
assessed, and rather than corresponding with reduced interpersonal closeness and engagement 
with others (as predicted in Hypothesis 10), in a number of ways, the manipulation may have 
helped rather than hurt those outcomes. Though with only weak support, people who saw the self 
on-screen felt more similar to their conversation partner and reduced self-focus in their language 
by telling stories with fewer words than those who did not see the self on-screen. They looked no 
less at the other. Finally, seeing oneself on-screen increased people’s ratings of liking of their 
conversation partner as private self-consciousness increased (in contrast to Hypothesis 11), 
though ratings were decreased for those who did not see the self on screen as private self-
consciousness increased. 
 The findings in this experiment that reveal positive interpersonal outcomes associated 
with increased self-focus may be surprising in light of previous research that demonstrated self-
focus’s negative effects on interpersonal outcomes (Gordon & Chen, 2013; Lawrence et al., 
2007; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009). Because self-focus is thought to reduce one’s focus on 
aspects of the other (Greenwald, 1980; Silvia et al., 2013) increased self-focus was predicted to 
correspond with reduced interpersonal closeness and engagement (Hypothesis 10). Yet, as self-
focus is part of a theoretically adaptive process (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1981), a critical 
question for this research was how to make sense of this apparent discrepancy: between the 
negative outcomes associated with self-focus and its theoretically adaptive process. The present 
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results suggest that a conditional increase in self-focus may improve social outcomes, at least 
contingent on its interaction with personality dimensions of self-esteem and self-consciousness. 
Traits Related to Self-Focus and Interpersonal Outcomes 
 In Exp. 3, it was traits related to self-focus, specifically social anxiety and private and 
public self-consciousness, that influenced the interpersonal outcomes, more so and regardless of 
the manipulation of self-focus. This suggests that the type of person entering a conversation may 
have more to do with interpersonal outcomes than the temporary manipulation of self-focus that 
was used.  
 Both public self-consciousness and social anxiety, for whom self-focus tends to be 
naturally high, (Clark & Wells, 1995; Fenigstein et al., 1975), were associated with improved 
social ratings, regardless of the self-focus manipulation. More publicly self-conscious people 
reported liking the other more than less publicly self-conscious people. More socially anxious 
people had a wide range of improved interpersonal outcomes as well. They reported liking the 
other more, feeling more empathic, and the sum of their ratings was higher than less socially 
anxious people. Each of these findings was opposite of the prediction (Hypothesis 11) that those 
more naturally self-focused would rate the conversation and their partner more negatively. In 
fact, those who are more naturally self-focused reported feeling more favorably to their social 
partner. 
 Private self-consciousness, on the other hand, interacted with seeing oneself on-screen; it 
was only without the self on-screen that increased private self-consciousness predicted decreased 
liking of one’s conversation partner. However, with the visual reminder of the self on-screen, 
that negative outcome was eliminated, a finding that did not support the prediction (Hypothesis 
11) that the added induction of self-focus would decrease interpersonal ratings for more naturally 
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self-focused people. This finding reveals how situationally increased self-focus can actually 
mitigate what would be a decreased social outcome for those who are more naturally self-
focused.   
 Indeed, not all self-focus seems to be experienced in the same way by all people. Insofar 
as the presence of the self on-screen cued the induction of self-focus, that presence improved 
interpersonal outcomes for people already inclined to focus on the self (indicated by higher 
private self-consciousness). Thus, self-focus may improve outcomes for people for whom it is 
already a more comfortable experience, such as those who tend to be more privately self-
focused. 
Manipulated Visual Self-Focus and Engagement With the Other 
 More generally, self-focus was not found to be automatically problematic for engagement 
with the other, as previous research would suggest. This is important because it shows that 
seeing oneself on-screen did not decrease visual engagement with one’s conversation partner or 
increase the self-focus of one’s language. Although self-focus has been shown to induce self-
centered thinking (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993) and has been implicated in difficulties engaging 
with others (Uddin et al., 2008), that was not supported here. Instead, seeing oneself on-screen, 
though in only one result when controlling for self-esteem, reduced another index of self-focus: 
those who saw the self told stories with fewer words than those who did not see the self on-
screen. This contradicts the prediction (Hypothesis 10) that those who saw the self on-screen 
would tell longer stories. Moreover, seeing oneself on-screen had no adverse effects on 
interpersonal outcomes; instead, in one way, it improved an outcome: after seeing oneself on-
screen during the conversation, people reporting feeling more similar to their conversation 
partner than those who had not seen the self on-screen. 
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Manipulated Visual Self-Focus and Linguistic Indices of Self-Focus 
 Seeing oneself on-screen also interacted with self-esteem and story type to predict the 
length of people’s stories (measured as story word count), and these results support self-
verification theory. As self-esteem involves thoughts and feelings about the self; people with 
high self-esteem tend to hold more positive self-views, and people with low self-esteem tend to 
hold more negative, or more balanced, self-views (Swann et al., 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Accordingly, when people saw the self on-screen, as self-esteem increased, this linguistic index 
of self-focus increased while sharing proud stories (matching positive self-views) and decreased 
while sharing guilty stories (not matching positive self-views). 
Study Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although Exp. 3 provides some clues about how self-focus influences interpersonal 
outcomes, more specific measures should be taken to more directly assess the characteristics and 
mechanisms of the relationship between self-focus and interpersonal outcomes. More refined 
outcome variables should be assessed both within and following the conversations. Although 
some evidence for how self-focus influences basic ratings of interpersonal connection has been 
found, much of what these relationships reveal about underlying psychological processes is left 
to inference. Future research using the new method of measuring looking at the self during 
conversation and manipulating self-focus in live video chats should be undertaken with 
additional outcome variables across different conversation contexts and types of conversation 
partner.  
 135 
Chapter 9: General Discussion 
To some degree, self-focus has endured a negative reputation in psychological research 
and everyday thinking. Self-focus sounds selfish and particularly problematic in a social context. 
In the context of a conversation with another, the practical question that motivated this 
dissertation was when one could focus on the other, why would one focus on the self? The 
question provides a puzzle because based on prior research, self-focus was understood to be 
largely associated with negative affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002) and outcomes (Hung & Wyer, 
2014; Judah et al., 2013; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2009); however, it was also theorized to be a 
part of an adaptive process. Specifically, by activating self-evaluation to how one is aligning 
with standards, resulting behavior change should help one align with those standards (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972).  
Results from this dissertation provide some insight into the regulatory role of self-focus 
within ongoing interactions, a context which has been studied too little in the self-focus 
literature. Collectively, but with mixed results, we found that self-focus did increase for some 
more than others and did improve social outcomes for some more than others. More specifically, 
combining results from Exp. 1 and 2, those who perceive smaller self-standard discrepancies 
(e.g., greater self-esteem, lower social anxiety and self-consciousness) demonstrated increased 
self-focus while sharing personal experiences regardless of content, whereas those who perceive 
larger discrepancies were shown to strategically avoid it, particularly when that discrepancy was 
greatest, during their own embarrassing stories (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1987; 
Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Self-focus’s increase was also shown in Exp. 3 to improve social 
outcomes, at least for those who perceive greater self-standard discrepancies (e.g., greater social 
anxiety and public self-consciousness), which have been associated with the tendency to 
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naturally self-focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Overall, these results are consistent with an 
adaptive and regulatory role of self-focus, and they suggest that personality traits play a large 
role in the amount of self-focus, perhaps more so than momentary fluctuations brought on by 
changing content within a conversation. Personality traits were largely responsible for the 
variations in self-focus in Exp. 1 and 2, and they will be discussed first.   
The Influence of Personality Variables on Self-Focus 
Across Experiments 1 and 2, personality variables served as significant moderators of the 
measurement of self-focus, with some replication, and these findings reveal the importance of 
individual differences in the regulatory role of self-focus. 
Public and Private Self-Consciousness and Self-Focus. The fact that both private and 
public self-consciousness, which indicate a tendency to think more about one’s self (Fenigstein 
et al., 1975), were related to the new looking measurement of self-focus is not surprising, and the 
relationship provides evidence for the usefulness of the new looking measure. However, the 
direction of the relationship was somewhat surprising. In Exp. 2, both public and private self-
consciousness predicted a decrease in looking at the self, especially when telling one’s own 
stories. This is surprising because a dispositional tendency to focus on aspects of the self could 
reasonably be reflected in increased measured self-focus across a conversation (Fenigstein et al., 
1975).  
To speculate about the inverse relationship found in Exp. 2 between public self-
consciousness and looking at the self during one’s own stories, it may be that people higher in 
public self-consciousness, who were also shown in Exp. 3 to like the conversation partner more 
and feel more similar to the conversation partner, in being more aware of how they present to 
others, resisted attending to the external video of the self on the screen, as such explicit attention 
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to the self could have been noticed by their conversation partner, which would be considered 
socially undesirable. This potential evidence of behavioral regulation by more publicly self-
conscious people supports the adaptive, regulatory role of self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 
Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Being more publicly self-conscious may bring one’s attention to how 
one is doing relative to standards, and so behavior, even self-focused behavior, is changed in a 
way that might be considered more socially desirable (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). 
The fact that private self-consciousness predicted decreased rather than increased looking 
at the self on the screen is perhaps more difficult to explain because it has been found in past 
research to correlate positively with other indices of self-focus, such as results of the self-focus 
sentence completion task, although that finding was produced outside a social context (Carver & 
Scheier, 1978; Exner, 1973). One potential explanation for the decrease in measured self-focus 
as private self-consciousness increased may be that when self-focus is maxed-out, additional, 
especially more explicit forms of self-focus are reduced, resulting in a non-linear relationship. 
This possibility is supported by earlier work; Carver & Scheier (1978) note that in a study 
examining the additive effect of placing participants in front of a mirror (analogous to our 
measure of looking at the self on the screen), measured self-focus (they used the self-focus 
completion task; Exner, 1973) was greater for people dispositionally low in self-consciousness, 
not high. It was proposed that for those dispositionally high in self-consciousness, a ceiling exists 
to the amount of additional self-focus that would result, which accounted for the relative 
decrease compared to those dispositionally low in self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1978). 
Social Anxiety and Self-Focus. A coherent set of results between social anxiety and self-
focus was found based on various measures across Exp. 1 and 2, in which reductions in 
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measured self-focus (looking at the self, self-focused pronoun use, and story length) were found 
as a function of participants’ reported social anxiety. These findings seem to contradict a central 
tenet of the clinical literature about social anxiety—that social anxiety is associated with 
increased self-focus. According to Clark (2005), the association between social anxiety and 
increased self-focus is well supported. In fact, self-focus is so much considered an issue for 
people with extreme social anxiety, that they receive therapy directing them to shift their 
attention more externally (Clark, 2005), and this therapy has been shown to work in reducing 
social anxiety (Mörtberg, Hoffart, Boecking, & Clark, 2015). However, because the population 
used in the present research was not a clinical one, and more socially anxious people in our 
sample demonstrated down-regulation of self-focus, we may have uncovered a difference 
between non-clinical and clinical populations. Non-clinically socially anxious people may have 
the ability to decrease self-focus within ongoing interactions in ways that people with clinical 
conditions of social anxiety are not able to.  
In past research, more socially anxious people have, in fact, reported being more self-
focused in social interactions than less socially anxious people (Mellings & Alden, 2000), but 
this was gauged with a post-event report, not a moment-to-moment measure as we used. This 
methodological difference is important because it may indicate that post-hoc measures fail to 
assess the actual avoidance of self-focus that occurs within an ongoing interaction, when the 
question is posed following the interaction. Or, it may be that the increased self-focus that 
socially anxious participants have been shown to experience actually occurs following the 
interaction (Gaydukevych & Kocovski, 2012). It has been shown that people who are more 
socially anxious and who were induced to self-focus engaged in more negative post-event 
processing following an interaction (Gaydukevych & Kocovski, 2012). It does not necessarily 
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follow that people are who are more socially anxious can be caught engaging in explicit self-
focusing behavior during ongoing interactions, especially the sort that is observable by one’s 
conversation partner. 
 Because the experience of self-focus is inherently more negative for people with social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995), despite its natural prevalence, it makes sense why, in reality, it 
may be explicitly avoided, as we found. According to Clark & Wells' (1995) model, social 
anxiety is in part a reaction to signals from the body, such as increased heart rate, and negative 
feelings about how those bodily signals will affect people’s self-presentation in a social situation. 
This theoretical model has been demonstrated experimentally; people induced to believe their 
heart rate had increased felt worse, thought they performed worse, and expressed more negative 
rumination after engaging in a speech task, all mediated by increased self-focused attention 
(Makkar & Grisham, 2013). These findings occured for people both high and low in social 
anxiety. In another experiment, people with generalized social anxiety engaged in a task in which 
one participant gave a speech (either about the self or the other) while a second participant 
listened to a speech (either about the self or the other) – both in front of an audience. For both 
participants, when the speech was about oneself, self-reports of anticipated anxiety and observer-
rated anxious appearance were increased. For participants standing by, hearing a speech about 
oneself also increased self-report of anxiety during the task (Woody, 1996). Thus, while self-
focus is tied up in the experience of social anxiety, ultimately, given the choice to engage further 
or avoid, more socially anxious people may commonly choose to avoid additional self-focus, as 
we found in Exp. 1. 
 Unlike the looking measure of self-focus used in this dissertation and which is entirely 
new, linguistic indices, such as self-focused pronoun use, have been used in past work as 
 140 
indicators of self-focus (e.g. Brockmeyer et al., 2015; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). It is 
promising that in the present work, both looking and a linguistic index (the number of words 
used in stories) showed some similar results. In Exp. 1, more socially anxious people looked at 
the self less and told stories with fewer words, and the reduction was especially great when 
telling embarrassed stories.  
 These findings are in line with past research that indicates socially anxious people avoid 
certain cues and engage in safety behaviors to prevent negative evaluation (Grisham et al., 2015), 
as would be expected to occur during the sharing of embarrassing stories. More socially anxious 
people may have avoided looking at the externally-produced image of the self, especially in their 
most vulnerable moments, because they are preoccupied using internal cues to judge their 
performance, which keep them from attending to external cues (Clark & Wells, 1995; Morrison 
& Heimberg, 2013). Differences between these internal and external cues have been shown 
before. More socially anxious people gazed more at the face of another than less socially anxious 
people, even though their heart rate also sped up in response to the direct gaze (Wieser, Pauli, 
Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009). So, although socially anxious people tend to shift their attention 
away from external, threatening cues, they are also known to be more self-focused (Boehme et 
al., 2015). This may mean that instead of capturing the internal self-focus of socially anxious 
participants, in this dissertation when an external image of the self was presented with a choice 
of whether or not to look at it, we gave socially anxious participants another cue to avoid.  
In Exp. 2, a different linguistic index of self-focus revealed a different pattern relative to 
emotional content. Social anxiety predicted fewer self-focused pronouns per minute more so 
during positive than negative stories, and to the greatest degree during stories involving positive 
self-conscious emotions (i.e. proud) compared to negative or basic emotions. Although generally 
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speaking, linguistic self-focus tended to decreased as social anxiety increased across 
Experiments 1 and 2, precisely when (i.e. during which story types) that decline was sharper 
differed. Generally, it has been shown that the induction of negative mood leads to increased 
self-focus whereas positive moods do not (Sedikides, 1992; Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, et al., 
1990). For socially anxious people, sharing experiences involving negative self-conscious 
emotions, such as guilt, shame, or embarrassment, should be anxiety provoking. This is 
hypothesized to be because guilt is associated with a discrepancy between the actual and ought 
self (Higgins, 1987; Tracy & Robins, 2004). However, for socially anxious people, sharing 
prideful experiences may be no less anxiety provoking, especially if such self-promotional 
behavior is seen as bragging (Scopelliti, Loewenstein, & Vosgerau, 2015). 
Self-Esteem and Self-Focus. In Exp. 1 and 2, self-esteem predicted a pattern of self-
focus in the reverse direction to social anxiety. In both Exp. 1 and 2, when people talked about 
themselves, the higher their self-esteem, the more they looked at themselves during the 
conversation. The root cause of this moderating influence of self-esteem on looking at the self 
may be a fundamentally different regulatory strategy used by people with higher self-esteem 
compared to those with lower self-esteem, and this difference may be related to differences in 
their self-views. Contrary to early work (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) predicting that following 
negative evaluation, people will uniformly attempt to reduce self-focus in order to reduce 
negative affect, others have shown that when and why someone self-focuses depends on one’s 
views of the self. In one study comparing depressed and non-depressed people, the role of self-
views, whether more positive or negative, was shown to matter. For example, people with 
depression will seek self-focus after a negative outcome and avoid it after a positive one 
(Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986). The researchers showed that although all people immediately 
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increase self-focus after failure compared to success, after some time (following a distraction 
task), non-depressed people were more self-focused after success than failure. However, 
depressed people remained more self-focused after failure than success. For non-depressed 
people, the immediate outcome is consistent with control theory (Carver, 1979; Carver & 
Scheier, 1981) because, following failure, there is a high need to self-regulate. However, as time 
passes, the need decreases, and continued self-focus becomes non-adaptive (Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 1986). For depressed people, on the other hand, continued increased self-focus 
following failure may continue to be adaptive; that, coupled with a reduction in self-focus 
following success, may serve to maintain their already negative self-views (Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 1986). 
 In the same way that prior research (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986) showed differences 
in self-focus depending on one’s self-views, we showed that as self-esteem increased, self-focus 
while sharing personal emotional experiences increased, thus confirming that people adopt 
different self-focusing styles depending on their views of the self—whether more positive or 
negative. An explanation for the different regulatory strategies of those with different levels of 
self-esteem may be in the relative strength of their motives, namely self-enhancement versus 
self-protection motives (Baumeister, 1998). Whereas people with higher self-esteem tend to be 
motivated by self-enhancement, people with lower self-esteem tend to be motivated by self-
protection. This difference in motivation relates to a difference in self-views. Whereas people 
with higher self-esteem think highly of themselves and want to present and promote those 
positive aspects, people with lower self-esteem who tend to think negatively about themselves 
feel concerned by the presentation of negative aspects and hope to avoid presenting those 
negative aspects publicly (Baumeister, 1998).  
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 Another explanation for why self-focus differed depending on self-esteem concerns the 
qualitative difference between the experiences of participants tasked with engaging in a getting 
acquainted conversation with a stranger. In the present experiments, those with greater self-
esteem may have found the experience of sharing personal information to be an overall more 
self-enhancing experience than those with lower self-esteem (Taylor & Brown, 1988). People’s 
tendency toward positive self-illusions, sometimes over accuracy is especially true for people 
with greater self-esteem, opposed to those with lower self-esteem who take on a more balanced 
self-view (Swann et al., 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Moreover, combining sociometer theory (e.g. Leary & Baumeister, 2000) with self-
verification theory (e.g. Swann, 1983), whereas people with high self-esteem expect positive 
feedback in social interactions, people with low self-esteem may not. Thus, in an experience in 
which social feedback is present, such as a getting to know you conversation with a stranger, the 
experience may not be entirely comfortable for people with low self-esteem (Stinson et al., 
2010). Even though sharing is important for relationship-building, sharing of personal 
experiences, especially emotional ones, as we asked our participants to do, is not always easy, 
and thus not uniformly beneficial (Gaucher et al., 2012).  
In fact, past research has proposed that self-esteem determines how much one will share 
emotional experiences with others. In an experiment that used the social media website 
Facebook, researchers found that people with higher self-esteem viewed and updated their 
profiles during an experiment more so than people with lower self-esteem (Gonzales & Hancock, 
2011). That is, people with higher self-esteem demonstrated increased self-focus, similar to our 
measure of looking at the self during an online video chat. Because this type of sharing includes 
the potential for rejection, and because people with low self-esteem are more susceptible to 
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rejection, they might be less inclined to engage in this type of sharing (Gaucher et al., 2012). 
Thus, people with low self-esteem tend to self-protect more in this type of experience than 
people with high self-esteem do (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989), and that means they tend to 
self-disclose less than people with high self-esteem do (Gaucher et al., 2012). 
 Self-disclosure, the sort of which we asked the participants in our studies to do, or the 
kind investigated in studies of social media, such as on Facebook, in which participants share 
information about themselves to an online network, is particularly risky for people with low self-
esteem because of the chance of rejection (Forest & Wood, 2012). People with high self-esteem 
are happier to draw attention to themselves and the positive views of the self they hold, whereas 
people with low self-esteem might wish to avoid sharing aspects of the self, which they tend to 
view more negatively (Forest & Wood, 2012). This past finding supports findings from the 
present research, in which people with higher self-esteem self-focused more while sharing 
personal information during online video chats. However, it has been argued that, for people 
with lower self-esteem, being able to disclose online could help, or be a little easier, than in 
person (Forest & Wood, 2012). So, although we saw reduced self-focus in people with lower 
self-esteem in the present research, it would be interesting to discover other online platforms that 
encourage self-focus.  
A final point to be made is about the value of the new measure of looking at the self, 
based on its relationship to self-esteem. In both our and past studies, self-esteem has not 
predicted linguistic indices of self-focus (Pennebaker et al., 2003). Although self-esteem has 
been associated with the use of negative emotion words (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000), 
self-focused pronoun use has not been shown to relate to self-esteem (Pennebaker et al., 2003). 
Yet, self-esteem did, across two experiments, predict looking at the self. This provides some 
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evidence for the distinction and usefulness of the new measure in demonstrating relationships 
between personality differences, such as self-esteem, and self-focus. 
The Effect of Conversation Factors on Self-Focus 
Beyond the influencing role of personality, conversation factors, including the speaker, 
valence, and type of emotional experience being shared, were manipulated in each of the 
experiments and were hypothesized to meaningfully increase or decrease self-focus across the 
conversation.  
The Effect of Valence on Self-Focus. First, considering the influence of emotional 
valence of conversation content, there was evidence for increased self-focus during negative 
self-evaluations in Exp. 1, in which one linguistic index of self-focus, word count, was greater 
during embarrassed than proud stories, hinting at a relationship between self-focus and the 
induction of negative affect. However, that main effect was qualified by an interaction with 
social anxiety, such that it was only as social anxiety decreased that people told longer 
embarrassed stories. As social anxiety increased, on the other hand, that difference was 
eliminated. The association of self-focus with negative affect supports the regulatory model—
that self-focus would occur more when it is needed, when the self is not in perfect alignment 
with standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Thus, for all people following failure, there is a 
hypothesized higher need to self-regulate (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981). In the present 
research, this was the case for less socially anxious people, who were perhaps better equipped to 
regulate their self-presentation during the different parts of a conversation, unlike for more 
socially anxious people, who experience fears about the social situation and doubt their ability to 
make a good impression (Clark & Wells, 1995; Spurr & Stopa, 2002). Further evidence for the 
relationship between social anxiety and negative self-evaluations was also provided by the 
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looking measure of self-focus in Exp. 1. Again, as social anxiety decreased, looking at the self 
was at its greatest during specifically one’s own embarrassed story. 
However, this pattern was not uniform across experiments and self-focus indices. In Exp. 
2, people’s use of self-focused pronoun actually decreased during negative compared to positive 
stories. Considering this lack of coherences across the different linguistic indices we tested, they 
seem to be measuring different aspects of self-focus. Future testing is required to understand 
their individual contributions. 
The Effect of Emotion Type on Self-Focus. The prediction that increased self-focus 
would occur while sharing personal experiences involving self-conscious compared to basic 
emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2004) was partially supported in Exp. 2. A greater percent of self-
focused pronouns out of total words were used during stories involving self-conscious compared 
to basic emotions. However, those stories were actually shorter (in time) and contained fewer 
words than those involving basic emotions. Again, this misalignment reveals the difference 
between the linguistic indices used in these experiments. Although story length has not 
previously been used in research to indicate self-focus, the use of self-focused pronouns has 
(Davis & Brock, 1975; Fineberg et al., 2015). An increase in self-focus while sharing stories 
involving self-conscious emotions was expected (Tracy & Robins, 2004), so the fact that self-
focused pronoun use showed that effect may serve to validate that index over others. 
The Influence of Self-Focus and Personality Variables on Interpersonal Outcomes 
 Understanding what factors lead to increased or decreased self-focus in a conversation is 
especially important insofar as they go on to impact interpersonal outcomes. As one might 
expect based on our findings that personality variables (i.e., self-esteem, self-consciousness, and 
social anxiety) were influential in predicting the amount of self-focus in a conversation (in 
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Experiments 1 and 2), those same personality variables (i.e. self-consciousness and social 
anxiety) also predicted differences in interpersonal outcomes when the amount of self-focus was 
manipulated (Exp. 3). 
Public Self-Consciousness and Interpersonal Outcomes. People who self-reported 
being more publicly self-conscious, which indicates a tendency to focus on public aspects of the 
self (Fenigstein et al., 1975), also reported better post-conversation interpersonal outcomes; they 
liked their conversation partner more, regardless of the manipulation of self-focus. Previous 
research has shown that as more attention is paid to the self as a social object, the greater will be 
the attribution made to the self in a social scenario (Fenigstein, 1979). Extending this logic, 
people who take greater responsibility for a conversation’s quality may find their conversation 
partner more likable.  
It is noteworthy that the improved interpersonal outcome occurred as public, though not 
private, self-consciousness increased. Similarly, in past research, whereas greater private self-
consciousness corresponded to increased attributions of one’s causal role in imagined scenarios 
(Buss & Scheier, 1976), in actual interactions, it was increased public self-consciousness that 
corresponded to increased attributions of one’s own role in a group’s behavior (e.g., confederates 
either rejecting or accepting the participant) (Fenigstein, 1979). From having an increased sense 
of social responsibility, it logically follows that there will be increased improvements in 
interpersonal relationships. 
 In addition to being explained by an increased sense of responsibility for the quality of 
the interaction (Fenigstein, 1979), one’s sense of power to control the social situation (Sun & 
Wu, 2012), may also explain the improved interpersonal ratings. Having an increased sense of 
power in a social situation could reasonably improve the quality, or at least perceived quality, of 
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a social relationship. This relationship was considered in a study of socializing that is done 
online, for which researchers developed a scale of “online public self-consciousness,” adapted 
from Fenigstein et al.’s (1975) original self-consciousness scale (Sun & Wu, 2012). Their scale 
contained questions like: “On my Facebook site, I have the ability to control the way I come 
across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them” (Sun & Wu, 2012). Online 
public self-consciousness was found to correlate with people’s sense that they could modify how 
they self-present on the social network site Facebook. Similarly, greater public self-
consciousness in the present research may have related to people’s sense of power over the social 
interaction with a stranger, improving their quality ratings of their conversation partner, as more 
likable. 
 Other past work has shown that greater public self-consciousness can lead to positive 
social outcomes. In one study, researchers used a video camera and another accountability cue to 
create an induced state of public self-awareness, and that manipulation was found to decrease the 
bystander effect. In other words, being more publicly self-aware encouraged people to help 
others more (van Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers, & Van Lange, 2012). In all these ways, we and 
others have shown that increased dispositional self-focus, at least the kind related to public 
aspects of the self, can result in better self-reported relationship outcomes. 
Private Self-Consciousness and Interpersonal Outcomes. Unlike public self-
consciousness, private self-consciousness, which is the tendency to think about one’s self in a 
private rather than social context (Fenigstein et al., 1975), tells a more nuanced story. That is, 
reported liking of one’s conversation partner depended on whether a person’s self-focusing 
tendency matched the self-focus manipulation that was presented. Specifically, the reminder to 
self-focus improved a social outcome as private self-consciousness increased, but for those who 
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did not see the self on-screen, increased private self-consciousness predicted decreased liking. In 
other words, more privately self-conscious people liked others more when their self-focus was 
reinforced (when they saw the self on-screen), not when their self-focus was not reinforced 
(when they did not see the self on-screen). What this means is that people who naturally tend to 
self-focus more had an improved social outcome if they were reminded to self-focus, by seeing 
the self on-screen during the conversation. Meanwhile, for people who naturally tend to self-
focus less, this was not the case: the reminder to self-focus, as it did not match their natural 
tendency, did not improve their social outcome. 
This match/mismatch explanation has been corroborated by past work. In one study, 
people showed greater behavioral compliance when a message (an appeal for charity) matched 
their current state (whether promotion or prevention-focused), and this pattern was more 
pronounced for people high in private self-consciousness compared to those low in private self-
consciousness (Fransen, Fennis, Pruyn, & Vohs, 2011). An important takeaway that Fransen and 
colleagues (2011) point out is that it is not simply that “when people focus on themselves they 
become egocentric and therefore disinterested in information from the external environment,” 
but instead, that external information can be made more self-relevant when people are highly 
self-focused, and this assumed self-relevance influences their response in the social situation. 
  This fact, that for people with high self-focus, external information can be made more 
self-relevant (Fransen et al., 2011) has been demonstrated in other studies as well, and it can 
serve to explain how the interaction of increased state self-focus and dispositional private self-
consciousness can influence social outcomes. For instance, Hull and colleagues (1988) found a 
correlation between private self-consciousness and improved memory for self-referenced words, 
indicating a relationship between increased self-focus and improvements in the encoding and 
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retrieving of self-relevant information (Hull et al., 1988). In the same study, people higher in 
private self-consciousness were more influenced by the affect of studied words. They 
remembered less the depressive-related words during a self-reference task. Additionally, both 
private self-consciousness and the number of self-referenced words remembered, as two indices 
of self-focus, were associated with sadness following a failure induction (Hull et al., 1988). 
Thus, from the present results and past ones, we see that the more privately self-focused one is, 
the more external information can be made self-relevant, and this may improve social relations if 
that self-focus is made salient. However, for those less privately self-focused, unwanted 
reminders to self-focus may harm social relations. 
Social Anxiety and Interpersonal Outcomes. Despite past associations between social 
anxiety and negative outcomes, in Exp. 3, social anxiety was related to several social advantages. 
Social anxiety predicted increased ratings of liking and empathy towards one’s conversation 
partner, as well as a combined score of the four interpersonal ratings (liking, empathy, interest, 
and similarity). These social benefits among more socially anxious people is consistent with past 
research, in which more socially anxious people were shown to help more in the presence of a 
group (Garcia, Weaver, Darley, & Spence, 2009). Despite the difficulty faced by more socially 
anxious people in social situations, they may benefit from a relational advantage via a 
compensatory route. People with social anxiety, despite being motivated to make a good 
impression, fear they will not make a good impression (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Thus, to 
compensate for one’s perceived social failings, socially anxious people may increase their sense 
of the quality of the conversation and their partner to attempt to improve the social situation. 
 This positive relationship is mirrored by a more negative one when considering how 
more socially anxious participants were judged in Exp. 2. When two naïve participants engaged 
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in a conversation and rated the perceived interpersonal connection following the conversation, 
one participant’s social anxiety was related to a negative outcome: their conversation partners 
gave lower ratings of “inclusion of other in the self” (Aron et al., 1992) to more socially anxious 
participants. This can be interpreted to mean that others felt less connected to people they just 
met who were more socially anxious. This finding is corroborated by past work showing, as 
Clark (2005) summarized, that socially anxious people, who tend to self-focus and engage in 
safety behaviors, can be less appealing to and liked by others (Alden & Wallace, 1995). 
Study Limitations 
Several limitations must be noted about the present research. First, inconsistencies were 
found between the various proposed indices of self-focus and across experiments. In Exp. 1 and 
2, when both looking at the self and linguistic indices of self-focus were measured as outcomes, 
little overlap was found between these outcomes relative to the experimental design. In Exp. 3, 
the manipulation of seeing oneself on-screen during the video chat did not induce any increases 
in linguistic self-focus. Moreover, the dispositional tendency to self-focus, indicated in particular 
by the private self-consciousness scale did not positively predict looking at the self. In fact, in 
Exp. 2, increased public and private self-consciousness predicted decreased looking at the self.  
Another problem with employing these multiple measures is that many different analyses 
were done, so there may be a multiple comparison problem. Although this work was hypothesis-
driven, it was also mostly new. Because the looking measure is new and, in large part, the study 
of self-focus in conversation is not well-established, at a minimum, there was a goal to observe 
self-focus across conversations using multiple measures with the hope of uncovering 
relationships between self-focus, personality variables, and conversation factors. 
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In addition to using an entirely new looking measure of self-focus, spoken language was 
considered to be the second best available index of self-focus to be assessed across ongoing 
conversations, so a variety of measures were considered based on what and how much people 
said. In the end, the linguistic indices of self-focus neither cohered with one another nor did they 
adequately support the new looking measure of self-focus. Though they may be measuring 
certain aspects of self-focus in ongoing conversation, their usefulness was not strongly supported 
in this research. Hence, for future projects, a focus on the looking measure of self-focus should 
be undertaken considering different conversation contexts, different types of interaction partners, 
and more refined manipulations. 
Despite some promising initial findings, especially based on its relationship to personality 
variables of self-esteem, self-consciousness, and social anxiety, the new looking measure of self-
focus provided in this work requires much additional investigation into its ability to indicate self-
focus in conversation.  
Part of the inherent difficulty of the task of measuring self-focus is that the object of 
attention in self-focus is typically a mental representation of the self, which exists in one’s mind 
(Carver, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Self-focus is even often contrasted with attention to 
anything in the external environment, such as other people or things (Ingram, 1990; Morin, 
2006). It is somewhat easier, and more reasonable, to measure attention to another based on 
one’s gaze at the other (e.g. Pfeiffer et al., 2012) or to text or images based on eye movements 
towards them (e.g. Isaacowitz, 2006). 
In this dissertation, a readily available technology, the video chat platform, was used for 
its capacity to create an atypical occurrence that is now nonetheless commonplace: a 
representation of the self was projected into the external environment. Unlike in live face-to-face 
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interaction, in which one cannot see the self, in a video chat, this is a typical occurrence. The self 
is presented on the video chat screen for participants to see while talking to another. Despite its 
potential, a major limitation to the present work is the question of whether attention to an 
external representation of the self, the video of the self playing back on the screen during a video 
conversation, adequately represents self-focus in the psychological sense. In some ways, we have 
shown that increased external self-focus (looking at the self on screen) does correspond with 
what was theorized to be increased internal self-focus. For instance, results replicated in both 
Exp. 1 and 2 showed that self-focus increased during the sharing of personal information about 
the self as self-esteem increased. However, self-focus decreased during the sharing of personal 
information about the self as social anxiety and public and private self-consciousness increased. 
Theoretically, being more privately or publicly self-conscious is by definition more self-focused, 
so the fact that we did not show exact tracking in these cases indicates that looking at the self on 
screen does not perfectly reveal when internally-directed self-focus might be high. 
 What we do provide in the present research is an experimental situation in which people 
can externally direct their attention either to the self or other. Using this approach, we have come 
to know more about when and for whom attention to this external representation of the self rises 
and falls, which is revealing about the function and consequences of self-focus in ongoing 
conversation, especially as it relates to personality variables of self-esteem, self-consciousness, 
and social anxiety.  
Chapter Conclusions 
 Occurring in both quiet moments of deliberation and in the midst of everyday 
conversations, self-focus is a psychologically rich phenomenon that is as common as it is unique. 
Although it has received some research attention as a factor in personal outcomes, such as affect, 
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anxiety, and effort, it has not been evaluated much in the context of ongoing interactions. This 
may be because previous methods for manipulating and measuring self-focus are insufficient for 
understanding the functions of self-focus in the context of ongoing social interactions. By 
manipulating and measuring self-focus in ongoing interactions, we have provided some 
preliminary answers about how self-focus serves a regulatory role in social contexts, especially 
those involving self-evaluation, depending on individual differences, and the various 








Material from Exp. 3 
Introduction Script 
 
Hi I’m <insert name>. (Let the participant say hi) 
How are you today? (Let the participant respond) 
So what’s going to happen is we’re each going to get the chance to do a “confessional” for one 
another, kind of like we see on reality TV. Have you ever seen that on a reality show? Like 
where they talk into the camera about things that happened. (Let the participant respond) 
So we’re going to do that for one another with the stories we prepared. You’ll start and I’ll just 
sit and listen while you’re telling me your stories, and you’ll get a short break in between your 
first and second stories. When you’re done, the roles will be reversed and you’ll get to listen to 
me tell you my stories. 
Remember: there is a gray “break” screen between each story (and between this intro and the 
first story). When we’re done talking now, you’ll see a gray screen that allows you to take a 
break. Whenever you’re ready you’ll press the space bar and I’ll be back. Whenever you get 
back to the screen with my face, let me know you’re back by saying “I’m back.” 
Do you have any questions for me? (Let the participant respond) 






Additional Results from Exp. 1 
 
Table 33 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and 
Private Self-Consciousness on Percent Time Looking at the Self 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 2.437 0.842 175 2.894 0.004 0.775 4.099 
Speaker -1.324 0.984 171 -1.346 0.180 -3.266 0.618 
Story -0.710 0.984 171 -0.722 0.471 -2.652 1.232 
Private Self-Consciousness 0.143 0.152 175 0.938 0.349 -0.158 0.444 
Speaker x Story 0.576 1.391 171 0.414 0.679 -2.170 3.323 
Speaker x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.054 0.178 171 -0.306 0.760 -0.406 0.297 
Story x Private Self-Consciousness -0.057 0.178 171 -0.319 0.750 -0.408 0.295 
Speaker x Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.035 0.252 171 0.139 0.889 -0.462 0.532 
Speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; Story variable: 1 = embarrassed, 0 = proud 
 
Table 34 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and 
Public Self-Consciousness on Percent Time Looking at the Self 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 2.437 0.845 174 2.886 0.004 0.770 4.104 
Speaker -1.324 0.983 171 -1.347 0.180 -3.264 0.617 
Story -0.710 0.983 171 -0.722 0.471 -2.651 1.230 
Public Self-Consciousness -0.055 0.193 174 -0.286 0.775 -0.436 0.326 
Speaker x Story 0.576 1.390 171 0.415 0.679 -2.168 3.320 
Speaker x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.083 0.225 171 0.370 0.712 -0.360 0.527 
Story x Public Self-Consciousness 0.155 0.225 171 0.689 0.492 -0.289 0.598 
Speaker x Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.155 0.318 171 -0.487 0.627 -0.782 0.472 
Speaker variable: 1 = self, 0 = other; Story variable: 1 = embarrassed, 0 = proud 
 
Table 35 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-Esteem on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 166.559 17.270 82 9.644 0.000 132.205 200.914 
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Story -30.407 15.018 57 -2.025 0.048 -60.480 -0.333 
Self-Esteem -0.197 3.261 82 -0.060 0.952 -6.685 6.291 
Story x Self-Esteem 0.172 2.836 57 0.060 0.952 -5.508 5.851 
 
Table 36 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Private Self-Consciousness on 
Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 166.559 17.092 83 9.745 0.000 132.563 200.556 
Story -30.407 15.016 57 -2.025 0.048 -60.476 -0.337 
Private Self-Consciousness -3.562 3.092 83 -1.152 0.253 -9.711 2.588 
Story x Private Self-Consciousness 0.370 2.716 57 0.136 0.892 -5.069 5.809 
 
Table 37 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public Self-Consciousness on 
Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 166.559 17.131 82 9.723 0.000 132.479 200.639 
Story -30.407 14.778 57 -2.058 0.044 -59.999 -0.815 
Public Self-Consciousness 0.686 3.917 82 0.175 0.861 -7.106 8.477 
Story x Public Self-Consciousness 4.624 3.379 57 1.369 0.176 -2.141 11.390 
 
Table 38 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-Esteem on Self-Focused 
Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.163 0.497 114 22.478 <.001 10.179 12.147 
Story 0.103 0.701 57 0.146 0.884 -1.300 1.505 
Self-Esteem -0.006 0.094 114 -0.065 0.948 -0.192 0.180 
Story x Self-Esteem 0.007 0.132 57 0.057 0.955 -0.257 0.272 
 
Table 39 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Private Self-Consciousness on 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.163 0.493 114 22.638 <.001 10.186 12.140 
Story 0.103 0.692 57 0.148 0.883 -1.283 1.488 
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Private Self-Consciousness 0.104 0.089 114 1.167 0.246 -0.073 0.281 
Story x Private Self-Consciousness -0.151 0.125 57 -1.209 0.232 -0.402 0.099 
 
Table 40 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public Self-Consciousness on 
Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.163 0.492 114 22.708 <.001 10.189 12.137 
Story 0.103 0.687 57 0.149 0.882 -1.273 1.478 
Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.092 0.112 114 0.816 0.416 -0.131 0.314 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.238 0.157 57 -1.513 0.136 -0.552 0.077 
 
Table 41 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social Anxiety on Self-Focused 
Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.163 0.495 114 22.548 <.001 10.182 12.144 
Story 0.103 0.700 114 0.146 0.884 -1.284 1.490 
Social Anxiety 0.040 0.091 114 0.444 0.658 -0.139 0.219 
Story x Social 
Anxiety 
0.025 0.128 114 0.196 0.845 -0.228 0.279 
 
Table 42 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-Esteem on Self-Focused 
Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 19.965 1.725 112 11.576 <.001 16.548 23.383 
Story -3.427 2.281 57 -1.503 0.138 -7.994 1.140 
Self-Esteem -0.227 0.326 112 -0.698 0.486 -0.873 0.418 
Story x Self-Esteem 0.250 0.431 57 0.581 0.564 -0.612 1.112 
 
Table 43 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Private Self-Consciousness on 
Self-Focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
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      Lower Upper 
Intercept 19.965 1.717 113 11.631 <.001 16.564 23.366 
Story -3.427 2.286 57 -1.499 0.139 -8.004 1.151 
Private Self-Consciousness -0.214 0.311 113 -0.689 0.492 -0.829 0.401 
Story x Private Self-Consciousness -0.111 0.413 57 -0.268 0.789 -0.939 0.717 
 
Table 44 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public Self-Consciousness on 
Self-Focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 19.965 1.724 112 11.583 <.001 16.550 23.380 
Story -3.427 2.287 57 -1.498 0.140 -8.007 1.153 
Public Self-Consciousness -0.201 0.394 112 -0.511 0.610 -0.982 0.579 
Story x Public Self-Consciousness -0.037 0.523 57 -0.071 0.944 -1.084 1.010 
 
Table 45 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social Anxiety on Self-Focused 
Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 19.965 1.703 112 11.724 <.001 16.591 23.340 
Story -3.427 2.240 57 -1.530 0.132 -7.912 1.059 
Social Anxiety -0.573 0.311 112 -1.840 0.068 -1.190 0.044 
Story x Social Anxiety 0.639 0.409 57 1.560 0.124 -0.181 1.459 
 
Table 46 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-Esteem on Story Time Length 
(seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 65.051 8.161 93 7.971 <.001 48.846 81.256 
Story 0.271 8.407 57 0.032 0.974 -16.564 17.107 
Self-Esteem 0.108 1.541 93 0.070 0.944 -2.952 3.168 
Story x Self-Esteem -1.384 1.588 57 -0.872 0.387 -4.563 1.796 
 
Table 47 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Private Self-Consciousness on 
Story Time Length (seconds) 
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Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 65.051 8.167 94 7.965 <.001 48.835 81.267 
Story 0.271 8.440 57 0.032 0.974 -16.630 17.172 
Private Self-Consciousness -0.202 1.477 94 -0.137 0.891 -3.136 2.731 
Story x Private Self-Consciousness -0.851 1.527 57 -0.557 0.580 -3.908 2.206 
 
Table 48 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public Self-Consciousness on 
Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 65.051 8.077 95 8.054 <.001 49.016 81.086 
Story 0.271 8.448 57 0.032 0.975 -16.645 17.187 
Public Self-Consciousness 1.811 1.847 95 0.981 0.329 -1.855 5.477 
Story x Public Self-Consciousness 0.887 1.931 57 0.459 0.648 -2.981 4.754 
 
Table 49 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social Anxiety on Story Time 
Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 65.051 8.059 94 8.072 <.001 49.051 81.051 
Story 0.271 8.403 57 0.032 0.974 -16.555 17.098 
Social Anxiety -2.550 1.473 94 -1.731 0.087 -5.474 0.375 
Story x Social Anxiety 1.392 1.536 57 0.906 0.368 -1.683 4.468 
 
Table 50 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-Esteem on Percent Time 
Looking at the Other 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 23.883 2.853 100 8.370 <.001 18.222 29.544 
Speaker 27.603 2.383 171 11.585 <.001 22.900 32.307 
Story 3.705 2.383 171 1.555 0.122 -0.998 8.408 
Self-Esteem 0.606 0.539 100 1.125 0.263 -0.463 1.675 
Speaker x Story 2.737 3.370 171 0.812 0.418 -3.914 9.389 
Speaker x Self-Esteem 0.108 0.450 171 0.239 0.811 -0.781 0.996 
Story x Self-Esteem -0.033 0.450 171 -0.074 0.941 -0.922 0.855 




Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Private Self-Consciousness on 
Percent Time Looking at the Other 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 23.883 2.830 101 8.440 <.001 18.270 29.496 
Speaker 27.603 2.379 171 11.603 <.001 22.907 32.299 
Story 3.705 2.379 171 1.557 0.121 -0.991 8.401 
Private Self-Consciousness 0.951 0.512 101 1.857 0.066 -0.065 1.966 
Speaker x Story 2.737 3.364 171 0.814 0.417 -3.904 9.378 
Speaker x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.234 0.430 171 -0.544 0.587 -1.083 0.615 
Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.320 0.430 171 -0.744 0.458 -1.169 0.529 
Speaker x Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.534 0.609 171 0.878 0.381 -0.667 1.736 
 
Table 52 
Multilevel Model Results of Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public Self-Consciousness on 
Percent Time Looking at the Other 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 23.883 2.833 101 8.431 <.001 18.263 29.503 
Speaker 27.603 2.371 171 11.644 <.001 22.924 32.283 
Story 3.705 2.371 171 1.563 0.120 -0.975 8.385 
Public Self-Consciousness 0.899 0.648 101 1.388 0.168 -0.386 2.184 
Speaker x Story 2.737 3.353 171 0.816 0.415 -3.881 9.355 
Speaker x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.359 0.542 171 0.663 0.508 -0.710 1.429 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.338 0.542 171 -0.624 0.533 -1.408 0.732 
Speaker x Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 





Additional Results from Exp. 2 
Table 53 
Multilevel Model Results of Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-
Conscious), Valence (Positive v. Negative) and Social Anxiety on Looking at the Self On-Screen  
 95% CI 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.059 0.01 141 5.837 <0.001 0.039 0.079 
Speaker -0.015 0.009 468 -1.741 0.082 -0.032 0.002 
Emotion Type -0.002 0.009 468 -0.215 0.83 -0.019 0.015 
Valence 0.009 0.009 468 1.032 0.302 -0.008 0.026 
Social Anxiety 0 0.002 142 -0.18 0.858 -0.004 0.004 
Speaker x Emotion Type 0.003 0.012 468 0.238 0.812 -0.021 0.027 
Speaker x Valence -0.007 0.012 468 -0.562 0.575 -0.031 0.017 
Speaker x Social 
Anxiety 
0.001 0.002 468 0.563 0.574 -0.002 0.004 
Emotion Type x Valence -0.002 0.012 468 -0.193 0.847 -0.026 0.021 
Emotion Type x Social 
Anxiety 
0 0.002 468 0.018 0.986 -0.003 0.003 
Valence x Social 
Anxiety 
-0.001 0.002 468 -0.425 0.671 -0.004 0.003 
Speaker x Emotion Type 
x Valence 
-0.008 0.017 468 -0.447 0.655 -0.041 0.026 
Speaker x Emotion Type 
x Social Anxiety 
0 0.002 468 0.031 0.976 -0.005 0.005 
Speaker x Valence x 
Social Anxiety 
0.001 0.002 468 0.445 0.656 -0.004 0.006 
Emotion Type x Valence 
x Social Anxiety 
0.001 0.002 468 0.328 0.743 -0.004 0.005 
Speaker x Emotion Type 
x Valence x Social 
Anxiety 
-0.001 0.003 468 -0.159 0.874 -0.007 0.006 
 
Table 54 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Private Self-Consciousness on Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 12.336 0.339 246 36.425 0.000 11.669 13.003 
Emotion Type -1.218 0.534 597 -2.280 0.023 -2.268 -0.169 
Valence 2.147 0.534 597 4.019 <.001 1.098 3.197 
Private Self-Consciousness 0.046 0.063 245 0.733 0.464 -0.077 0.169 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.109 0.814 598 -1.362 0.174 -2.707 0.490 
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Emotion Type x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.103 0.099 597 -1.042 0.298 -0.297 0.091 
Valence x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.072 0.099 597 -0.725 0.469 -0.266 0.122 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
0.066 0.151 597 0.438 0.661 -0.230 0.362 
 
Table 55 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Public Self-Consciousness on Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 12.329 0.338 246 36.427 <.001 11.662 12.996 
Emotion Type -1.208 0.534 597 -2.260 0.024 -2.257 -0.158 
Valence 2.156 0.534 597 4.035 <.001 1.107 3.206 
Public Self-Consciousness -0.001 0.072 243 -0.009 0.993 -0.142 0.141 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.126 0.814 598 -1.384 0.167 -2.725 0.472 
Emotion Type x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.019 0.113 597 -0.168 0.867 -0.241 0.203 
Valence x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.053 0.113 597 0.467 0.640 -0.169 0.275 
Emotion Type x Valence x Public 
Self-Consciousness 
0.085 0.173 597 0.492 0.623 -0.254 0.424 
 
Table 56 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Social Anxiety on Self-Focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 12.321 0.338 248 36.495 <.001 11.656 12.986 
Emotion Type -1.199 0.534 597 -2.244 0.025 -2.249 -0.150 
Valence 2.163 0.534 597 4.048 <.001 1.114 3.213 
Social Anxiety 0.104 0.066 257 1.561 0.120 -0.027 0.234 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.126 0.814 598 -1.384 0.167 -2.725 0.472 
Emotion Type x Social Anxiety -0.091 0.105 598 -0.866 0.387 -0.297 0.115 
Valence x Social Anxiety -0.084 0.105 598 -0.801 0.423 -0.290 0.122 
Emotion Type x Valence x Social 
Anxiety 
0.071 0.159 599 0.446 0.656 -0.242 0.383 
 
Table 57 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Private Self-Consciousness on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
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Intercept 90.262 7.996 83 11.289 <.001 74.359 106.166 
Emotion Type 19.549 6.128 593 3.190 0.001 7.514 31.583 
Valence -11.293 6.128 593 -1.843 0.066 -23.327 0.741 
Private Self-Consciousness 2.862 1.478 83 1.936 0.056 -0.078 5.801 
Emotion Type x Valence -18.390 9.335 593 -1.970 0.049 -36.724 -0.056 
Emotion Type x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.950 1.133 593 0.838 0.402 -1.276 3.175 
Valence x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.933 1.133 593 -0.824 0.411 -3.159 1.292 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
0.059 1.727 593 0.034 0.973 -3.332 3.451 
 
Table 58 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Public Self-Consciousness on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 90.212 8.204 81 10.996 <.001 73.888 106.536 
Emotion Type 19.508 6.135 593 3.180 0.002 7.460 31.557 
Valence -11.201 6.135 593 -1.826 0.068 -23.250 0.847 
Public Self-Consciousness 0.875 1.741 81 0.503 0.617 -2.590 4.340 
Emotion Type x Valence -18.412 9.347 593 -1.970 0.049 -36.769 -0.055 
Emotion Type x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-1.004 1.300 593 -0.772 0.440 -3.556 1.549 
Valence x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.802 1.300 593 -0.617 0.537 -3.355 1.750 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
1.197 1.982 593 0.604 0.546 -2.695 5.090 
 
Table 59 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Social Anxiety on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 90.256 8.014 83 11.263 <.001 74.317 106.196 
Emotion Type 19.453 6.130 593 3.173 0.002 7.413 31.492 
Valence -11.133 6.130 593 -1.816 0.070 -23.172 0.906 
Social Anxiety -2.985 1.559 84 -1.915 0.059 -6.085 0.115 
Emotion Type x Valence -18.463 9.339 593 -1.977 0.049 -36.805 -0.121 
Emotion Type x Social Anxiety 0.595 1.202 593 0.495 0.621 -1.766 2.956 
Valence x Social Anxiety -0.877 1.202 593 -0.730 0.466 -3.238 1.484 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Social Anxiety 





Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Self-Esteem on Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 18.243 0.633 186 28.827 <.001 16.995 19.492 
Emotion Type -1.618 0.906 597 -1.787 0.074 -3.397 0.160 
Valence 2.229 0.906 597 2.461 0.014 0.450 4.007 
Self-Esteem 0.209 0.113 183 1.851 0.066 -0.014 0.432 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.546 1.379 597 -1.121 0.263 -4.255 1.163 
Emotion Type x Self-Esteem -0.033 0.162 597 -0.205 0.837 -0.352 0.285 
Valence x Self-Esteem -0.121 0.162 597 -0.749 0.454 -0.440 0.197 
Emotion Type x Valence x Self-
Esteem 
0.023 0.247 597 0.095 0.925 -0.462 0.509 
 
Table 61 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Private Self-Consciousness on Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 18.231 0.633 186 28.783 <.001 16.982 19.481 
Emotion Type -1.611 0.905 597 -1.779 0.076 -3.389 0.167 
Valence 2.250 0.905 597 2.485 0.013 0.472 4.028 
Private Self-Consciousness 0.075 0.117 186 0.637 0.525 -0.157 0.306 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.557 1.379 597 -1.129 0.259 -4.266 1.151 
Emotion Type x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.085 0.167 597 0.508 0.611 -0.244 0.414 
Valence x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.156 0.167 597 0.933 0.351 -0.173 0.485 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.099 0.255 597 -0.387 0.699 -0.600 0.402 
 
Table 62 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Public Self-Consciousness on Self-Focused Pronouns per Minute 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 18.229 0.641 181 28.430 <.001 16.964 19.494 
Emotion Type -1.617 0.905 597 -1.787 0.074 -3.395 0.160 
Valence 2.240 0.905 597 2.475 0.014 0.462 4.017 
Public Self-Consciousness -0.020 0.136 179 -0.147 0.883 -0.288 0.248 
Emotion Type x Valence -1.555 1.379 597 -1.128 0.260 -4.263 1.153 
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Emotion Type x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.009 0.192 597 -0.049 0.961 -0.386 0.367 
Valence x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.142 0.192 597 0.740 0.460 -0.235 0.518 
Emotion Type x Valence x Public 
Self-Consciousness 
0.043 0.292 597 0.146 0.884 -0.531 0.617 
 
Table 63 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Private Self-Consciousness on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 36.590 3.049 82 12.001 <.001 30.525 42.656 
Emotion Type 7.091 2.429 591 2.920 0.004 2.322 11.861 
Valence -4.653 2.429 591 -1.916 0.056 -9.422 0.117 
Private Self-Consciousness 1.022 0.564 82 1.814 0.073 -0.099 2.144 
Emotion Type x Valence -6.765 3.700 591 -1.829 0.068 -14.032 0.501 
Emotion Type x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.069 0.449 591 -0.153 0.878 -0.951 0.813 
Valence x Private Self-
Consciousness 
-0.795 0.449 591 -1.769 0.077 -1.677 0.087 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
0.634 0.684 591 0.926 0.355 -0.710 1.978 
 
Table 64 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Public Self-Consciousness on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 36.532 3.085 81 11.841 <.001 30.394 42.671 
Emotion Type 7.124 2.434 591 2.928 0.004 2.345 11.904 
Valence -4.569 2.434 591 -1.878 0.061 -9.349 0.210 
Public Self-Consciousness 0.100 0.655 81 0.153 0.879 -1.203 1.403 
Emotion Type x Valence -6.835 3.708 591 -1.843 0.066 -14.117 0.447 
Emotion Type x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.481 0.516 591 -0.933 0.351 -1.494 0.531 
Valence x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.435 0.516 591 -0.843 0.399 -1.447 0.578 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
0.698 0.786 591 0.887 0.375 -0.847 2.242 
 
Table 65 
Multilevel Model Results of Emotion Type (Basic v. Self-Conscious), Valence (Positive v. 
Negative) and Social Anxiety on Story Time Length (seconds) 
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Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 36.566 3.049 82 11.991 <.001 30.500 42.633 
Emotion Type 7.084 2.434 591 2.911 0.004 2.304 11.864 
Valence -4.590 2.434 591 -1.886 0.060 -9.370 0.190 
Social Anxiety -1.003 0.593 83 -1.690 0.095 -2.183 0.177 
Emotion Type x Valence -6.802 3.708 591 -1.834 0.067 -14.084 0.481 
Emotion Type x Social Anxiety 0.419 0.477 591 0.879 0.380 -0.518 1.357 
Valence x Social Anxiety 0.187 0.477 591 0.391 0.696 -0.751 1.124 
Emotion Type x Valence x 
Social Anxiety 
-0.311 0.725 591 -0.430 0.668 -1.735 1.112 
 
Table 66 
Correlations between Looking at the Self During Different Story Conditions and Inclusion of 












Own Positive Basic  0.006 0.091 -0.063 -0.116 
Own Negative Basic  -0.066 0.163 -0.169 -0.062 
Own Positive Self-Conscious  -0.091 0.181 -0.199 0.033 
Own Negative Self-Conscious  -0.129 0.17 -0.219^ 0.031 
Other’s Positive Basic  -0.175 0.112 -0.208^ -0.029 
Other’s Negative Basic  -0.169 0.035 -0.146 -0.04 
Other’s Positive Self-Conscious  -0.132 0 -0.094 -0.111 
Other’s Negative Self-Conscious  -0.198 0.104 -0.218^ 0.017 
All correlations include 69 participants with df = 68; *p < .050; ^p < .100 
 
Table 67 










DV: Self-focused pronouns used per minute 
Positive Basic -0.034 0.007 -0.029 0.05 
Negative Basic 0.117 0.026 0.064 -0.086 
Positive Self-Conscious 0.061 -0.019 0.057 0.072 
Negative Self-Conscious .274* -0.003 0.197 -0.063 
DV: Self-focused pronouns out of total words 
Positive Basic -0.086 0.112 -0.145 0.046 
Negative Basic 0.135 0.043 0.065 0.059 
Positive Self-Conscious -0.23^ -.299* 0.059 -0.083 
Negative Self-Conscious 0.136 -0.022 0.113 -0.011 
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DV: Story time 
Positive Basic 0.083 0.2^ -0.09 -0.023 
Negative Basic 0.085 0.197 -0.086 -0.113 
Positive Self-Conscious -0.095 0.17 -0.195 -0.002 
Negative Self-Conscious -0.005 0.175 -0.134 -0.006 
DV: Word Count 
Positive Basic 0.112 0.215^ -0.08 -0.023 
Negative Basic 0.104 0.187 -0.066 -0.148 
Positive Self-Conscious 0.053 .237* -0.139 -0.01 
Negative Self-Conscious 0.047 0.174 -0.096 -0.036 
All correlations include 69 participants with df = 68; *p < .050; ^p < .100 
 
Table 68 










Private Self-Consciousness  -.200^ .028 -.163 -.143 
Public Self-Consciousness .024 -.004 .020 -.215^ 
Social Anxiety -.126 -.256* .100 -.078 
Total Self-Consciousness -.155 -.114 -.026 -.210^ 







Reliability and Factor Structure of Social Outcome Measures in Exp. 3 
 
To evaluate the reliability of the social outcome measures, of which there were four 
items, gauging participants’ likeability, empathy, interest, and perceived similarity towards their 
conversation partner, Cronbach's alpha was found to be α = .723. Because the alpha is between .7 
and .8, the scale is considered to carry an acceptable level of internal consistency. Further, if any 
one of the items were deleted, it would result in a lower alpha. Thus, all items are kept. 
 The factor structure of the four self-report items (likeability, empathy, interest, and 
perceived similarity) was examined to consider if any self-report items should be collapsed. To 
perform exploratory factor analysis, first the scree test was used to determine the number of 
factors to extract (Costello & Osborne, 2005). A scree plot showed that only one factor was 
evident (Figure 16). Because 3 of the 4 items were non-normally distributed, “principal axis 
factors” analysis was used (Costello & Osborne, 2005) and because the individual items were 
correlated (Table 25), an oblique rotation “direct oblimin” was used. Results showed that a one-
factor solution had an eigenvalue of 2.215 and explained 55.377% of the variance. It was 
manually attempted to extract more than one factor, but only one factor was able to be extracted. 







Correlations between Individual Outcome Measures 
 Interest Empathy Similarity 
Likeability .402** .359** .419** 
Interest  .359** .394** 
Empathy   .492** 




Factor Matrix using Principal Axis Factoring 
Figure 16. Scree plot for factor analysis. 
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Additional Results from Exp. 3 
 
Table 71 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Self-Esteem on Sum of Interpersonal 
Outcomes 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 9.236 0.316  29.267 <.001 8.608 9.864 
 Self-Esteem -0.009 0.041 -0.024 -0.211 0.833 -0.089 0.072 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.309 0.450 0.078 0.688 0.494 -0.586 1.204 
2 (Constant) 9.214 0.319  28.903 <.001 8.579 9.848 
 Self-Esteem -0.031 0.055 -0.088 -0.571 0.570 -0.141 0.078 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.304 0.452 0.077 0.674 0.502 -0.595 1.203 
 Self-Esteem x Seeing Oneself 
On-Screen 
0.051 0.082 0.095 0.619 0.538 -0.112 0.214 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.006 0.241 2 79 0.787   
2  0.005 0.383 1 78 0.538   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 72 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Private Self-Consciousness on Sum of 
Interpersonal Outcomes 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 9.272 0.312  29.692 <.001 8.650 9.893 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.065 0.063 -0.116 -1.036 0.304 -0.190 0.060 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.237 0.443 0.060 0.535 0.594 -0.645 1.120 
2 (Constant) 9.327 0.310  30.056 <.001 8.709 9.945 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.194 0.098 -0.348 -1.979 0.051 -0.390 0.001 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.219 0.438 0.055 0.499 0.619 -0.654 1.091 
 Private Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.215 0.126 0.297 1.698 0.094 -0.037 0.467 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.019 0.757 2 79 0.472   
2  0.035 2.883 1 78 0.094   
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For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 73 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Public Self-Consciousness on Sum of 
Interpersonal Outcomes 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 9.228 0.311  29.635 <.001 8.609 9.848 
 Public Self-Consciousness 0.067 0.064 0.117 1.049 0.297 -0.060 0.194 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.324 0.441 0.082 0.734 0.465 -0.554 1.201 
2 (Constant) 9.256 0.309  29.962 <.001 8.641 9.871 
 Public Self-Consciousness -0.053 0.098 -0.092 -0.535 0.594 -0.248 0.143 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.316 0.437 0.080 0.723 0.472 -0.554 1.185 
 Public Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.204 0.128 0.273 1.590 0.116 -0.051 0.460 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.019 0.772 2 79 0.466   
2  0.031 2.530 1 78 0.116   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 74 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Self-Esteem on Liking of Conversation 
Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.745 0.079  34.561 <.001 2.587 2.903 
 Self-Esteem -0.011 0.010 -0.127 -1.121 0.266 -0.032 0.009 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.051 0.113 -0.051 -0.451 0.653 -0.276 0.174 
2 (Constant) 2.744 0.080  34.118 <.001 2.584 2.904 
 Self-Esteem -0.013 0.014 -0.139 -0.909 0.366 -0.040 0.015 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.051 0.114 -0.051 -0.451 0.653 -0.278 0.175 
 Self-Esteem x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
0.003 0.021 0.019 0.123 0.903 -0.039 0.044 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.021 0.844 2 79 0.434   
2  0.000 0.015 1 78 0.903   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 75 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Self-Esteem on Interest in Conversation 
Partner 
     95% CI for B 
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Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.566 0.097  26.332 <.001 2.372 2.760 
 Self-Esteem 0.005 0.013 0.046 0.401 0.690 -0.020 0.030 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.083 0.139 -0.068 -0.597 0.552 -0.359 0.194 
2 (Constant) 2.547 0.097  26.329 <.001 2.354 2.739 
 Self-Esteem -0.015 0.017 -0.136 -0.895 0.373 -0.048 0.018 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.087 0.137 -0.072 -0.636 0.527 -0.360 0.186 
 Self-Esteem x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
0.044 0.025 0.268 1.784 0.078 -0.005 0.094 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.006 0.223 2 79 0.800   
2  0.039 3.183 1 78 0.078   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 76 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Private Self-Consciousness on Interest in 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.556 0.097  26.368 <.001 2.363 2.749 
 Private Self-Consciousness 0.011 0.019 0.063 0.562 0.576 -0.028 0.050 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.064 0.138 -0.052 -0.464 0.644 -0.338 0.210 
2 (Constant) 2.555 0.098  26.048 <.001 2.360 2.751 
 Private Self-Consciousness 0.013 0.031 0.075 0.418 0.677 -0.049 0.075 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.064 0.139 -0.052 -0.459 0.648 -0.339 0.212 
 Private Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
-0.003 0.040 -0.015 -0.085 0.932 -0.083 0.076 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.008 0.301 2 79 0.741   
2  0.000 0.007 1 78 0.932   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 77 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Public Self-Consciousness on Interest in 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.561 0.097  26.434 <.001 2.368 2.754 
 Public Self-Consciousness -0.001 0.020 -0.007 -0.061 0.952 -0.041 0.038 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.074 0.137 -0.060 -0.537 0.592 -0.347 0.199 
2 (Constant) 2.564 0.097  26.314 <.001 2.370 2.758 
 Public Self-Consciousness -0.015 0.031 -0.085 -0.484 0.630 -0.077 0.047 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.075 0.138 -0.061 -0.542 0.589 -0.349 0.200 
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 Public Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.024 0.041 0.102 0.582 0.562 -0.057 0.104 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.004 0.145 2 79 0.865   
2  0.004 0.339 1 78 0.562   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 78 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Social Anxiety on Interest in Conversation 
Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.561 0.097  26.468 <.001 2.368 2.753 
 Social Anxiety 0.005 0.015 0.033 0.292 0.771 -0.026 0.035 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.072 0.137 -0.059 -0.529 0.598 -0.345 0.200 
2 (Constant) 2.561 0.097  26.300 <.001 2.367 2.755 
 Social Anxiety 0.002 0.025 0.016 0.085 0.932 -0.048 0.052 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.072 0.138 -0.059 -0.526 0.600 -0.347 0.202 
 Social Anxiety x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
0.004 0.032 0.022 0.119 0.906 -0.060 0.067 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.005 0.186 2 79 0.831   
2  0.000 0.014 1 78 0.906   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 79 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Self-Esteem on Reported Empathy with 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.334 0.122  19.172 <.001 2.092 2.577 
 Self-Esteem -0.007 0.016 -0.053 -0.464 0.644 -0.038 0.024 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.136 0.174 0.089 0.784 0.436 -0.209 0.481 
2 (Constant) 2.339 0.123  18.981 <.001 2.094 2.584 
 Self-Esteem -0.003 0.021 -0.019 -0.124 0.902 -0.045 0.040 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.137 0.175 0.090 0.785 0.435 -0.211 0.484 
 Self-Esteem x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
-0.010 0.032 -0.050 -0.326 0.746 -0.073 0.053 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.009 0.362 2 79 0.697   
2  0.001 0.106 1 78 0.746   




Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Private Self-Consciousness on Reported 
Empathy with Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.360 0.119  19.854 <.001 2.124 2.597 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.044 0.024 -0.205 -1.852 0.068 -0.092 0.003 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.084 0.169 0.055 0.499 0.619 -0.252 0.420 
2 (Constant) 2.380 0.118  20.093 <.001 2.144 2.616 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.090 0.037 -0.417 -2.400 0.019 -0.165 -0.015 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.078 0.167 0.051 0.464 0.644 -0.255 0.411 
 Private Self-Consciousness 
x Seeing Oneself On-
Screen 
0.076 0.048 0.272 1.573 0.120 -0.020 0.172 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.048 1.981 2 79 0.145   
2  0.029 2.475 1 78 0.120   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 81 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Public Self-Consciousness on Reported 
Empathy with Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 2.340 0.121  19.326 <.001 2.099 2.581 
 Public Self-Consciousness 0.005 0.025 0.021 0.189 0.851 -0.045 0.054 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.124 0.171 0.081 0.724 0.471 -0.217 0.465 
2 (Constant) 2.352 0.120  19.619 <.001 2.113 2.591 
 Public Self-Consciousness -0.045 0.038 -0.203 -1.176 0.243 -0.121 0.031 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.121 0.169 0.079 0.713 0.478 -0.217 0.458 
 Public Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.085 0.050 0.293 1.698 0.094 -0.015 0.184 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.007 0.272 2 79 0.763   
2  0.035 2.882 1 78 0.094   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 82 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Self-Esteem on Perceived Similarity to 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
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1 (Constant) 1.590 0.119  13.315 <.001 1.353 1.828 
 Self-Esteem 0.005 0.015 0.037 0.334 0.739 -0.025 0.036 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.307 0.170 0.202 1.805 0.075 -0.032 0.646 
2 (Constant) 1.584 0.121  13.115 <.001 1.344 1.825 
 Self-Esteem -0.001 0.021 -0.009 -0.058 0.954 -0.043 0.040 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.306 0.171 0.201 1.787 0.078 -0.035 0.646 
 Self-Esteem x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
0.014 0.031 0.068 0.455 0.651 -0.048 0.076 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.045 1.845 2 79 0.165   
2  0.003 0.207 1 78 0.651   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 83 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Private Self-Consciousness on Perceived 
Similarity to Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 1.596 0.118  13.506 <.001 1.361 1.831 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.025 0.024 -0.118 -1.070 0.288 -0.073 0.022 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.295 0.168 0.194 1.761 0.082 -0.038 0.629 
2 (Constant) 1.614 0.118  13.683 <.001 1.379 1.849 
 Private Self-Consciousness -0.068 0.037 -0.315 -1.818 0.073 -0.142 0.006 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.289 0.167 0.190 1.736 0.086 -0.042 0.621 
 Private Self-Consciousness x 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 
0.071 0.048 0.253 1.467 0.146 -0.025 0.166 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.057 2.385 2 79 0.099   
2  0.025 2.151 1 78 0.146   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 84 
Moderated Multiple Regression of Seeing Oneself and Social Anxiety on Perceived Similarity to 
Conversation Partner 
     95% CI for B 
Model B SE Beta t Sig. Lower Upper 
1 (Constant) 1.583 0.117  13.557 <.001 1.350 1.815 
 Social Anxiety 0.030 0.019 0.173 1.593 0.115 -0.007 0.067 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.322 0.165 0.211 1.951 0.055 -0.007 0.651 
2 (Constant) 1.580 0.116  13.626 <.001 1.349 1.811 
 Social Anxiety 0.064 0.030 0.373 2.136 0.036 0.004 0.124 
 Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.323 0.164 0.212 1.972 0.052 -0.003 0.650 
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 Social Anxiety x Seeing 
Oneself On-Screen 
-0.055 0.038 -0.254 -1.457 0.149 -0.131 0.020 
Model Summary R2 F df1 df2 Sig.   
1  0.073 3.114 2 79 0.050   
2  0.025 2.121 1 78 0.149   
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0 
 
Table 85 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story 
(Proud v. Guilty) and Private Self-Consciousness on Percent Time Looking at Other On-Screen 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.280 0.032 177 8.683 <.001 0.217 0.344 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.009 0.046 177 -0.187 0.852 -0.099 0.082 
Speaker 0.358 0.032 234 11.124 <.001 0.295 0.421 
Story 0.030 0.032 234 0.935 0.351 -0.033 0.093 
Private Self-Consciousness 0.002 0.008 177 0.227 0.821 -0.015 0.018 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 0.021 0.046 234 0.471 0.638 -0.068 0.111 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.008 0.046 234 -0.179 0.858 -0.098 0.082 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Private 
Self-Consciousness 
-0.009 0.013 177 -0.661 0.510 -0.035 0.017 
Speaker x Story -0.032 0.046 234 -0.693 0.489 -0.121 0.058 
Speaker x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.010 0.008 234 1.158 0.248 -0.007 0.026 
Story x Private Self-Consciousness 0.000 0.008 234 0.045 0.964 -0.016 0.017 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Story 
0.007 0.064 234 0.109 0.913 -0.120 0.134 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.017 0.013 234 -1.307 0.192 -0.043 0.009 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
0.004 0.013 234 0.284 0.777 -0.022 0.030 
Speaker x Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.002 0.012 234 0.157 0.875 -0.021 0.025 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Story x Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.001 0.019 234 -0.040 0.968 -0.037 0.036 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
speaker variable: self = 1, other = 0; for story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 86 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story 
(Proud v. Guilty) and Public Self-Consciousness on Percent Time Looking at Other On-Screen 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
 177 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.281 0.032 180 8.741 <.001 0.217 0.344 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.010 0.045 180 -0.219 0.827 -0.100 0.080 
Speaker 0.354 0.032 234 10.969 <.001 0.290 0.417 
Story 0.031 0.032 234 0.955 0.341 -0.033 0.094 
Public Self-Consciousness 0.005 0.009 180 0.634 0.527 -0.012 0.022 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 0.022 0.046 234 0.491 0.624 -0.068 0.112 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.006 0.046 234 -0.130 0.896 -0.096 0.084 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Public 
Self-Consciousness 
-0.014 0.013 180 -1.044 0.298 -0.040 0.012 
Speaker x Story -0.032 0.046 234 -0.691 0.490 -0.121 0.058 
Speaker x Public Self-Consciousness 0.000 0.009 234 0.050 0.960 -0.017 0.017 
Story x Public Self-Consciousness 0.004 0.009 234 0.444 0.658 -0.013 0.021 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Story 
0.006 0.065 234 0.099 0.921 -0.121 0.134 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Public Self-Consciousness 
-0.001 0.013 234 -0.063 0.950 -0.027 0.026 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
-0.009 0.013 234 -0.682 0.496 -0.036 0.017 
Speaker x Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.004 0.012 234 0.289 0.773 -0.021 0.028 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Story x Public Self-Consciousness 
0.001 0.019 234 0.062 0.950 -0.036 0.039 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
speaker variable: self = 1, other = 0; for story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 87 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Speaker (Telling v. Listening), Story 
(Proud v. Guilty) and Social Anxiety on Percent Time Looking at Other On-Screen 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.280 0.032 178 8.733 <.001 0.217 0.343 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.010 0.045 178 -0.213 0.831 -0.099 0.080 
Speaker 0.354 0.032 234 11.059 <.001 0.291 0.417 
Story 0.031 0.032 234 0.953 0.341 -0.033 0.094 
Social Anxiety 0.002 0.006 178 0.258 0.797 -0.011 0.014 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 0.022 0.045 234 0.479 0.632 -0.068 0.111 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.007 0.045 234 -0.156 0.876 -0.096 0.082 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Social 
Anxiety 
-0.015 0.011 178 -1.422 0.157 -0.036 0.006 
Speaker x Story -0.033 0.045 234 -0.723 0.470 -0.122 0.056 
Speaker x Social Anxiety 0.004 0.006 234 0.556 0.579 -0.009 0.016 
Story x Social Anxiety 0.007 0.006 234 1.071 0.285 -0.006 0.020 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 0.008 0.064 234 0.128 0.898 -0.118 0.134 
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x Story 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Social Anxiety 
0.001 0.011 234 0.130 0.897 -0.019 0.022 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story x 
Social Anxiety 
-0.005 0.011 234 -0.467 0.641 -0.026 0.016 
Speaker x Story x Social Anxiety -0.004 0.009 234 -0.487 0.627 -0.023 0.014 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Speaker 
x Story x Social Anxiety 
0.010 0.015 234 0.685 0.494 -0.019 0.039 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
speaker variable: self = 1, other = 0; for story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 88 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-
Esteem on Self-focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.089 0.451 146 24.614 <.001 10.199 11.980 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.611 0.636 146 -0.961 0.338 -1.869 0.646 
Story -0.286 0.545 78 -0.525 0.601 -1.371 0.799 
Self-Esteem -0.018 0.086 146 -0.216 0.829 -0.188 0.151 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.191 0.770 78 -0.248 0.805 -1.723 1.341 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Self-
Esteem 
0.068 0.115 146 0.592 0.554 -0.160 0.297 
Story x Self-Esteem -0.099 0.104 78 -0.956 0.342 -0.305 0.107 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Self-Esteem 
0.175 0.140 78 1.251 0.215 -0.103 0.453 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 89 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and 
Private Self-Consciousness on Self-focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.045 0.445 146 24.827 <.001 10.166 11.924 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.560 0.630 146 -0.888 0.376 -1.805 0.686 
Story -0.358 0.541 78 -0.663 0.509 -1.435 0.718 
Private Self-Consciousness -0.062 0.115 146 -0.541 0.589 -0.289 0.165 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.121 0.766 78 -0.158 0.875 -1.646 1.404 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.068 0.182 146 -0.376 0.708 -0.428 0.291 
Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.054 0.139 78 0.387 0.700 -0.224 0.332 
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Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.218 0.221 78 -0.987 0.326 -0.659 0.222 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 90 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public 
Self-Consciousness on Self-focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.088 0.444 146 25.000 <.001 10.212 11.965 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.621 0.627 146 -0.990 0.324 -1.861 0.619 
Story -0.372 0.541 78 -0.687 0.494 -1.450 0.706 
Public Self-Consciousness 0.073 0.119 146 0.611 0.542 -0.162 0.307 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.163 0.766 78 -0.212 0.832 -1.688 1.362 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
-0.234 0.185 146 -1.267 0.207 -0.598 0.131 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.041 0.145 78 0.280 0.781 -0.248 0.329 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Public Self-Consciousness 
-0.105 0.225 78 -0.467 0.642 -0.554 0.343 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 91 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social 
Anxiety on Self-focused Pronouns out of Total Words 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 11.083 0.445 146 24.908 <.001 10.204 11.963 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.649 0.629 146 -1.031 0.304 -1.893 0.595 
Story -0.387 0.540 78 -0.716 0.476 -1.462 0.689 
Social Anxiety 0.139 0.090 146 1.548 0.124 -0.039 0.317 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.164 0.764 78 -0.215 0.830 -1.685 1.357 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Social Anxiety 
-0.194 0.146 146 -1.327 0.186 -0.483 0.095 
Story x Social Anxiety -0.059 0.109 78 -0.544 0.588 -0.277 0.158 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Social Anxiety 
0.074 0.177 78 0.417 0.678 -0.279 0.427 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 




Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and 
Private Self-Consciousness on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 213.598 27.932 94 7.647 <.001 158.137 269.058 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 85.359 39.563 94 2.158 0.034 6.803 163.914 
Story -15.541 17.068 78 -0.911 0.365 -49.520 18.438 
Private Self-Consciousness 4.715 7.202 94 0.655 0.514 -9.586 19.015 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-42.296 24.175 78 -1.750 0.084 -90.425 5.833 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
12.016 11.421 94 1.052 0.295 -10.660 34.693 
Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.275 4.401 78 0.063 0.950 -8.486 9.037 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
9.629 6.979 78 1.380 0.172 -4.265 23.522 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 93 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public 
Self-Consciousness on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 212.617 28.911 93 7.354 <.001 155.206 270.027 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 94.328 40.902 93 2.306 0.023 13.105 175.550 
Story -15.542 17.281 78 -0.899 0.371 -49.947 18.862 
Public Self-Consciousness 4.451 7.742 93 0.575 0.567 -10.923 19.824 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-39.118 24.449 78 -1.600 0.114 -87.793 9.557 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
-8.105 12.027 93 -0.674 0.502 -31.987 15.777 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.501 4.628 78 0.108 0.914 -8.712 9.714 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
4.033 7.189 78 0.561 0.576 -10.279 18.345 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 




Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social 
Anxiety on Word Count 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 211.522 28.604 94 7.395 <.001 154.725 268.318 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 95.344 40.454 94 2.357 0.021 15.018 175.671 
Story -15.653 17.305 78 -0.905 0.368 -50.103 18.798 
Social Anxiety -0.746 5.786 94 -0.129 0.898 -12.236 10.743 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-37.786 24.473 78 -1.544 0.127 -86.509 10.937 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Social Anxiety 
-8.256 9.392 94 -0.879 0.382 -26.905 10.393 
Story x Social Anxiety 0.067 3.501 78 0.019 0.985 -6.902 7.036 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Social Anxiety 
-2.075 5.682 78 -0.365 0.716 -13.386 9.237 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 95 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-
Esteem on Self-focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 17.749 0.833 142 21.300 <.001 16.102 19.396 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.244 1.177 142 0.208 0.836 -2.081 2.570 
Story -1.403 0.980 78 -1.432 0.156 -3.354 0.547 
Self-Esteem 0.218 0.158 142 1.377 0.171 -0.095 0.531 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story -0.111 1.383 78 -0.080 0.936 -2.865 2.643 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Self-
Esteem 
0.035 0.214 142 0.164 0.870 -0.387 0.457 
Story x Self-Esteem -0.168 0.186 78 -0.904 0.369 -0.539 0.202 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Self-Esteem 
0.063 0.251 78 0.250 0.804 -0.437 0.562 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 96 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and 
Private Self-Consciousness on Self-focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
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Intercept 17.916 0.817 144 21.925 <.001 16.301 19.531 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 0.030 1.157 144 0.026 0.979 -2.258 2.318 
Story -1.524 0.974 78 -1.565 0.122 -3.463 0.415 
Private Self-Consciousness -0.101 0.211 144 -0.478 0.633 -0.517 0.316 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 0.177 1.380 78 0.128 0.898 -2.570 2.923 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.360 0.334 144 -1.078 0.283 -1.021 0.300 
Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.097 0.251 78 0.388 0.699 -0.402 0.597 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Private Self-Consciousness 
-0.250 0.398 78 -0.627 0.532 -1.043 0.543 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 97 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public 
Self-Consciousness on Self-focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 17.937 0.815 144 22.021 <.001 16.327 19.547 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.053 1.152 144 -0.046 0.963 -2.331 2.224 
Story -1.542 0.971 78 -1.588 0.116 -3.474 0.391 
Public Self-Consciousness -0.094 0.218 144 -0.429 0.669 -0.525 0.338 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 0.106 1.373 78 0.077 0.939 -2.628 2.840 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
-0.488 0.339 144 -1.440 0.152 -1.158 0.182 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
0.103 0.260 78 0.398 0.692 -0.414 0.621 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Public Self-Consciousness 
-0.003 0.404 78 -0.008 0.994 -0.807 0.801 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 98 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social 
Anxiety on Self-focused Pronouns Per Minute 
Parameter Estima
te 
SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 17.967 0.820 143 21.903 <.001 16.346 19.589 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen -0.182 1.160 143 -0.156 0.876 -2.475 2.112 
Story -1.571 0.966 78 -1.626 0.108 -3.495 0.353 
Social Anxiety 0.100 0.166 143 0.601 0.549 -0.228 0.428 
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Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 0.143 1.367 78 0.104 0.917 -2.578 2.864 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Social Anxiety 
-0.529 0.269 143 -1.966 0.051 -1.062 0.003 
Story x Social Anxiety -0.067 0.195 78 -0.343 0.732 -0.456 0.322 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x Story 
x Social Anxiety 
0.258 0.317 78 0.813 0.419 -0.374 0.890 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 99 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Self-
Esteem on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 81.984 10.170 92 8.062 <.001 61.788 102.180 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 22.870 14.360 92 1.593 0.115 -5.648 51.388 
Story -6.792 5.941 78 -1.143 0.256 -18.620 5.035 
Self-Esteem -1.994 1.933 92 -1.031 0.305 -5.834 1.846 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-12.075 8.389 78 -1.439 0.154 -28.776 4.625 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Self-Esteem 
-0.820 2.606 92 -0.315 0.754 -5.996 4.356 
Story x Self-Esteem 1.322 1.129 78 1.171 0.245 -0.927 3.571 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Self-Esteem 
-2.417 1.523 78 -1.587 0.116 -5.448 0.614 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 100 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and 
Private Self-Consciousness on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 80.722 9.805 93 8.233 <.001 61.252 100.191 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 23.539 13.888 93 1.695 0.093 -4.037 51.116 
Story -5.421 5.914 78 -0.917 0.362 -17.195 6.353 
Private Self-Consciousness 1.543 2.528 93 0.610 0.543 -3.477 6.563 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-13.363 8.377 78 -1.595 0.115 -30.039 3.314 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Private Self-Consciousness 
6.198 4.009 93 1.546 0.125 -1.762 14.159 
Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
0.229 1.525 78 0.150 0.881 -2.807 3.265 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 2.045 2.418 78 0.846 0.400 -2.769 6.859 
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Story x Private Self-
Consciousness 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 101 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Public 
Self-Consciousness on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 80.684 10.223 92 7.893 <.001 60.381 100.987 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 26.744 14.463 92 1.849 0.068 -1.980 55.468 
Story -5.522 5.933 78 -0.931 0.355 -17.334 6.290 
Public Self-Consciousness 2.680 2.738 92 0.979 0.330 -2.757 8.116 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-12.541 8.394 78 -1.494 0.139 -29.252 4.170 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Public Self-Consciousness 
-2.089 4.253 92 -0.491 0.624 -10.535 6.357 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
-0.013 1.589 78 -0.008 0.993 -3.176 3.150 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Public Self-
Consciousness 
1.089 2.468 78 0.441 0.660 -3.824 6.003 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
story variable: guilty = 1, proud = 0 
 
Table 102 
Multilevel Model Results of Seeing Oneself On-Screen, Story (Proud v. Embarrassed) and Social 
Anxiety on Story Time Length (seconds) 
Parameter Estimate SE df t Sig. 95% CI 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept 80.070 10.238 92 7.821 <.001 59.736 100.405 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen 27.584 14.480 92 1.905 0.060 -1.175 56.342 
Story -5.530 5.892 78 -0.939 0.351 -17.261 6.200 
Social Anxiety 0.082 2.071 92 0.040 0.969 -4.032 4.195 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story 
-12.145 8.333 78 -1.457 0.149 -28.735 4.445 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Social Anxiety 
-1.121 3.362 92 -0.334 0.739 -7.798 5.555 
Story x Social Anxiety -0.134 1.192 78 -0.113 0.911 -2.507 2.239 
Seeing Oneself On-Screen x 
Story x Social Anxiety 
-1.479 1.935 78 -0.764 0.447 -5.330 2.373 
For seeing oneself on-screen variable: saw self on-screen = 1, did not see self on-screen = 0; for 
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